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I. INTRODUCTION 
There are multiple motivations to undertake a research of U.S. 
corporate fiduciary law, from historical considerations about the role of 
directors to philosophical reflections on “the means and ends of corporate 
governance.”1  From a law and economics perspective, however, there are 
two primary motivations.  
The first is gaining a thorough positive overview of the area of law 
that occupies the center stage of the American corporate governance system.  
Virtually all the ordinary and fundamental aspects of the corporation’s 
existence—such as mergers and acquisitions, transactions in control, 
executive and non-executive compensation policies, industrial strategies, and 
capital structure formation—are directors’ decisions. 2   As such, they 
necessarily involve the application and interpretation of corporate fiduciary 
duties. 3   Viewed through this lens, corporate decisions can in fact be 
described as the equilibrium outcomes of multi-party games whose rules are 
                                                
1  See S. M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Ends and Means of 
CorporateGovernance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2002) (arguing that unfettered directorial 
decision-making is the essential means of efficient corporate governance, while shareholder 
wealth maximization is its ultimate end). 
2 It is important to emphasize that in this work, the term directors refers jointly to 
the individuals who (i) are formally delegated control over the corporation (i.e., directors), 
and (ii) materially exercise control over the corporation (i.e., executive directors or 
managers). 
3 See W. T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS 172 (3d ed. 2009). 
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set by corporate fiduciary law.4   
To make this observation more tangible, consider the impact that 
corporate fiduciary law can have on industrial strategies.  These strategies 
intrinsically involve directors’ decisions that reallocate corporate resources 
among various corporate participants, including capital providers, workers, 
and consumers.  As a result, both the allocative and distributional effects of a 
corporation’s industrial strategy will reflect the applicable regime of 
directors’ fiduciary duties.  For example, production strategies may need to 
subordinate shareholders’ interests to those of employee under a fiduciary 
regime that requires directors to take into account the welfare of labor.5  On 
the contrary, a fiduciary regime that requires directors to maximize 
shareholder wealth may favor a merger transaction that consolidates a 
                                                
4  Legal rules influence the actions of economic actors.  Hence, the knowledge of 
legal rules helps policy-makers to predict social and economic outcomes.  See generally D. 
G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW  (1st. ed. 1994).  
5 Germany offers a concrete example of a country enforcing a similar corporate 
fiduciary duties regime, with board codetermination by the workforce providing the essential 
mechanism to make this enforcement effective. See J.C. Dammann, The Future of 
Codetermination after Centros: Will German Corporate Law Move Closer to the U.S. 
Model? 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN L. 607, 608 (2003) (“… German corporate law is 
designed to serve the interests of employees as well as those of shareholders.”)  Such 
mechanisms, however, are notably absent in the U.S. corporate system. In fact, one of the 
most famous cases in the history of U.S. corporate fiduciary law—Dodge v. Ford Motor 
Co.—explicitly denied the ability of corporate directors to subordinate shareholders’ interests 
to those of employees under circumstances similar to those described in the example 
appearing in text. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).  See also infra 
Part IV.1.2.2. (discussing Dodge v. Ford in detail). 
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corporation’s outstanding debt with the liabilities of a riskier counterparty, 
although this transaction transfers wealth from fixed claimants to 
shareholders.6  The logic behind these decisional patterns can be extended to 
any other fundamental corporate decision.  Hence, the choice of directors’ 
liability regime has crucial policy implications.  
The second motivation for researching U.S. corporate fiduciary law is 
normative.  Indeed, one important lesson has emerged from the 2008-2009 
financial crisis: a capitalistic system driven by profit-seeking shareholders 
and conceived as an unregulated state of nature is not always compatible with 
social welfare maximization.7   Along this line of reasoning, several corporate 
scholars have recently argued that the traditional shareholder-centered 
paradigm of American corporate law—commonly referred to as shareholder 
primacy rule (or norm)8—was partially responsible for the crisis.9  This 
                                                
6 For a discussion of the underpinning economic argument, see infra note 12 and 
accompanying text.   
7 See generally R. A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ’08 AND 
THE DESCENT INTO THE DEPRESSION (2008), J. E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE 
MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 1–57 (2010); P. Krugman, Ideology 
and Economics, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2013, available at 
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/05/ideology-and-economics/?smid=fb-share (last 
visited on Jan. 10, 2013). 
8 As I discuss in detail in Part IV.1, the shareholder primacy rule or norm (or 
shareholder wealth maximization rule or norm) requires directors to run the business 
enterprise exclusively to maximize shareholders’ returns. 
9 See L. STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDER 
FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS AND THE PUBLIC (2012); R. Squire, Shareholder 
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paradigm hinges on the idea that corporations are profit-making entities 
whose interests coincide with the shareholders’ interests. But as the crisis has 
dramatically shown, in highly leveraged corporations (e.g., banks) focusing 
exclusively on shareholder wealth maximization may decrease, rather than 
increase, social welfare.  This is because equity payoffs become asymmetric 
when a corporation has outstanding debt.  As a result, shareholders profit 
from the undertaking of riskier projects at the expense of debtholders and, 
potentially, society as a whole—a problem that is commonly referred to by 
economists as asset substitution.10  Indeed, being shielded by limited liability 
and holding a residual claim on corporate profits,11 shareholders expect to 
reap all the upside potential from riskier projects.  Instead, debtholders, as 
fixed claimants, bear most of the downside losses from such projects.12  
                                                                                                                         
Opportunism in a World of Risky Debt, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1151 (2010); L. A. Bebchuk & 
H. Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247 (2010); S.M. Sepe, Regulating Risk 
and Governance in Banks: A Contractarian Perspective, 62 EMORY L. J. 101 (2012) 
(manuscript on file with Author).  
10 The classic treatment of asset substitution is M. C. Jensen & W. Meckling, Theory 
of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 
305, 334-37 (1976).  Other corporate actions that may illegitimately transfer wealth from 
debtholders to stockholders include the payment of excessively large dividends, the issuance 
of additional debt, and the rejection of projects with a positive net present value when the 
benefits from such projects accrue solely to the debtholders. See C. W. Smith, Jr. & J. B. 
Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117, 
118-119 (1979).  
11 See infra Part IV.1.1.2. (discussing the economics of the shareholders’ position as 
residual claimants) 
12 A simple example can be useful to better understand the implications of this form 
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Perhaps more importantly, as leverage increases, shareholders may even have 
incentives to undertake value-decreasing projects—a more severe form of 
shareholder opportunism, which is referred to as excessive risk taking.13  
Indeed, higher leverage increases the amount of losses that is borne by 
debtholders rather than shareholders.  Hence, excessive risk-taking does not 
just raise distributive concerns, but also allocative concerns. 
                                                                                                                         
of shareholders’ moral hazard. Consider the case of a corporation whose capital structure is 
represented by equity capital, 𝐸 .  The directors can decide to undertake two different 
investments: Investment 1 or Investment 2.  Investment 1 generates revenues 𝑅!  with 
probability 𝑝! and 0 with probability 1 − 𝑝! .  Instead, Investment 2 generates revenues 𝑅! 
with probability 𝑝! and 0 with probability 1 − 𝑝! .  In this example, I make the following 
assumptions: 
(A1)       𝑝! > 𝑝!;  
(A2)       𝑅! < 𝑅!; and  
(A3)       𝑝!𝑅! > 𝑝!𝑅!.  
This means that: (i) Investment 2 is riskier than Investment 1; (ii) in the event of 
success Investment 2 delivers a higher payoff relative to Investment 1; and, finally, (iii) the 
present value of Investment 1 is higher than the present value of Investment 2.   Under this 
binary investment choice, if the corporation is exclusively funded through equity, it is easy to 
see that Investment 1 maximizes shareholder wealth.  Indeed, the undertaking of Investment 
2 would reduce shareholder and corporate value by 𝑝!𝑅! − 𝑝!𝑅!.  However, assume now 
that the capital structure also includes debt, 𝐷.  Under this different capital structure, the 
shareholders’ payoffs change as follows: under Investment 1 they expect to receive 𝑝! 𝑅! − 𝐷 , while under Investment 2 they expect to get 𝑝! 𝑅! − 𝐷 .  Hence, whenever 𝐷 >    !!!!!!!!!!!!!!  , Investment 2 maximizes shareholder value at the expense of debtholder 
value and, potentially, aggregate welfare.   
13 See Sepe, supra note 9, at 115 (providing an example to clarify the distinction 
between asset substitution and excessive risk-taking). 
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This analysis suggests that a corporate fiduciary system that is 
exclusively centered on shareholders’ interests might be “systemically 
biased” in favor of excessive risk-taking, especially in the banking sector.14  
Indeed, in this sector two circumstances tend to exacerbate the inefficiencies 
that may arise from shareholder primacy.  First, banks’ business model rests 
on these organizations’ ability to employ high leverage.15  Second, banks—
especially when they are “too big to fail”—benefit from governmental 
insurance and other forms of public support (i.e., safety nets) in situations of 
financial distress.16  While governmental insurance is unavoidable to prevent 
individual banking crises from disrupting the economic system as a whole,17 
                                                
14 Cf. id., at 106-07, 154-55 (explaining why bank shareholders have profited from 
such a system up to the crisis).  
15 Banks’ ability to use high leverage arises from the special business model they 
employ. Economists refer to this model as asset transformation because banks raise funds by 
issuing highly liquid claims (i.e., demand deposits) that they “transform” (i.e., invest) into 
illiquid assets such as medium- to long-term loans.  See, e.g., Philip Strahan, Liquidity 
Production in 21st Century Banking 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
13798, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1092846. 
 16 In the United States banks benefit from both federal deposit insurance, which 
guarantees qualified bank deposits in the event of bank failure, and several other forms of 
government-funded financial support (including, in the first-place, bailout interventions).  
See generally M. DEWATRIPONT ET AL., BALANCING THE BANKS: GLOBAL LESSONS FROM 
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 3–5 (2010). 
17 As famously noted by Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz, deposit 
insurance “has succeeded in achieving what had been a major objective of banking reform 
for at least a century, namely, the prevention of banking panics.” M. FRIEDMAN & A. J. 
SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1867–1960, at 440 (1963). 
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safety nets exacerbate the excessive risk incentives on the part of bank 
shareholders. 18   As a normative matter, this leads to question whether 
directors of financial corporations should take into account the consequences 
that their investment decisions may displace on the overall welfare before 
implementing those decisions.  
This same kind of analysis can be exported to the real sector.  
Consider, for example, a firm that leaves the community in which it operates 
and relocates elsewhere to reduce the cost of labor.  This decision will benefit 
the shareholders, who will enjoy the private gains arising from corporate 
relocation.  But this increase in shareholder value might come at the expense 
of even higher losses imposed on the local community—for example in terms 
of higher unemployment rates.  From a Pigouvian perspective, in such a case 
the corporation fails to fully internalize the negative externalities produced by 
its relocation decision.19  Again, this raises the normative question of what 
                                                
18 See, e.g., R. S. Demsetz et al., Agency Problems and Risk Taking at Banks 1–2 
(Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Research Paper No. 9709, 1997), available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/research_papers/9709.pdf (discussing the 
special moral hazard problem of bank shareholders).   
19 See generally A. MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 351-354 (1995) 
(providing a general illustration of the problem of externalities). Pigou has provided the basic 
theory of static technological externalities, suggesting that governamental intervention 
through the imposition of taxes and subsidies can correct this market failure. See A.C. PIGOU, 
THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1920).  See also MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra, at 354-56.  The 
other seminal theoretical approach to the problem of externalities is owed to Coase, who 
argued that only efficient property rights reallocation can reduce externalities.  See R. Coase, 
The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 7 (1960).  For some recent contributions, see 
J.M. Buchanan, External Diseconomies, Corrective Taxes and Market Structure, 59 AM. 
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the directors’ conduct should be upon similar circumstances.  Should 
directors take distributional concerns into account?  Or should they do so 
only when this leads to a Pareto improvement in resource allocation20 (i.e., a 
Kaldor-Hicks efficient allocation)?21  
While the U.S. corporate fiduciary system has struggled with similar 
questions for more than two centuries, no definitive answer to such question 
emerges from my research.  Instead, the pendulum of American corporate 
fiduciary law has oscillated around two “ideological” paradigms: the 
contractarian and communitarian theories of the firm.22    
                                                                                                                         
ECON. REV. 174 (1969); P. Diamond, Consumption of Externalities and Imperfect Corrective 
pricing, BELL J. OF ECON. & MAN. 526 (1973).   
20 Pareto efficiency—named for Italian economist and sociologist Vilfredo Pareto— 
is the crucial equilibrium notion that has influenced the development of neoclassical 
economics. Under a Pareto efficient allocation no move can be made that increases the 
welfare of some individuals and makes no one worse off.  This means that an allocation of 
resources in the economy is optimal if there exists no other productively feasible allocation 
which makes all individuals as well-off, and at least one individual strictly better off, than 
they were initially. See generally A. Feldman, Pareto Optimality, 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 811 (1998).  See also generally MAS-COLELL ET AL., 
MICROECONOMIC THEORY 547 (1995). 
21  Kaldor–Hicks efficiency (or Kaldor–Hicks criterion), named for economists 
Nicholas Kaldor and John Hicks, is a measure of economic efficiency that is satisfied when 
an allocation can be made Pareto efficient by redistributing resources from the parties that 
that allocation makes better off to those that it makes worse off.  See generally A. Feldman, 
Kaldor-Hicks Compensation, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 417 (1998).  
22 See infra sources quoted at note 133. 
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For contractarians, economic agents, on the one hand, rationally seek 
to maximize their utility and, on the other, should be free from any external 
constraint in their utilitarian efforts, based on the assumption that capital 
markets will produce efficient outcomes. The political implication of such a 
view is clearly antiregulatory, with the pursuing of any super-individualistic 
interest being seen as an illegitimate, and inefficient, intrusion by the state. 23  
Under the freedom of contract advocated by contractarians, corporate law is 
thus reduced to a menu of default rules from which parties can choose the 
“best private arrangement”. 24  Fiduciary duties, in particular, provide the 
standard “contractual” terms of the shareholder-director relationship in order 
to mitigate the structural contracting problems faced by shareholders as 
                                                
23 The philosophical underpinning of the contractrarian view of the corporation rests 
on the classically liberal separation-argument.  This argument conceives of society as self-
regulating, therefore excluding the need for state intervention in the private sphere.  Put 
differently, under this view there is no need to impose authoritative norms, because such 
norms would naturally emerge as a result of private order agreements. For an insight on 
liberal political theory see J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); J. Rawls, A Kantian 
Constructivism in Moral Theory, J. PHIL. 515 (1980); J. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political 
not Metaphisical, 14 PHIL. & PUBBL. AFFAIRS (1985); R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS 
SERIOUSLY (1977); R. Dworkin, Liberalism, IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY (1978). 
24 “Default rules” identify rules that govern in the absence of contrary agreement, 
i.e. rules that the parties can contract around.  Conversely, “mandatory rules” (or “immutable 
rules”, or “iron rules”) describes the set of rules that parties cannot change by private 
agreement, i.e., rules that govern even if the parties attempt to contract around them. For 
example, rules awarding expectation damages are default rules because parties can stipulate 
alternative damage amounts. Instead, the duty of good faith is a mandatory rule that must be 
respected in all kinds of contracts. See I. Ayres, Default Rules for Incomplete Contracts, in 1 
THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 585 (1998). 
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residual claimants.  Put another way, fiduciary duties are supported in 
equilibrium as an exclusive contract to protect shareholder value.  
For communitarians, instead, corporations are social institutions tied 
to all their components—including shareholders, debtholders, managers, 
employees, and even local communities—by means of “trust”.25  Hence, 
communitarians challenge the contractarian view of the corporation as a 
contractual structure in which parties can freely and efficiently bargain for 
their interests.  For them, the contract is a limited instrument to govern 
multiple bilateral arrangements and the reciprocal externalities that such 
arrangements may generate. 26   Accordingly, corporate law should not 
exclusively focus on shareholders’ interests, but take into account the 
interests of all corporate participants.  Operationally, this view translates into 
a call for a multi-fiduciary model of corporate relationships, in which 
directors’ fiduciary obligations are owed to all corporate participants.27  
Both these arguments present a strong ideological characterization.  
Contractarians adopt an efficiency argument to justify the shareholder 
                                                
25 See infra sources quoted at note 162. 
26 The contracting part of the Coase Theorem states that parties will find it efficient 
to contract around externalities in order to reach a Pareto improvement.  See Coase, supra 
note 19.  Communitarians, however, argue that coordination costs and, most importantly, 
bargaining disparities may hinder efficient coasean bargaining.  See infra Part III.2.  See also 
MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 19, at 364 (for an analytical treatment of multilateral 
externalities). 
27 See infra Part IV.2. (discussing the multi-fiduciary or entity model of directors’ 
fiduciary duties). 
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primacy rule, assuming that other corporate constituencies can contractually 
internalize the potential externalities that such a rule may engender.  This 
assumption makes perfect sense under the frictionless Walrasian general 
equilibrium framework. 28   But in a world of imperfect markets and 
transaction costs, the contract may be an inadequate instrument to make the 
shareholder primacy rule compatible with the social optimum.29  On the other 
hand, the communitarian view suffers from paternalism and, at least in some 
variants, confuses egalitarianism with efficiency. 30   But even the more 
economically oriented among communitarians are strongly ideological.31  
These scholars assume that because directors have more and better 
information on corporate actions, they are in the best position to balance 
conflicting interests so to achieve Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.  However, this 
view fails to consider that giving directors unfettered discretion over 
corporate decisions may produce ex-ante uncertainty and, therefore, results in 
increased costs of capital.  
In the ensuing discussion I will explain that the evolution and 
                                                
28 See generally MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 19, at 519. 
29 Consider, for example, non-voluntary creditors (i.e., tort creditors).  In this case, 
the contract is not just an inadequate instrument, but an unavailable instrument.  The need for 
alternative solutions to those proposed by contractarians is self-evident upon these 
circumstances.  See infra note 416 and accompanying text. 
30 See infra Part IV.2.1 (discussing the egalitarian variant of the entity model of 
directors’ fiduciary duties) 
31 See infra Part IV.2.2 (discussing the economically grounded variant of the 
communitarian theory of directors’ fiduciary duties) 
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application of modern corporate fiduciary rules has reflected the unending 
tension between contractarians and communitarians. 32   This tension, 
however, has been unable to produce a normative theory of corporate 
fiduciary duties that is analytically justified, while being freed from 
ideological instances.  A primary reason for this failure is that such a theory 
does not exist, at least from a first-best perspective.  Indeed, it is 
technologically unfeasible to devise a universal rule for administering 
fiduciary duties that is both ex-ante and ex-post efficient.  This does not 
exclude, however, the possibility of theorizing and implementing second-best 
strategies.  To this end, I suggest that courts should take the lead and identify 
state-contingent fiduciary rules.   It is important to emphasize that to some 
extent this already occurs.  Indeed, both academics and courts acknowledge 
                                                
32 To some extent, the roots of this tension can be traced backed to the debate—later 
dubbed as the “Great Debate”—which developed in the 1930s between Columbia Professor 
Adolph Dodd and Harvard Professor Merrick Berle.  Cf. W.T. Allen et al., The Great 
Takeover Debate: A Meditation on Bridging the Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067 
(2002).  Professor Berle was the coauthor of a masterpiece of American corporate law 
scholarship, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, which was the first study to 
expose the modern corporation with dispersed shareholders and centralized management.  
See A.A. BERLE & G.C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY  
(1932).  For Berle, corporations only existed to generate profits for shareholders.  Therefore, 
"all powers granted to a corporation or to the management of a corporation, or to any group 
within the corporation . . . [are] at all times exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the 
shareholders as their interest appears. ".  See A.A. Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in 
Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (1931).  Professor Dodd fiercely disagreed.  For him, 
the purpose of corporations was to serve broad "social" purposes, including securing jobs for 
employees and producing quality products for consumers.  See E. M. Dodd, For Whom Are 
Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1145-46, 1153-54 (1932).  
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that directors owe creditors fiduciary duties upon the occurrence of 
insolvency.33  The much-celebrated 1991 decision of Chancellor Allen in 
Credit Lyonnais Bank Netherland v. Pathe Communications Corp. (“Credit 
Lyonnais”) moved further along this direction,34 suggesting that fiduciary 
duties may in fact shift to creditors “in the vicinity of insolvency”.35   In spite 
of the lack of precision of “the vicinity of insolvency” trigger,36 the idea that 
special circumstances may command special fiduciary rules deserves 
appreciation.   
Forging ahead in this direction, I suggest that courts should generalize 
this approach by identifying corporate contexts in which negative 
externalities are more likely to arise—such as, for example, banks, highly 
leveraged corporations, or quasi-insolvent corporations.  They should then 
prescribe specific fiduciary conducts for such contexts. In practice, this 
would require establishing whether directors should act as fiduciaries of 
shareholders, creditors or any other constituency. It is obvious that the 
question of how this proposal should be implemented is complex and open-
                                                
33 However, it is important to remark that whether directors’ fiduciary duties are 
exclusively owed to creditors or also to shareholders upon insolvency is an open issue.  See 
infra text accompanying notes 381-88. 
34 Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., CIV. A. 
No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991), reprinted in 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
1099  (1991). 
35 See id., at 1155.  
36 See infra text accompanying notes 419-23 (discussing criticisms of the “vicinity 
insolvency” trigger). 
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ended.  What is the optimal set of special corporate contexts courts should 
focus on? How should courts select one context over another? These are only 
two of the additional questions that need to be addressed under my proposal.  
It is important to emphasize, however, that experience would help to answer 
these questions. Over time, courts would gain statistical insights on fiduciary 
schemes that have proven successful and be able to amend those that have 
not, promoting more efficient corporate relationships.   
This research proceeds as follows. In Part II, I will discuss the 
positive conceptualization of directors’ fundamental fiduciary obligations of 
care and loyalty, as elaborated by U.S. courts from the early nineteenth 
century to modern times. As I will illustrate, the traditional approach of U.S 
courts has focused almost exclusively on the vertical dimension of the 
conflicts that corporate fiduciary duties are designed to solve: the conflict 
between directors and shareholders.37  Economically, this approach views the 
                                                
37 Corporate conflicts also involve a horizontal dimension, which takes places 
between shareholders and other corporate participants. In its most recent articulation, the 
distinction between vertical and horizontal corporate conflicts is developed within the 
principal-agent framework that is classical of contractarian analysis.  See, e.g., S. Sepe, 
Corporate Agency Problems and Dequity Contracts, 36 J. Corp. L. 113, 116, 129-33 (2010); 
R. P. Bartlett, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and the False Dichotomy of the Corporation, 
54 UCLA L. REV. 37, 42, 61-63 (2006) (making this distinction within the venture capital 
context). It is worth emphasizing, however, that this distinction was originally introduced in 
corporate law scholarship by communitarians, who were the first to highlight that the 
shareholder-directors problem was not the only conflict of interest that mattered for 
corporate life.  See, e.g., L.E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for 
Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579 (1992).   
Tesi di dottorato di Saura Masconale discussa presso l’Università LUISS Guido Carli. Soggetta a copyright. 
Sono comunque fatti salvi i diritti dell’Università LUISS Guido Carli di riproduzione per scopi di ricerca e 
didattici, con citazione della fonte. 
 
19 
 
directors as agents and the shareholders as principals.38  Within this analytical 
framework, conflicts may arise because the outcome of the relationship 
depends on unobservable actions of the agent, 39  who may exploit this 
informational asymmetry to pursue her own interest rather than the 
principal’s best interest.40   
In this light, the requirement that directors act with care (i.e., 
accuracy, diligence, and expertise) in taking business decisions can be 
described as the “first line of protection” the law grants to shareholders as 
firm owners.41  In the same vein, the duty to inform42—conceived as a 
corollary of the duty of care—provides the essential legal remedy against the 
informational asymmetry problems that affect the relationship between 
shareholders and directors.  Further, the duty of control43—the other corollary 
of the duty of care—is conceived as the coordination mechanism of the 
                                                
38 The seminal contribution on the agency theory of the firm is owed to Michael 
Jensen and William Meckling.  See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 10, at 305.  For a 
definitive exposition of the agency cost theory in corporate legal scholarship, see F.H. 
EASTERBROOK & D.  FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991); J. 
Armour et al., Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE 
LAW 35, 36 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2009). 
39 For simplicity, I have excluded in the discussion in the text the randomness 
component affecting the agent’s conduct.  See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 10, at 335.  
40 See id., at 308.  
41 See infra Part II.1. 
42 See infra Part II.1.1.  
43 See infra Part II.1.2. 
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relationship between executive directors, who have delegated authority over 
the business enterprise, and non-executive directors, who supervise the use of 
that authority as internal monitors. 
The core fiduciary duty, however, is the duty of loyalty, which—
unlike the duty of care—cannot be contractually limited or eliminated.44  As 
traditionally conceived, the duty of loyalty includes both a positive guidepost 
for directors’ conduct and a negative obligation.45  According to conventional 
wisdom, the positive mandate of the duty requires directors to maximize 
shareholder value.  The negative mandate, instead, requires them to refrain 
from self-interested conduct—including self-dealing, conflicting transactions, 
misappropriation or waste of corporate assets, and excessive compensation.46   
It is self-evident that under this formulation of the duty of loyalty, there is 
little, if any, room for the consideration of the horizontal conflicts that may 
arise between shareholders and other stakeholders—including creditors, 
workers, and consumers.47  Overlooking this additional order of conflicts, the 
traditional judicial approach to corporate fiduciary duties grants 
shareholders—through the positive requirement of the duty of loyalty—a 
primacy over other corporate constituencies.  Economically, we can say that 
                                                
44 Most U.S. states permit corporations to eliminate, or at least limit, the personal 
liability of directors for failing to act with due care through explicit provisions in the act of 
incorporation.  See infra note 94 and accompanying text.  
45 Cf. Sepe, supra note 37, at 165 (making a similar distinction). 
46 See infra sources quoted at notes 103-109.  
47 See supra note 37.  
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shareholders enjoy a monopoly power over directors’ decisions.  Within this 
approach, other corporate constituencies become—both economically and 
legally—“third parties” whose protection is relegated to the realm of contract. 
In Part III, I will contextualize corporate fiduciary duty rules within 
the framework of the “ideological” debate between contractarians and 
communitarians.  For the reasons explained above, 48  I maintain that 
understanding the radical differences between these two theories of the 
corporation is of fundamental importance for a full comprehension of the 
evolution of modern corporate fiduciary law and what I term the ideological 
dimension of corporate fiduciary duties.  
In Part IV, I will then approach the problem of horizontal corporate 
conflicts, attempting to understand whether there exists an efficient theory of 
the beneficiary of directors’ fiduciary duties in contexts of conflict of 
interests among corporate participants.  To this end, I will critically discuss 
the three major law and economics models that have attempted to answer this 
question: (i) the contractarian-oriented shareholder primacy model, (ii) the 
communitarian-oriented entity model, and (iii) the more recent team 
production model. 49  What emerges from my research is that each of these 
                                                
48 See supra text accompanying notes 28-31. 
49 Vanderbilt Professor Margaret Blair and Cornell Professor Lynn Stout articulated 
the “team production theory” (TPT) of corporate law in an influential article they published 
on the Virginia Law Review in 1999.  See M.M. Blair & L.A. Stout, A Team Production 
Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999).  While Blair and Stout’s TPT clearly 
echoes a communitarian view of the corporation (in its economically-oriented variant), I 
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models is more ideology-driven than economically founded.  Similarly, the 
judicial elaboration of corporate fiduciary duties has failed to establish 
general and coherent principles to solve the problem of horizontal corporate 
conflicts.  U.S. courts have traditionally embraced a view of the corporation 
as a profit oriented entity—in accordance with the shareholder primacy 
model. 50   More recent judicial decisions, however, have advocated a 
conceptualization of the corporate enterprise as an individual entity separated 
from its shareholders—more in line with the entity model.51  The result is that 
a clear judicial paradigm of the horizontal dimension of the duty of loyalty 
has yet to be elaborated. Instead, law and economics theories and legal 
doctrines alike reflect more a political view than an analytical approach to 
corporate fiduciary law.  
                                                                                                                         
prefer to discuss this model as standing on its own.  This is because the TPT has had much 
larger influence on subsequent corporate law scholarship than any other communitarian 
proposal.  Among the articles that have directly or indirectly discussed this theory of the 
corporations, see, e.g., J.C. Coates IV, Team Production in Business Organizations: 
Measuring the Domain of Mediating Hierarchy: How Contestable are U.S. Public 
Corporations?, 24 J. CORP. L. 837 (1999); G.S. Crespi, Redefining the Fiduciary Duties of 
Corporate Directors in Accordance with the Team Production Model of Corporate 
Governance, 36 CREIGHTON L. REV. 623 (2003); D. Millon, New Game Plan or Business as 
Usual? A Critique of the Team Production Model of Corporate Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1001 
(2000); H. Hansmann & R. Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 
439 (2001); P. Kostant, Team Production and the Progressive Corporate Law Agenda, 35 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 667 (2002); A.J. Meese, The Team Production Theory of Corporate 
Law: A Critical Assessment, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1629 (2002). 
50 See sources cited infra at Part IV.1.2. 
51 See sources cited infra at notes IV.2.2.  
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In Part V, I will discuss the most significant variant to the shareholder 
primacy model that has been endorsed by U.S. courts: the extension of 
directors’ fiduciary duties to creditors. I will illustrate the economic and legal 
arguments underpinning this variant and contextualize these arguments 
within the general frameworks provided by the trust fund doctrine52 and 
Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.53  These legal frameworks share the 
common feature of restricting fiduciary duties to creditors to one specific 
contingency: the occurrence of insolvency.  Insights from modern finance 
theory, however, suggest that framing the creditor variant of corporate 
fiduciary law as an insolvency-based exception to shareholder primacy is 
undesirable.  This is because the excessive risk-taking problem that justifies 
the attribution of fiduciary duties to creditors upon insolvency might 
materialize at an earlier stage of the corporate existence, as long as a 
corporation is highly leveraged.54  Chancellor Allen’s decision in Credit 
Lyonnais provides a fruitful illustration of this argument.55  
                                                
52 Under the trust fund doctrine developed in early American corporate law the 
assets of a corporation facing dissolution are held in trust to the benefit of the company’s 
creditors.  See infra Part V.1.   
53  Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, which was introduced by the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, regulates reorganization procedures of insolvent 
corporations.  In contrast, Chapter 7 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code regulates liquidation 
procedures.  See infra Part V.2. 
54 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
55 See Credit Lyonnais, supra note 34. 
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Finally, in Part VI I will conclude supporting the view that a 
corporate fiduciary paradigm centered on shareholder primacy may prove ex-
post inefficient to maximize social welfare.  At the same time, multi-
fiduciary models are unpractical to administer and create ex-ante uncertainty.  
Future research should move beyond both these paradigms and focus on 
identifying analytical parameters of directors’ conduct that can efficiently 
address both horizontal and vertical corporate conflicts.  My suggestion that 
courts should devise state-contingent fiduciary rules is a first attempt to move 
toward this direction. 
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II.  THE ORIGINAL CONCEPTUALIZATION 
Historically, fiduciary law finds its origins in the concept of trust.  
This concept developed in the English courts of equity to protect a party (the 
“entrustor”) from the abuses of confidence vested on another (the 
“fiduciary”).56  The general principle applied by equity courts was that “if a 
confidence is reposed, and that confidence is abused, a court of equity shall 
give relief."57  From this early origin, the progressive evolution of fiduciary 
law into its modern formulation has occurred “through a jurisprudence of 
analogy rather than principle”.58  By its very nature, fiduciary law is, indeed, 
                                                
56 The concept of equity is characteristic of English law and identifies those judicial 
decisions that are based on broad principles of common sense, rather than strict rules of law.  
See generally L.S. Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, 1962 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69 (1962).  On the 
historical contest in which fiduciary law developed, see also D.A. DeMott, Beyond 
Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 37 DUKE L.J. 879, 880 (1988); T. FRANKEL, 
FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES TODAY, IN EQUITY, FIDUCIARIES AND 
TRUSTS (1993); R. Cooter & B.J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic 
Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1045, 1045 (1991).  For some early 
cases encompassing an equity concept of fiduciaries duties, see Bishop of Woodhouse v. 
Meredith, 1 Jac. & W. 204, 213 (1820) (describing English roots of fiduciary duties); 
Winchester v. Knight, 1 P. Wms. 406, 407 (1717) (same). 
57 Sealy, supra note 56, at 69-70 (quoting Lord Thurlow in Gartside v. Isherwood, 1 
Bro. C.C. 558, 560, (1788), referring to Filmer v. Gott. 4 Bro. P.C. 230 (1742)).  
58 D.A. De Mott, supra note 56, at 881-882.  In facing fiduciary law decisions, 
judges first identify paradigmatic cases in which fiduciary obligations apply and then 
compare the relationship involved in the litigation with the paradigmatic case.  Only if the 
second relationship can be assimilated to the first, the judge will grant an extension of the 
fiduciary obligation to that relationship.  See id. 
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situation-specific: different kinds of fiduciary relationships can be 
comparable among themselves, but never a true copy of one another.  It is 
thus unsurprising that modern fiduciary law is applicable to a wide range of 
relationships among different parties, including principals and agents, trustors 
and trustees, partners, directors and officers, executors and administrators, 
bailors and bailees, and wards and guardians.  Indisputably, however, the 
corporate relationship between directors and shareholders has occupied the 
center stage of American fiduciary law since as early as the nineteenth 
century.59 
The traditional common law elaboration of the relationship between 
directors and the corporation reconceptualizes directors as corporate 
fiduciaries entrusted with the exercise of powers and discretion in the best 
interest of the corporation.60  Similarly to the trustee’s duty to constrain her 
                                                
59 See id., at 880. See also L.E. Mitchell, Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law, 43 
DUKE L. J. 425 (1993); R.B. Campbell, Jr., Corporate Fiduciary Principles for the Post-
Contractarian Era, 23 FLA ST. U. L. REV. 561, 563-64 (1996). 
60 The first reference to the existence of a trust relationship between shareholders 
and directors occurs in the 1807 case of Gray v. Portland Bank: “[an incorporation is] a trust 
created with certain limitations and authorities, in which the corporation is the trustee for the 
management of the property, and each stockholder a cestui que trust according to his interest 
and shares". Gray v. Portland Bank (3 Mass. (1 Tyng), at 364 (1807).  For cases in the same 
line, see Tippetts v. Walker, 4 Mass. (1 Tyng) 595, 596  (1808); Riddle v.  Mandeville, 9 
U.S. (5 Cranch) 322 (1809); Russel v. Clark’s Ex’rs, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 69 (1812); Long v. 
Majestre, 1 Johns. Ch. 305 (1814); Moses v. Murgatroyd, 1 Johns. Ch. 119 (1814); Shepherd 
v. McEvers, 4 Johns. Ch. 136 (1819); Dexter v. Stewart, 7 Johns. Ch. 52 (1823); Koehler v. 
Black River Falls Iron Co., 67 U.S. (2 Black) 715 (1862); Jackson v. Ludeling, 88 U.S. (21 
Wall.) 616, 624 (1874); Coons & Braine v. Tome, 9 F. 532, 534 (W.D. Pa. 1881).   
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interest to the trustor’s benefit, the law requires directors to act in the 
exclusive interest of the corporation.61  As operationalized by courts, this 
mandate requires directors to refrain from undertaking corporate strategies 
that are in conflict with corporate interests or abusing their control position to 
capture personal benefits.62  But while these aspects of directors’ fiduciary 
obligations are well-settled law, the interpretation of what it means exactly 
that directors must act in the exclusive “benefit of the corporate entity” 
remains an unsolved puzzle of the corporate law debate.63  Because the 
corporate entity is a legal fiction, at its core this debate gravitates around the 
identification of the beneficiaries of corporate fiduciary obligations. 
In this research, I will discuss the most important scholarly theories 
and legal doctrines that have attempted to solve “the fiduciary puzzle” and 
analyze the legal and economic consequences of each of these theories and 
doctrines.  In order to develop this analysis, I start in this Part with the 
examination of the content of directors’ basic fiduciary obligations of care 
and loyalty,64 as developed by American courts and statutory legislation from 
                                                
61 See T. Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REV. 1209, 1210-
1211 (1995) (drawing a parallel between fiduciary law and corporate fiduciary law).   
62 See infra notes 103-09 and accompanying text.  
63 See infra Part IV. 
64 It is worth noting, however, that purists of fiduciary law tend to exclude the duty 
of care from the world of fiduciary obligations: 
That duty [of care], however, is not distinctively fiduciary; many persons, by virtue 
of the law or their own contractual undertakings, owe duties of care to other persons 
with whom they have nonfiduciary relationships.  For example, motorists owe 
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the early nineteenth century to modern times.  
1.         The Duty of Care 
The duty of care requires directors to conduct the corporation’s affairs 
exerting the same degree of care that an ordinarily prudent person would 
exercise under similar circumstances. 65   However, while in its early 
                                                                                                                         
duties of care to pedestrians and to fellow motorists but are not, by virtue of these 
relationships, under any fiduciary constraint in their pursuit of self-interest! 
DeMott, supra note 56, at 915.  
65  The earliest definitions of the duty of care focused on the concept of care 
required to avoid gross negligence.  See, e.g., Godbold v. Branch Bank at Mobile, 11 Ala. 
191, 200 (1847); Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. 11, 24 (1872); Williams v. Fidelity Loan & 
Savings Co., 142 Va. 43, 67, 128 S.E. 615, 623 (1925); Nechis v. Gramatan Gardens, 35 
Misc. 2d 949, 951, 231 N.Y.S.2d 383,385 (Sup. Ct. 1962)).  See also M. Bradley & C.A. 
Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of Care Standard in Corporate Governance, 75 IOWA L. 
REV. 1, 17 (1989); Special Project Note, An Historical Perspective on the Duty of Care, the 
Duty of Loyalty and the Business Judgment Rule, 40 VAND. L. REV. 605, 607 (1987).  Some 
courts have specified the standard of the “ordinarily prudent persons acting under similar 
circumstances” by adding the prong “in the conduct of their own affairs”.  See, e.g., Briggs v. 
Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 152 (1891); Burkhart v. Smith, 161 Md. 398, 403, 157 A. 299, 301 
(1931); Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65, 71 (1880); Selheimer v. Manganese Corp. of Am., 423 Pa. 
563, 574, 224 A.2d 634, 640-41 (1966); Hodges v. New England Screw Co., 1 R.I. 312, 348 
(1850).  This formulation is also the one endorsed by most American states that have 
codified the duty of care.  See ALA. CODE § 10-2A-74 (1987); CAL. CORP. CODE § 309 
(Deering 1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-5-101 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313 
(West 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.111 (West 1977 & Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-
2-830 (1989); HAW. REV. STAT. § 415-35 (1988 & Supp. 1989); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-35 
(1980); IND. CODE ANN. §  23-1-35 (Burns Supp. 1989); IOWA CODE ANN. §  496A.34 (West 
Supp. 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6305 (Supp. 1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12.91 (West 
1969); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, § 716 (Supp. 1988);  MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. 
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formulation the benchmark of diligent directorial conduct was literally that of 
the “ordinarily prudent and diligent man”,66 over time this benchmark has 
evolved into a more articulated requirement encompassing two specific 
obligations: (i) the duty of being informed and (ii) the duty of control.  
1.1.      The Duty of Being Informed  
One aspect of the duty of care that is recognized as fulfilling the 
modern standard of the ordinarily prudent man is the duty of being informed, 
which requires directors, prior to taking any business decision, to inform 
                                                                                                                         
§ 2-405.1 (1985 & Supp. 1989); MASS. ANN. LAWS CH. 156B, § 65 (Law. Co-op. 1988); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1541 (West 1973 & Supp. 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. § § 
302A.251, 302A.361 (West 1985); MISS. CODE ANN. § §  79-4-8.30, 79-4-8.42 (1988); 
MONT. CODE ANN. §  35-1-401(2) (1989); NEB. REV. STAT. §  21-2035 (Supp. 1987); NEV. 
REV. STAT. § 78.751 (1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:35 (1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
14A:6-14 (West Supp. 1989); N.M. Stat. Ann. §  53-11-35(B) (Supp. 1989); N.Y. BUS. 
CORP. LAW §§ 715, 717 (Mckinney 1986 & Supp. 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-35 (1988); 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-50 (1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59 (Anderson Supp. 
1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1031 (West Supp. 1988); OR.  REV. STAT. §  60.357 
(1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS §  7-1.1-33 (Supp. 1989); S.C. CODE ANN. §  33-13-150 (Law. Co-
op. 1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-18-301 (1988); TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 2.41 
(VERNON 1980 & SUPP. 1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 (1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 23A.08.343 (Supp. 1989); WYO. STAT. § 17-1-133 (1977).  See also REVISED MODEL 
BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.30 (1985).  Finally, this is the formulation the American Law 
Institute's (ALI) adopts in its Principles of Corporate Governance. See ALI Principles of 
Corporate Governance and Structure: Analysis and Recommendations, Tent. Draft No. 4, 
1985. 
66 Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. (n.s.) 68 (La. 1829) is the first case that elaborated 
the standard of the “man of common sense, and ordinary attention”.   
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themselves of any material information that is reasonably available.67  As to 
the operational aspects of the duty to be informed, courts and commentators 
have focused on (i) the awareness of potential problems affecting the 
corporate enterprise, 68 and (ii) the adoption of careful decisions-making 
process sustained by scrupulous information-gathering activity.69  Based on 
this operationalization of the duty, in Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 
Consol, 70 the Supreme Court of Delaware found corporate directors liable for 
                                                
67 See, e.g., Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125,130 (Del. 1963); 
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (1984); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A. 2d, 872 (Del. 
1985.  For an academic discussion of the duty to be informed, see Bradley & Schipani, supra 
note 65, at 18-19; E. L. FOLK, III ET AL. FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION 
LAW: A COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS § 141.2.1.1 (3D ED. 1992); J.C. Lipson, Directors’ 
Duties to Creditors: Power Imbalance and the Financially Distressed Corporation, 50 
UCLA L. REV. 1189, 1199 (2003).  
68 See Bradley & Schipani, supra note 65, at 19; S.R. Cohn, Demise of the 
Director's Duty of Care:  Judicial Avoidance of Standards and Sanctions Through the 
Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEX. L. REV. 591, 613 (1983); Special Project Note, supra note 
65, at 611. 
69 As discussed in more detailed infra, Smith v. Van Gorkom provides the classical 
elaboration of this prong of the directors’ duty to be informed: 
A director's duty to inform himself in preparation for a decision derives from the 
fiduciary capacity in which he serves the corporation and its stockholders. (…) But 
fulfillment of the fiduciary function requires more than the mere absence of bad 
faith or fraud.  Representation of the financial interests of others imposes on a 
director an affirmative duty to protect those interests and to proceed with a critical 
eye in assessing information …”.  
Smith v. Van Gorkom, supra note 67, at 871-872.  
70 See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993).  The case 
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breach of the duty of care for taking the uninformed decision of selling the 
company at a too low per-share sale price.71  This decision provides a clear 
example of the evolution of the duty of being informed from early American 
corporate law, when directors could “undertake the management of a rubber 
company in complete ignorance of everything connected with rubber without 
incurring any responsibility for the mistakes which may result from such 
ignorance.”72 
 But the most significant decision on the evolution of the directors’ 
duty to make informed decisions is Smith v. Van Gorkom (also known as the 
Trans Union case)73—a merger context case in which the Supreme Court of 
                                                                                                                         
concerned a civil suit brought against the directors of a company by one of its shareholders 
in the context of a second-stage merger. 
71 The court’s statement in Cede v. Technicolor about the duty to be informed reads 
as follows:  
A director's duty of care requires a director to take an active and direct role in the 
context of a sale of a company from beginning to end. … A trial court will not find 
a board to have breached its duty of care unless the directors individually and the 
board collectively have failed to inform themselves fully and in a deliberate manner 
before voting as a board upon a transaction as significant as a proposed merger or 
sale of the company. 
Id. at 366-368.  
72 See L. Herzel & L. Katz, Smith v. Van Gorkom: The Business of Judging 
Business Judgment, 41 BUS. LAW. 1187, 1188 (1986) (quoting In re Brazilian Rubber 
Plantations & Estates, Ltd., 1 Ch. 425, 427 (1911)). 
73 Smith v. Van Gorkom, supra note 67. For an exhaustive discussion, see, e.g., R.F. 
Balotti & M.J. Gentile, Elimination or Limitation of Director Liability for Delaware 
Corporations, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 5, 15 (1987). 
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Delaware held the company’s directors liable for negligent appreciation of 
the information at their disposal.  The indexes of negligence identified by the 
court distinguish the case as a path breaking decision.  Indeed, the court 
found “the business acumen of the members of the board of Trans Union 
[and] the substantial premium over market offered by the [bidder]“ 74 
irrelevant as compared to the directors’ carelessness and rashness in 
approving the transaction.  The company’s chairman had exclusively 
negotiated the deal without preliminary informing or consulting the rest of 
the board.  The board had approved the merger within only two hours.  
Further, the transaction had been executed during a meeting of the Chicago 
Lyric Opera, without any prior reading of the agreement on the part of the 
company’s directors.75  Thus, the Court focused on the board’s decision-
                                                
74 Individuals with impeccable credentials formed the board of directors.  The five 
outside directors were a former dean of the University of Chicago Business School and 
chancellor of the University of Rochester, and CEOs of various other big corporations.  
Moreover, every Trans Union shareholder was paid $55 per share, a premium of 
approximately $20 over market price. Further, the merger agreement signed by the Trans 
Union directors on October 10, 1985 was not legally binding until the next January 26, 1985 
and provided that if a higher offer was made within that date Trans Union was contractually 
free to accept it.  See Smith v. Van Gorkom, supra note 67, at 864-870.  Based on these facts, 
the Delaware Chancery Court had indeed rejected any liability on the part of the company’s 
directors in the first grade of the civil process. Id., at 871.  
75 Among the other elements considered by the Court to declare the negligence of 
the Trans Union directors, there are the following facts.  First, Van Gorkom imposed the 
decision on the other directors as a must.  Second, the board’s approval of the merger was 
given relying solely upon Van Gorkom's 20-minute oral presentation and without any written 
summary of the merger’s terms or other supporting documentation.  Third, the board did not 
contact any financial consultants to obtain technical advice on the fairness of the per-share 
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making process rather than the final outcome of the decision, holding the 
directors’ conduct inconsistent with the standards imposed by the duty of 
care as duty of being informed.  As it will be discussed below, this decision 
shocked the corporate world, attracting much criticism for having imposed an 
intolerable burden on boards of directors.76 
In addition to the importance of procedural matters, Smith v. Van 
Gorkom also highlighted another aspect of the fiduciary duty of acting in an 
informed manner: the right of directors to rely on information provided by 
others. 77  This right is a direct consequence of the directors’ discretion to 
                                                                                                                         
price offer.  See id. 
76 On the consequences of the Trans Union decision, see infra Part II.1.3. For a 
critical appraisal of the decision, see D.R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the 
Trans Union Case, 40 BUS. LAW. 1437, 1455 (1985) (describing it as "one of the worst 
decisions in the history of corporate law"); W.J. Carney, The Ali's Corporate Governance 
Project:  The Death Of Property Rights?, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 898 (1993) (“[C]ourts 
seem to have ignored the fact that the question of how much information to assemble before 
making a choice is itself a business decision”); B. Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips 
on Life in the Boardroom After Van Gorkom, 41 BUS. LAW. 1 (1985) (“The dissent in Van 
Gorkom was vigorous. The corporate bar generally views the decision as atrocious. 
Commentators predict dire consequences as directors come to realize how exposed they have 
become.”) 
77 The ruling in Smith v. Van Gorkom highlights that under section § 141 (e) of the 
Delaware Code, "directors are fully protected in relying in good faith on reports made by 
officers." See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e).  It is worth emphasizing that the term "report" 
has traditionally been traditionally interpreted in an extensive manner, as to include also 
reports of informal personal investigation by corporate officers. See Cheff v. Mathes, Del. 
Supr., 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548, 556 (1964).  However, in the particular circumstances 
of the Trans Union case, the Supreme Court of Delaware refused to classify the oral 
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delegate their discretionary power to other corporate parties.78  Statutory 
provisions and case law are consistent in excluding the need for directors to 
personally investigate every issue taken to their attention.  But after the Trans 
Union case, directors are required to act in good faith in delegating their 
authority to others, that is, take direct action if they have any reasonable 
doubts on the information provided.  
 1.2. The Duty of Control 
The second set of obligations implied by the test of the ordinarily 
prudent man concerns the careful oversight of corporate management.  
According to the Business Law Section of the American Bar Association, 
"[a] director's duty of care relates to the director's responsibility to exercise 
appropriate diligence in making decisions and taking other actions, as well as 
in overseeing management of the corporation."79  However, it is important to 
emphasize that directors are not required to exercise “the utmost diligence” in 
                                                                                                                         
presentation of the merger agreement made by Van Gorkom as a “report”.  The reason for 
this was that the court held the Trans Union chairman uninformed himself.  See Smith v. Van 
Gorkom, supra note 67, at 873.  On the right of directors to rely on reports of other corporate 
officers, see also Michelson v. Duncan, Del. Ch., 386 A.2d 1144, 1156 (1978); aff'd in part 
and rev'd in part on other grounds, Del. Supr., 407 A.2d 211 (1979); Graham v. Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co., Del. Supr., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 188 A.2d 125, 130 (1963); Prince v. 
Bensinger, Del. Ch., 244 A.2d 89, 94 (1968). 
78 Under section § 141 (c) of the Delaware Code, directors are allowed to appoint 
committees that can exercise delegated authority over specific corporate matters.  See DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c).      
79 Committee on Corporate Laws, American Bar Association, Corporate Director's 
Guidebook (3d ed. 2001), reprinted in 56 BUS. LAW. 1571, 1582 (2001).   
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carrying out their duty of control, but “merely the possession of ordinary 
knowledge”.80   This means that directors are not obliged to have any 
particular competence besides that for which they were appointed.81  Hence, 
they cannot be held liable for breach of the duty of care in relation to 
activities that involve objective difficulties and require expertise they are not 
supposed to have. 82  Put another way, directors can excuse themselves by 
proving that they acted to the best of their (required) ability.  
1.3.      The Business Judgment Rule  
In light of the above, one could think that directors are subject to 
                                                
80 Percy v. Millaudon, supra notes 66, at 74, 78.  This decision, which is among the 
earliest on the duty of care, concerned a charge for negligence brought against bank directors 
for failing to control the conduct of the bank’s president and cashier.  The Court upheld the 
plaintiffs’ claim, announcing that:  
the directors' duty to control the bank officers depended on the circumstances, that 
if they had no knowledge to awaken suspicion of the fidelity of the president and 
cashier, ordinary attention to the bank's affairs was sufficient, but that if they were 
aware of facts that would put prudent men on their guard, a degree of care 
commensurate with the evil to be avoided was required.… The test of responsibility 
therefore should be, not the certainty of wisdom in others, but the possession of 
ordinary knowledge; and by showing that the error of the agent is of so gross a kind, 
that a man of common sense, and ordinary attention, would not have fallen into it  
81 See id.  
82 It is worth observing, however, that these kinds of technical impediments are 
often overcome trough the appointment of outside directors that have specific expertise. See 
Bradley & Schipani, supra note 65, at 21-22; G. W. Dent, Jr., The Revolution in Corporate 
Governance, the Monitoring Board, and the Director's Duty of Care, 61 B.U. LAW REV. 623 
(1981). 
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liability for breach of the duty of care in a wide range of situations, including 
mere negligence.83  In fact, directors are protected by the business judgment 
rule in the exercise of their functions.  This rule consists in the “presumption 
that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an 
informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that the action was in 
the best interest of the company".84  This implies that in order to hold 
directors liable for breach of the duty of care, shareholders bear the burden of 
proving that directors have acted contrary to the presumption set by the 
business judgment rule.    
While commentators have lamented the difficulty of defining the 
                                                
83 Only rare cases directors have been held liable for mere negligence.  See, e.g., 
Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940).  
84 See Aronson v. Lewis, supra note 67, at 812.  However, it was not until the 1963 
decision in Graham v. Allis-Chalmers that Delaware courts introduced the requirement that 
directors act in an informed manner. See H.R. Horsey, The Duty of Care Component of the 
Delaware Business Judgment Rule, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 971, 985-987 (1994). Among the 
most important cases on the business judgment rule, Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619 (Del. 
1984); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971); Beard v. Elster, 39 Del. 
Ch. 153, 165, 160 A.2d 731, 736-38 (1960); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 629, 393 
N.E.2d 994, 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926 (1979). The formulation of the business 
judgement rule as elaborated in Aronson has also been reproduced by the Model Business 
Corporation Act. of 1990, which defines a director's fiduciary duty in the following terms: 
A director shall discharge his duties as a director, including his duties as a member 
of a committee: (1) in good faith; (2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a 
like position would exercise under similar circumstances; and  (3) in a manner he 
reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation. 
2 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. §  8.30(a) (1990) 
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boundaries of the business judgment rule (especially the two latter prongs),85 
the rule’s importance in corporate fiduciary law cannot be overstated.  
Because of the business judgment rule, courts have traditionally refrained 
from intervening in the corporate life and steadily refused to second-guess 
directors’ decisions.86  Several rationales have been advanced to justify this 
judicial approach to the enforcement of the duty of care, including the better 
position of directors to take corporate decisions than judges,87 judiciary 
                                                
85 For example, it has been argued that the notion of good faith included in the 
business judgment rule overlaps with the requirements of the duty of loyalty.  See A. F. 
Conard, A Behavioral Analysis of Directors' Liability for Negligence, 1972 DUKE L.J. 895 
(1972).   
86 See Horsey, supra note 84, at 977-980 (stating that at least until the mid-eighties, 
“the business judgment rule had been applied in such a manner as to constitute an almost per 
se bar to shareholder claims of directors' breach of their fiduciary duty of care”); Cohn, supra 
note 68, at 594 (“[courts] invoke the purifying balm of the ‘business judgment rule’ . . . to 
preclude inquiry into the merits of directors' decisions in the absence of evidence of bad 
faith, fraud, conflict of interest, or illegality”); J.W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy 
Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE 
L.J. 1078, 1099 (1968) ("The search for cases in which directors of industrial corporations 
have been held liable in derivative suits for negligence uncomplicated by self-dealing is a 
search for a very small number of needles in a very large haystack."); Dent, supra note 82, at 
644-647 ("When stated in the abstract, the duty of care seems to impose a meaningful 
obligation on directors and officers. In practice, however, the duty has had almost no effect 
on corporate governance for several reasons …"); K. Chittur, The Corporate Director's 
Standard of Care: Past, Present, and Future, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 505 (1985) ("While 
rhetoric abounds regarding the standard of care to be met before this [business judgment] 
protection may be claimed, rarely have individual directors been held liable.").  
87 See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., supra note 5, at 508  (“[J]udges are not business 
experts”). 
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concerns about the uncertainty around the due care standard and the severity 
of available sanctions, the observation that “good directors” would refuse to 
take office if burdened with too strict fiduciary requirements,88 and the 
assumption that a too strict formulation of the duty of care could jeopardize 
the pursuing of shareholder wealth maximization.89  
This background helps to better understand why the decision of the 
Delaware Supreme Court in Smith v. Van Gorkom came as a real shock to 
both the business and academic communities.90  This shock did not come 
from the court’s application of the gross negligence standard.  This standard 
had already been applied in the few other cases in which directors had been 
held liable for breach of the duty of care.91  What shocked practitioners and 
academics alike was that the Delaware Supreme Court disregarded the 
                                                
88 By insulating directors from liability, the business judgment rule makes it easier 
for corporations to get qualified persons to serve on their boards. See, e.g., D.J. Block et al., 
Advising Directors on the D&O Crisis, 14 SEC. REG. L.J. 130, 131-32 (1986).  
89 If managers were not allowed the protection of the business judgment rule, they 
would be much less inclined to pursue risky strategies in order to increase expected 
shareholders’ returns.  See infra text accompanying notes 95-97. 
90 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, supra note 67, at 881.  
91 See, e.g., DePinto v. Provident Sec. Life Ins. Co., 374 F.2d 37 (9th Cir. 1967) 
(holding directors of insurance company to have acted negligently in buying shares of second 
company); Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971) (holding that in 
absence of proof that directors acted in bad faith or grossly abused their discretion, courts 
will not interfere with their business judgment); Penn Mart Realty Co. v. Becker, 298 A.2d 
349 (Del. Ch. 1972) (directors may be held to have breached their duty of care if the court 
finds them to have been grossly negligent). 
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outcome of the directors’ decision and considered, instead, the process 
through which that decision was taken.  Although the Trans Union 
shareholders received a substantial premium over market value for their 
shares, the court went on to scrutinize the procedure leading to that outcome, 
deciding that it was improper.  In so acting, the court entered into the 
company’s business affairs, substituting its own judgment to that of the 
company’s directors.  This was the real “trauma” from the Trans Union case. 
Immediately after the ruling in Smith v. Van Gorkom, shareholders’ 
suits against directors increased dramatically, liability insurance premiums 
raised to extremely high levels, and a large number of board members 
resigned to avoid the risk of exposure to liability. 92  The corporate world, 
however, did not wait too long before reacting to what became known as the 
“directors’ liability crisis”.  Several U.S. states soon enacted legislative 
statutes permitting corporations to eliminate, or at least limit, the personal 
liability of directors for failing to act with due care.  The first state to issue 
such a statute was Indiana (in April 1986), soon followed by Delaware, 
which enacted section 102(b) (7) not even a year after the decision in the 
Trans Union case.93  The same did the states of New York, Virginia and some 
                                                
92 For an extensive discussion of the so-called "director's liability crisis", see R. 
Romano, What Went Wrong With Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance, 14 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 1, 6-7 (1989); R.E. Mallen & D.W. Evans, Surviving the Directors' and Officers' 
Liability Crisis: Insurance and Other Alternatives, 12 INS. L. ANTH. 439 (1987); S.R. 
Slaughter, Note, Statutory and Non-Statutory Responses to the Director and Officer Liability 
Insurance Crisis, 63 IND. L. J. 181 (1988). 
93 The Delaware statute enables corporations incorporated in the state to include in 
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other forty states.94   
                                                                                                                         
their act of incorporation:  
[a] provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the 
corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as 
a director, provided that such provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a 
director (i) for any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the corporation or its 
stockholders; (ii)  for acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve 
intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (iii) under section 174 of this 
Title; or (iv) for any transaction from which the director derived an improper 
personal benefit. 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7).  
94 See ALA. CODE § 10-2A-21(f) (1987); ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.010(f) (1987); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-054(A)(9), 10-005(B), 10-005(F), 10-005(G), 10-1202(A), 
(1987); ARK. STAT. ANN. §  4-27-202(B)(3), 4-27-850(B), 4-27-850(F) (1987); CAL. CORP. 
CODE § §  204(a)(10), 204.5, 204(a)(11), 317(g), 317 (i) (1988); COLO. REV. STAT. §  7-3-
101(u), 7-3-101.5(9) (1987); D.C. CODE ANN. §  29-304(16) (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
607.1645, 607.014(2), 607.014(7) (1988); 1988 GA. LAWS 1272, Act effective July 1, 1989, 
ch. 1819; HAW. REV. STAT. § 415-5(h), 415-5(g) (1987); IDAHO CODE §  30-1-54(2), 30-1-
5(f) (1987), Act of Mar. 22, 1988, ch. 84, 1988 Idaho Sess. Laws, 1448; 1214, 85th Leg., §  1 
(1988), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 8.85 (1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(e), 23-1-37-
8, -13,  23-1-37-15, 23-1-35-1(d) (1988); IOWA CODE ANN. §  491.5(8), 496A.49(13), 
496A.4A(7) (1988); Kan. Stat. Ann. §  17-6002(b)(8), 17-6305(b), 17-6305(f), (1987); KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 271A.026(12) (1987), Act effect July 15, 1988, ch. 22, 1988 Ky. Acts 
460 § 2; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:24(c)(4), 12:83(A), 12:83(E), 12:83(F) (1988); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, §  716 (Supp. 1987); Act of Feb. 18, 1988, 1988 MD. LAWS ch. 3 (to be 
codified at Md. Corps. & Ass'ns Code Ann. § 2-104(b)(8), -405.2); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 156B, 
§ S. 1502, 175th Leg., 2d Sess. §  1 (1988) (bill to 13(b)(1 1/2); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 
450.1209(c), 450.1562, 450.1565 (1988); Minn. Stat. § 302A.111(4)(u), 251(4) (1988); MO. 
REV. STAT. § 351.355(2), (7) (1988); Act effective Apr. 9, 1988, ch. 21, 1988 NEB. LAWS 
1110, § 24; NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.036(1), 78.751(2), 78.751(6)(a), 78.752 (1987); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §  293-A:5(VI) (1987); N.J. REV. STAT. §  14A:2-7(3) (Supp. 1987) (Act 
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effective Feb. 4, 1987, ch. 35, 1987 N.J. LAWS 2510, §  7 (expires Feb. 2, 1989); N.M. STAT. 
ANN. §  53-12-2(E), 53-11-4.1(J), 53-11-35(D) (1987); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 402(b), 722 
(c), 721, 717 (b) (1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7(11), 55-19(a) (1987); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. §  1701.59(D), 1701.13(E)(6), 1701.13(E)(7), 1701.59(E); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 
1006 (B)(7) (1988), 1031 (F) (1986); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.047(2)(c), 60.414 (1987); 42 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8363(b), 8364, 8365 (a) (1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-48(a)(6), 7-1.1-
4.1(g) (1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §  47-2-58.8, 47-2-58.6; TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-
12-102(b)(3), 48-18-509 (1987); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1302- 7.06 (1988), TEX. 
BUS. CORP. ACT. ANN. art. 2.02-1(R) (1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-49.1, 16-10-4(2)(b) 
(1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1, 13.1-704 (1987); WASH. REV. CODE § 
23A.12.020(10)(d), 23A.08.025(8) (1988); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.305, 180.307, 180.044, 
048, .049 (1987); WYO. STAT. § 17-1-202(c) 17-1-105.1(a), (c)  (1987).  It is important to 
observe that, in a few states, statutes providing limitations to directors’ liability were enacted 
even before Smith v. Van Gorkom (i.e., District of Columbia).  
James J. Hanks Jr. has conducted a very extensive research on exculpatory statutes, 
distinguishing among (i) charter option statutes (i.e., statutes consenting provisions in the 
article of incorporation to limit directors’ liability—such the Delaware statute); (ii) self-
executing statutes (i.e., direct alterations of ordinary standards of care—such as the Indiana 
statute); (iii) cap on money damages statute (i.e., combination of forms under (i) and (ii) 
above—only Virginia has adopted this kind of statute); (iv) expanded indemnification 
statutes (i.e., statutes consenting expanded indemnification against judgments, settlements, 
and expenses involving directors—such as the Florida statute); (v) expanded non exclusivity 
statutes (i.e., statutes permitting corporations to provide rights other than indemnification by 
charter, by-law, board resolution, contract, or otherwise—such as the Maryland statute); (vi) 
alternative-sources reimbursement statutes (i.e., statutes consenting alternative means of 
indemnification or insurance, including aptive insurance subsidiaries, association captives 
formed by industry groups, trust funds, letters of credit, guaranties, and sureties—such as the 
Louisiana statute), and (vii) non stockholder constituencies statutes (expanding the criteria 
that directors may consider in reaching decisions on behalf of the corporation—such as the 
New York statute). See J.J. Hanks Jr., Evaluating Recent State Legislation on Director and 
Officer Liability Limitation and Indemnification, 43 BUS. LAW. 1207 (1988).  
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The “exculpatory statutes” enabled corporations (i.e., shareholders) to 
contract around the personal liability of directors,95 with the limits of bad 
faith or improper benefits from a conflicting transaction (i.e., loyalty 
obligations).96   The common justification for this legislative reaction is that 
the excessively onerous burden imposed by Smith v. Van Gorkom on 
corporate directors could challenge the capacity of corporations to attract 
“good directors”. In law and economics terms, the risk was that this decision 
could exacerbate adverse selection problems. This is because, as compared to 
good directors, bad directors have less to lose in terms of reputation from 
liability for breach of the duty of care.97  Therefore they are more likely to 
accept a board appointment under a strict liability regime.   
While the above explanation for the statutes’ enactment may be 
theoretically plausible, in practice the sudden swift in state legislation on the 
duty of care has engendered uncertainty in the formulation and application of 
the duty.  This, in turn, has affected the duty’s ability to serve as an effective 
                                                
95 For a very interesting analysis of the positive effects on share price of such a 
limitation of directors’ liability, see Y. Brook & R.K.S. Rao, Shareholder Wealth Effects of 
Directors’ Liability-Limitation Provisions, 29 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANAL. 480 (1994).  
96 Note that there are exceptions to these limits. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-
7(11) (conflict of interest between directors and the corporation does not limit the waiver of 
directors’ liability.)  
97 Cf. J. TIROLE, THE THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 113 (explaining that firms 
with low quality projects might be more willing to accept higher interest rates because they 
are more likely to default on their loans and, therefore, are less affected by an increase in 
interest rates.) 
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tool to curb directors’ potential misbehaviors.98  It is also worth observing 
that the final draft of the Principles of Corporate Governance issued by the 
American Law Institute (hereinafter, ALI Project) endorses a fiduciary model 
that radically departs from the enabling model chosen by the states with 
respect to the directors’ obligation of care.99  The ALI’s fiduciary model 
grants courts broad discretionary powers to intervene in corporate 
decisions—a mandate that clearly echoes the ruling in Smith v. Van Gorkom.  
But as this research will attempt to show the real tension between enabling 
and regulating conceptions of fiduciary law concerns the interpretation and 
application of directors’ primary obligation of loyalty.  The next section 
develops the positive analysis of the duty of loyalty and begins to illustrate 
the tension underlying the duty’s content.  
2.         The Duty of Loyalty 
Besides exercising their role with due care, directors’ must fulfill the 
standards of conduct imposed by the duty of loyalty, which requires them to 
act in good faith in the best interest of the corporation and not in conflict of 
interest.100  Hence, the duty of loyalty includes both a positive guidepost for 
                                                
98 See Balotti & Gentile, supra note 73; D.M. Branson, Intracorporate Process and 
the Avoidance of Director Liability, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 97, 97-98 (1989).  
99 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.03- 7.10. (1992) [hereinafter ALI, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE].  See also W.J. Carney, Section 40.1 of the American Law Institute’s 
Corporate Governance Project: Restatement or Mistatement?, 66 Wash. U. L. Rev. 239, 
240-41 (1988). 
100 This is the formulation of the duty loyalty established in the famous case of Guth 
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directors’ conduct and a negative obligation.  The positive mandate of the 
duty imposes on directors to act in the best interest of the corporation.101  The 
                                                                                                                         
v. Loft, Inc., which concerns the foundation of the Pepsi industry.  The Supreme Court of 
Delaware held one of the directors of Loft Inc.–a corporation engaged in the manufacturing 
and selling of candies, syrups, beverages and other food stuff–liable for breach of the duty of 
loyalty because of the misappropriation of the corporate opportunity represented by the Pepsi 
business. The court claimed that Guth should have refrained from the Pepsi affair, based on 
the fact that Loft Inc. was financially able to undertake this opportunity and the interested 
industry was in line with Loft Inc.’s corporate business.  See Guth v. Loft, Inc. 5 A.2d 503 
Del. 1939. The court’s ruling is remarkable in depicting the essence of the duty of loyalty:  
Corporate officers and directors are not permitted to use their position of trust and 
confidence to further their private interests.  While technically not trustees, they 
stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its stockholders. A public policy, 
existing through the years, and derived from a profound knowledge of human 
characteristics and motives, has established a rule that demands of a corporate 
officer or director, peremptorily and inexorably, the most scrupulous observance of 
his duty, not only affirmatively to protect the interests of the corporation committed 
to his charge, but also to refrain from doing anything that would work injury to the 
corporation, or to deprive it of profit or advantage which his skill and ability might 
properly bring to it, or to enable it to make in the reasonable and lawful exercise of 
its powers.  The rule that requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the 
corporation demands that there shall be no conflict between duty and self-interest. 
The occasions for the determination of honesty, good faith and loyal conduct are 
many and varied, and no hard and fast rule can be formulated. The standard of 
loyalty is measured by no fixed scale. 
Id. at 510. 
101 It is important to note that it is not infrequent for this formulation to read “in the 
best interest of the corporation and its shareholders.” See, e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. 
MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1264, 1280 (Del. 1988) (“[T]he directors owe fiduciary 
duties of care and loyalty to the corporation and its shareholders….”). But as I will discuss in 
detail in Part IV.1.2, I consider this alternative formulation has a product of ideological stand 
Tesi di dottorato di Saura Masconale discussa presso l’Università LUISS Guido Carli. Soggetta a copyright. 
Sono comunque fatti salvi i diritti dell’Università LUISS Guido Carli di riproduzione per scopi di ricerca e 
didattici, con citazione della fonte. 
 
45 
 
negative mandate, instead, requires directors to refrain from, among others, 
self-interested conduct, including self-dealing or conflicting transactions, 
misappropriation and waste of corporate assets, and excessive compensation. 
However, as the discussion that follows will show, the application of these 
mandates in early as well modern U.S. corporate law has been everything but 
uncomplicated.102  
2.1.  Early Foundations 
Courts have traditionally hold directors liable for breach of the duty 
of loyalty in a variety of cases,103 including self-dealing and conflicting 
transactions,104 misappropriation of corporate assets for personal gain,105 
                                                                                                                         
rather than an intrinsic feature of the positive mandate of the duty of loyalty.  
102 For a detailed analysis of the historical evolution of duty of loyalty, see H. 
Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees?, 22 BUS. LAW. 35 (1966). 
103 See generally R. Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS 
AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55, 55–79 (eds. 1985) (providing a thorough 
discussion of the duty of loyalty). 
104 See, e.g., Cartwright & Bros. v. United States Bank & Trust Co., 23 N.M. 82, 
121, 167 P. 436, 453 (1917); Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590, 599 
(1921); Dixmoor Golf Club v. Evans, 325 Ill. 612, 616, 156 N.E. 785, 787 (1927); Guth v. 
Loft, supra note 100; Simpson v. Spellman, 522 S.W.2d 615, 619-20 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); 
Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984); Pogostin v. Rice, supra 
note 84; Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 966-67 (Del. Ch. 1985); Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 
798 F. 2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986); Mills Acquisition, supra note 101; Cede v. Technicolor, supra 
note 70.  
105 For misappropriation of corporate opportunities is meant either the deprivation 
of corporate profits through the directors’ engagement in personal business ventures in the 
corporation’s same line of business or the personal advantage directors obtain out of business 
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waste of corporate assets,106 excessive compensation,107 abuse of corporate 
subsidiaries, 108  and sale of corporate control. 109   However, while early 
decisions required directors to refrain entirely from transactions in potential 
conflict of interest, 110 courts have gradually admitted these transactions if 
approved by disinterested directors 111 and responding to the “standard of 
                                                                                                                         
opportunities offered to them as representatives of the corporation. See Guth v. Loft, supra 
note 100; Duncan v. Ponton, 102 S.W.2d 517, 519 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); Raines v. Toney, 
228 Ark. 1170, 1178-80, 313 S.W.2d 802, 808-10 (1958); Sequoia Vacuum Sys. v. Stransky, 
229 Cal. App. 2d 281, 286, 288, 40 Cal. Rptr. 203, 206 (1964); Klinicki v. Hundgren, 298 
Or. 662, 666, 695 P.2d 906, 910 (1985); Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys. 673 A.2d 148, 149 (Del. 
1996).  
106 See, Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211 (Del. 1979); Colorado Management 
Corp. v. American Founders Life Ins. Co., 145 Colo. 413, 418-19, 359 P.2d 665, 668 (1961). 
107 See McKey v. Swenson, 232 Mich. 505, 514, 205 N.W. 583, 586 (1925); Rogers 
v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582 (1933). See also Marsh, supra note 103, 58-60. 
108 See Sinclair Oil v. Levien, supra note 84. 
109 See Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955); Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson 
& Co., 460 P.2d (Cal. 1969). For a detailed analysis of this line of cases, see W. D. Andrews, 
The Stockholder’s Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Shares, 78 HARV. L. REV. 505 
(1965).  
110 This notion of the duty of loyalty was typical of the railroad fraud cases of the 
1860s and 1880s. See Hoffman Steam Coal Co. v. Cumberland Coal and Iron Co., 16 Md. 
456 (1860); Stewart v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 38 N.J.L. 505 (N.J. 1875); Wardell v. Union Pac. 
R.R., 103 U.S. 651 (1880); Memphis & C. R. Co. v. Wood, 88 Ala. 630, 7 So. 108 (1889); 
McKey v. Swenson, supra note 107 at 586; Duncan v. Ponton, supra note ---, at 519.  See 
also H. Marsh, supra note 103, at 36-37; Carney, supra note 76, at 927-928; Bradley & 
Schipani, supra note 65, at 25-27.  
111 Among the numerous cases on this exculpation from liability for breach of 
loyalty, see Glengary Consol. Min. Co. v. Boehemer, 28 Colo. 1, 62 P. 839 (1900); 
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fairness” to the corporation.112  From an historical perspective, this evolution 
of the duty of loyalty can be explained in terms of the progressive judicial 
recognition of the reality of corporate affairs.  Indeed, in response to the strict 
liability rules enforced by early American corporate law, corporations started 
to incorporate provisions to contract around these rules in their bylaws.  That 
is, corporations began to allow transactions in conflict of interests whereas 
disinterested directors or shareholders had previously approved such 
                                                                                                                         
Schnittger v. Old Home Consolidated Mining Co., 144 Cal. 603, 78 P. 9 (1904); Jacobson v. 
Brooklyn Lumber Co., 184 N.Y. 152, 162-63, 76 N.E. 1075, 1078-79 (1906); Pennsyilvania 
R.R. Co. v. Minis, 120 Md. 461, 87 A 1062 (1913);  Cartwright & Bros. v. United States 
Bank & Trust Co., 23 N.M. 82, 122, 167 P. 436, 449 (1917); Corsicana Nat'l Bank v. 
Johnson, 251 U.S. 68, 90  (1919); Dixmoor Golf Club v. Evans, 325 Ill. 612, 616, 618, 156 
N.E. 785, 788 (1927); Holcomb v. Forsyth, 216 Ala. 486, 113 so. 516 (1927); Patrons’ Mut. 
Fire Ins. Co. of Michigan v. Holden, 245 Mich. 493, 222 N.W. 754 (1929); Newcomer v. 
Mountain Springs Ice & Cold. Storage Co., 63 S.D. 81, 256 N.W. 359 (1934).  More recent 
cases include Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 91 A.2d 57, 58 (Del. 1952); Cathedral 
Estates, Inc. v. Taft Realty Corp., 228 F.2d 85, 87 (2d Cir. 1955); Raines v. Toney, 228 Ark. 
1170, 1181-82, 313 S.W.2d 802, 810 (1958); Alcott v. Hyman, 208 A.2d 501, 506 (Del. 
1965); Puma v. Marriott, 283 A.2d 693, 696 (Del. Ch. 1971); Fliegler v. Lawrence, 316 A.2d 
218, 221 (Del. 1976); Cohen v. Ayers, 596 F.2d 733, 740 (7th Cir. 1979); Weinberger v. 
UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1983); Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 405 n.3 (Del. 
1987).  
112 Until the 1960s, however, the decision of the courts was conditioned by the prior 
approval of the corporation, that is, the challenged transaction was to be considered 
automatically voidable upon shareholders’ demand. After the 1960s, however, courts 
established their unilateral power to decide whether a transaction was void.  See Shlensky v. 
South Parkway Building Corp., 19 Ill.2d 268 at 280-281, 166 N.E. 2d 793 at 800 (1960) 
(first case to reflect such a change in the fairness standard); International Bankers Life Ins. 
Co. v. Holloway, 368 S.W.2d 567, 576 (Tex. 1963); Pappas v. Moss, 303 F. Supp. 1257, 
1280 (D.N.J. 1969); Edelman v. Fruehauf, supra note 104, at 882, 886.  
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transactions.113  Courts upheld these corporate amendments to the rule,114 
which led to the creation of a less strict fiduciary standard of loyalty.  State 
legislation soon adjusted to this new standard, with the result that legal 
statutes began to provide multiple means to validate per se conflicting 
transactions.115  One commentator has observed that by the 1960s language 
                                                
113 See Marsh, supra note 102, at 44-46. 
114 Id. 
115 The Delaware General Corporation Law at section 144 provides as follows:  
(a) No contract or transaction between a corporation and 1 or more of its directors or 
officers, or between a corporation and any other corporation, partnership, 
association, or other organization in which 1 or more of its directors or officers, are 
directors or officers, or have a financial interest, shall be void or voidable solely for 
this reason, or solely because the director or officer is present at or participates in 
the meeting of the board or committee which authorizes the contract or transaction, 
or solely because his or their votes are counted for such purpose, if:  
     (1) The material facts as to his relationship or interest and as to the contract or 
transaction are disclosed or are known to the board of directors or the committee, 
and the board or committee in good faith authorizes the contract or transaction by 
the affirmative votes of a majority of the disinterested directors, even though the 
disinterested directors be less than a quorum; or  
     (2) The material facts as to his relationship or interest and as to the contract or 
transaction are disclosed or are known to the shareholders entitled to vote thereon, 
and the contract or transaction is specifically approved in good faith by vote of the 
shareholders; or  
     (3) The contract or transaction is fair as to the corporation as of the time it is 
authorized, approved or ratified, by the board of directors, a committee or the share-
holders. 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144.  See also, CAL. CORP. CODE § 820; NEV. GEN. CORP. LAW § 
78.140 (modelled on the California Code);  NEW YORK BUS. CORP. LAW, § 713; NO. CAR. 
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similar to the private amendments of the rule had been made a part of the 
corporate codes of some like fifteen states.116  Soon after, The Model Act 
endorsed the general trend, permitting approval or ratification of transactions 
in conflict of interests by either disinterested directors or shareholders.117  
Finally, the early evolution of the duty of loyalty can be said to have 
prevented the “intrusion” of courts into corporate life.  
2.2.      Recent Developments  
Section II.2.1 above has clarified that American law has given an 
increasingly narrower interpretation to the duty of loyalty.  Commentators 
have observed that case law on the duty of loyalty has evolved into holding 
directors liable for the duty’s breach in just two kinds of situations: 
undeniable self-dealing and stolen corporate opportunities.118  They have also 
observed, however, that “[d]espite its narrow focus, the duty of loyalty has 
                                                                                                                         
BUS. CORP. ACT, § 55-30 (also modeled on the California Code); SO. CAR. BUS. CORP. ACT, 
§ 12-18.16; MASS. GEN. CORP. ACT. § 450.13 (5); RH. IS. GEN. CORP. LAW, § 7-4-7; MICH. 
GEN. CORP. ACT § 450.13 (5); CONN. STOCK. CORP. LAW § 33-323; VER. GEN. CORP. LAW § 
105; W. VA. GEN. CORP. LAW § 3081. For a detailed analysis of such statutes, see Marsh, 
supra note 103, at 47-48. 
116 See Carney, supra note 76, at 928. 
117 1 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. §  41 cmt., at 842 (2d ed. 1971). 
118 Blair & Stout, supra note 49, at 298-299, 306-307 (1999).  In particular, Blair 
and Stout highlight that the duty of loyalty is not applicable to constrain directors from 
taking “corporate action with mixed motives”: i.e. business decision that provide non-
monetary benefits to themselves at the expense of shareholders. 
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teeth, and sets important substantive limits on directors' behavior”.119  Indeed, 
unlike the duty of care, the duty of loyalty “has had a fairly robust career.”120  
There are two basic reasons for this pivotal distinction between the two 
duties.  First, directors cannot invoke the protection of the business judgment 
rule in cases involving a conflict of interest between themselves and the 
corporation. Second, corporate actors cannot bargain for a waiver of the duty 
of loyalty as they can do with the duty of care.121 
Most recent judiciary trends reaffirm this distinction, by restricting 
the parties’ ability to ratify conflicted transactions.  For one thing, U.S. courts 
have increasingly stressed the importance of the simultaneous presence of all 
the indexes of ratification of a self-dealing transaction.  That is, courts have 
refused to uphold self-dealing transactions only approved by independent 
directors, rather than both directors and shareholders.122  The reason for this 
approach rests on the courts’ concern that officers and executive directors 
                                                
119 Id. at 298. 
120 Lipson, supra note 67, at 1197. 
121 See supra text accompanying notes 93-96.  
122 Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 241 P.2d 66, 73 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1952). Moreover, the Ali Institute reports that statutes on the fiduciary duty of loyalty 
of at least six states (Alabama, Alaska, California, Connecticut, Illinois, and Kentucky) 
expressly require some form of fairness test even in the presence of approval by disinterested 
directors or by shareholders. See Carney, supra note 76, at fn. 167-168. On the insufficiency 
of the mere approval of independent directors to assure fairness of conflict of interest 
transactions, see also V. Brudney, The Independent Director – Heavenly or Potemkin 
Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597 (1982); R.J. Gilson & R. Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside 
Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863 (1991). 
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may exercise as much power on the board process as to negate the 
independency of outside directors, especially in the takeover context.123  In 
other cases, courts have affirmed their exclusive authority to decide conflict-
of-interest situations, regardless of related provisions included in by-laws or 
the act of incorporation.124  This shift in the courts’ attitude has gone so far 
that while traditionally the mere existence of a conflict did not entail 
transaction void, it is now upon the directors to prove the fairness of the 
transaction in order not to be held liable for breach of the duty of loyalty. 125  
Along the same line, the ALI Project on corporate governance has 
rejected the “old” notion of the duty of loyalty and proposed a “new duty of 
                                                
123 See, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 277 (2d 
Cir. 1986). The new position taken by courts with respect to takeover situations seems to go 
toward an expansion of the duty of loyalty that includes also directorial decisions that only 
provide non-monetary benefits. In this respect, former Delaware Chancellor William Allen 
has spoken of a third kind of fiduciary duty: the “no-entrenchement” duty.  Such a duty 
would cover all those conflicts in which directors "have no direct pecuniary interest in the 
transaction but have an 'entrenchment' interest, i.e., an interest in protecting their existing 
control of the corporation". See W.T. Allen et al., Function Over Form: A Reassessment of 
Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287, 1290 (2001).  See 
also infra note 181. 
124 See Holi-Rest, Inc. v. Treloar, 217 N.W.2d 517, 525 (Iowa 1974); Scott v. Multi-
Amp Corp., 386 F. Supp. 44, 68 (D.N.J. 1982); Flieger v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 
1976); Aronoff v. Albanese, 446 N.Y.S.2d 368, 370- 71 (App. Div. 1982); Cede v. 
Technicolor, supra note 70; Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 241 P.2d 66 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1952). 
125 See Edelman v. Fruehauf, supra note 104. 
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fair dealing”.126  This proposal supports a model that attempts to find a 
balance between private regulation and judicial determination of the duty of 
loyalty.127  On the one hand, the ALI Project confirms the (judiciary) rule that 
imposes the burden of proof on directors in case of conflicts of interest.  On 
the other hand, however, it allows to avoid such a requirement if the 
transaction is approved by disinterested directors or disinterested 
shareholders.128  In this case, the burden of proof is shifted to the plaintiff, 
who needs to show that the transaction is "so clearly outside of the range of 
reasonableness" that disinterested directors could not have concluded that it 
was fair.129   
From this analysis, it could seem that most of the tension underlying 
the duty of loyalty has been driven by the difficulty of defining the exact 
boundaries of the duty’s negative mandate, i.e., the requirement not to act in 
conflict of interest.  In fact, as the next Chapter will explain, most of the 
modern debate on fiduciary law has focused on the positive mandate of the 
duty of loyalty, attempting to give concrete meaning to the requirement that 
                                                
126 ALI, PRINCIPLE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 99, at § 5.10. 
127 We must observe however that in relation to different kinds of transactions 
involving the breach of the duty of loyalty (such as misuse of corporate property, position, 
and information or sale of control), the Code proposes a much stricter view and argue for a 
stricter judicial scrutiny. See W.W. Bratton, Self-Regulation, Normative Choice, and the 
Structure of Corporate Fiduciary Law, 61 GEO WASH. L. REV. 1084, at 1091; Carney, supra 
note 76, at 929-931. 
128 ALI, PRINCIPLE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 99, at § 5.02(a)(1)-(2). 
129 Id. at § 5.02(b). 
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directors must act to the exclusive benefit of the corporation.   
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III.  CONTRACTARIANS AND COMMUNITARIANS 
In this Part, I contextualize corporate fiduciary duties—and, in 
particular, the duty of loyalty—in the modern debate between contractarians 
and communitarians. As I will explain, these two “philosophical” visions are 
the pillars of the modern evolution and political dimension of corporate 
fiduciary duties. 
1.   The Firm in the Contractarian Perspective 
The contractarian instance emerges during the 1980s as a reform, 
imported from economics,130 of the traditional idea of the corporation as an 
                                                
130  The new economic theory of the firm finds its origins in the early 1970s. Since 
the very beginning, the theory developed two variants: the institutional variant and the 
neoclassical variant.  The roots of the institutional variant can be traced back to the 1937 
essay of Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm.  See R. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 
ECONOMICA 386 (1937). In this work, Coase analyzes firms and markets as alternative forms 
of contracting, identifying transaction costs as the determinants of the choice between these 
options.  The entrepreneurial firm substitutes the market structure when the costs of 
organization and direction are cheaper than market transactions. The neoclassical variant, 
instead, radically contests the hierarchical structure of the firm.  The pivotal work in this line 
of research is Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization by Armen Alchian 
and Harold Demsetz, who redefined the firm as the result of voluntary exchanges among the 
members of a team (so-called team production model) and re-interpret hierarchy as 
contractual monitoring.  Under this view, the coesian assumption that the firm is a non-
market entity within a market economy is displaced and so is the central role of the 
entrepreneur as owner of the firm.  See A. Alchian & H. Demsetz, Production, Information 
Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972).  However, the team 
production model still “echoes” the coesean hierarchy in delineating the role of the team 
production’s monitor. These residual similarities, however, disappear in the subsequent 
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artificial structure created through state concession,131 independent by its 
                                                                                                                         
evolution of the economic theory of the firm.  In 1976, Michael Jensen and William 
Meckling publish the other fundamental work on the neoclassical elaboration, Theory of the 
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure.  Jensen and Meckling 
requalify the firm as “[…] a legal fiction which serves as a nexus for a set of contracting 
relationships among individuals”. .  See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 10, at 310. Among 
the additional seminal economic contributions, see E. Fama, Agency Problems and the 
Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POLITICAL ECON. 288 (1980); E. Fama & M. Jensen, The 
Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J. L. & ECON. 301 (1983); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977); S.N.S. Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the Firm, 26 J. 
L. & ECON. 1 (1983); O.E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND 
ANTITRUST  IMPLICATIONS (1975); O.E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF 
CAPITALISM (1985); V. L. Smith, Economic Theory and its Discontents, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 
320 (1974); W.A. Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive 
Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978).  For a descriptive account, see H.N. 
Butler & L.E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-
Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990); J.S. Johnston, The Influence of The Nature of 
the Firm on the Theory of Corporate Law, 18 J. CORP. L. 213 (1993); T. Ulen, The Coasean 
Firm in Law and Economics, 18 J. CORP. L. 301 (1993).  
131 The so-called “concession theory” was imported from British law at the time 
when the special charter (i.e., the institution of the corporate form by the sovereign’s grant of 
a charter) was the dominant mode of corporate creation also in the American corporate 
practice. Its principles are well summarized in the 1819 decision of Trustees of Dartmouth 
College v. Woodward, where Chief Justice Marshall stated that the corporation was an  
"artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing solely in contemplation of state law."' 
Throughout the nineteenth century, however, the concession theory gradually lost its 
predominant role, because of the steady increase of permissive general incorporation statutes 
and private formations of corporations. See G.M. Anderson & R.D. Tollison, The Myth of the 
Corporation as a Creation of the State, 3 INTL REV. L. & ECON. 107 (1983); Bratton, Nexus 
of Contracts, supra note 162, at 433-439; Butler & Ribstein, supra note 130, at 8-10; D. 
Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201 (1990); D. Gordon Smith, The 
Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. LAW 277, 280 (1998).   
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components, and dominated by management.132  Contractarians contend that 
the corporation is, instead, the aggregate product of various contractual 
relationships between its participants. 133  The firm is considered as a nexus of 
                                                
132 The managerialist view of the corporation appeared between the 1880s and the 
turn of the century, in concomitance with the progressive rise of large corporations and the 
gradual demise of the concession theory of the firm. The novelty introduced by 
managerialism, with its magnification of the central role of management, was clearly a 
mirror of the economic reality of large corporations: managers represented the true power 
dominating the hierarchical structure of the firm. The managerialist vision of the firm found 
his apex during the 1930s, with the publication of the work of Berle and Means, The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property.  See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 32.  Berle and Means 
viewed the delegation of corporate powers to managers as a choice imposed by the broad 
dispersion of ownership in large corporations, with shareholders conceived as passive 
investors and managers as the true owners of the firm. Managerialism continued to dominate 
corporate law until the rise of the new economic theory and originated several other legal 
theories of the firm, both pro-managerialist and anti-managerialist.  See also A.A. BERLE, 
JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 32-39 (1954); A.D. CHANDLER, JR., THE 
VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977); G.C. 
MEANS, THE CORPORATE REVOLUTION IN AMERICA 50-51 (1962); R. NADER ET AL., TAMING 
THE GIANT CORPORATION 62-65 (1976); M.J. Roe, A Political Theory of American 
Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10 (1991).  
133 The legal literature on the subject is far beyond extensive. Its most prominent 
articulation is perhaps the work of F. Easterbrook & D. Fischel, which has been collectively 
reproduced in THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW.  See EASTERBROOK & 
FISCHEL, supra note 38. Among the numerous other contributions, see William T., Contracts 
and Communities in Corporation Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1395, 1399 (1993); S.M. 
Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive 
Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856 (1997); B.D. Baysinger & H.N. 
Butler, Antitakeover Amendments, Managerial Entrenchment, and the Contractual Theory of 
the Corporation, 71 VA. L. REV. 1257 (1985); H.N. Butler, The Contractual Theory of the 
Corporation, 11 GEO. MASON UNIV. L. REV. 99 (1989); Butler & Ribstein, supra note 130; 
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contracts: the result of a complex system of devices, which regulate the 
diverse interests and purposes of shareholders, managers, creditors, 
employees and other corporate participants.134  Under this view, it follows 
that corporate law should not have any mandatory character, but just default 
nature. 135   That is, corporate law should simply provide standard-form 
contracts, freely rectifiable or modifiable by the parties’ agreement.  
The contractarian perspective entails an individualistic conception of 
the corporation, based on the assumptions that economic agents, on the one 
                                                                                                                         
R. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 
49 (1984); R.E. Scott, Corporation Law and the American Law Institute Corporate 
Governance Project, 35 STAN. L. REV. 927 (1983); N. Wolfson, The Modern Corporation: 
Free Markets Versus Regulation (1984). For a critical approach, see L.A. Kornhauser, The 
Nexus of Contracts Approach to Corporations: A Comment on Easterbrook and Fischel, 89 
COLUM. L. REV. 1449 (1989); R. Romano, Comment on Easterbrook and Fischel, “Contract 
and Fiduciary Duty”, 36 J. L. ECON. 447 (1993). It is also worth emphasizing that some 
commentators consider contractualism as a new version of the “aggregate theory” of the firm 
dating back to the beginning of the century.  This theory opposed the idea of corporations as 
shareholder-centered institutions originating by private initiative to the then dominant 
conception of corporations as artificial entities created by the state.  See Bratton, The New 
Economic Theory of the Firm, supra note 162, at 1489-1490, P.N. Cox, The Public, The 
Private and the Corporation, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 391 (1997). 
134 The use of the terms “contract” or “contractual” in the contractarian theory is to 
be understood in its economic rather than legal meaning, that is, as identifying “long-term 
relationships characterized by asymmetric information, bilateral monopoly, and 
opportunism”. See S. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L. 
REV. 1, 10 (2002). See also A. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE 
L.J. 472 (1980).  
135 For a definition of default rules, see supra note 24.    
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hand, rationally seek to maximize their utility and, on the other, should be 
free from any external constraint in their utilitarian efforts.136  The political 
implication of such a view is clearly antiregulatory and opposes any 
interference by the state into the existence of corporations.  Put another way, 
freedom of contract reduces corporate law to a private matter, with the 
pursuing of any super-individualistic interest being seen as an illegitimate 
intrusion by the state into private autonomy.137 
The “contractarian firm” combines individualism and contract so that 
corporate relationships are solely the product of voluntary exchanges, which 
are designed to achieve the best possible arrangement for the many self-
interested components of the corporation.  From this perspective, cooperation 
among firm participants becomes a means to the end of productivity and 
profit maximization.  As a consequence, mutual consent replaces hierarchy.  
Shareholders delegate decisional authority to directors and managers, who 
are conceived as shareholders’ “agents”.138  Directors and managers, on their 
                                                
136 But see Cox, supra note 133, at 394, 415.  Cox views “the neoclassical 
normative commitment” as “colletictivist, even organic”, that is, a theory of “the common 
good”,identified with the mutual welfare of the participants to the corporation. See also G. 
Lawson, Efficiency and Individualism, 42 DUKE L.J. 53, 83-96 (1992) (proposing an 
analogous view of contractarianism).     
137 But see L.A. Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 
89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (1989), at 1409 (arguing that “[…] deregulators do not have a 
monopoly over the contractual framework of analysis“ and acknowledging the existence of 
“public aspects of the private firms”.)  
138 See EASTERBROOK& FISCHEL, supra note 38, at 69. 
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turn, exercise this delegated authority to increment firm profits, in exchange 
for contractually established compensation and some other benefits.139  In the 
same vein, employees accept to be subordinated to the discretional power of 
directors and managers and receive a fixed wage in exchange.140  In brief, all 
the components of the firm (including creditors) are entrenched in a net of 
corporate contracts.141  The actual specification of the various corporate 
contracts depends on several variables, including the size of the firm, the 
identity of both managers and investors, and the specific economic activity 
that the corporation carries out.142 In other terms, the complex relationship 
among corporate participants is adaptive; and it could not be otherwise, this 
relation being the result of voluntary arrangements.143  
Corporate contracting, however, is not inexpensive.  Composing the 
                                                
139 See id. 
140 On the corporate contract of employees, see C. Chang, Capital Structure as an 
Optimal Contract Between Employees and Investors, 47 J. FIN. (1992) 
141 From a contractarian perspective, creditors are conceived as contractual suppliers 
of capital. In this sense, their relationship with the firm is “contractual”: they provide money 
in exchange for a payment at interest. But the relationship is also contractual in the sense that 
creditors bargain for “incidents of ownership”, i.e., control. See W. Bratton, Corporate Debt 
Relationships: Legal Theory in a Time of Restructuring, 1989 DUKE L.J. 92, 102, 171. 
142 See F.H. Easterbrook and D.R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1416, 1427 (1989).  
143 Id at 1428-30 (observing that "[…] all the terms in corporate governance are 
contractual in the sense that they are fully priced in transactions among the interested parties 
[…] it is unimportant that they may not be 'negotiated'; the pricing and testing mechanisms 
are all that matter...."). 
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different, and often contrasting, interests of corporate participants and 
monitoring their activity result in agency costs.  These are the costs arising in 
any relationship, in which a party, i.e., the principal, delegates authority to 
another, i.e., the agent, to perform some services.144  Agency costs arise 
because of the inevitable conflicts of interest between the principal and the 
agent, who exert unobservable actions and therefore has incentives to pursue 
her own interests rather than the principal best interest.145  Because of agency 
costs and other transaction costs, corporate contracts are inherently 
                                                
144 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 10, at 308. 
145 The expression “agency costs” was first introduced by Jensen and Meckling to 
define the costs incurred by the principal and the agent in any agency relationship: 
If both parties to the relationship are utility maximizers there is good reason to 
believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal. The 
principal can limit divergences from his interest by establishing appropriate 
incentives for the agent and by incurring monitoring costs designed to limit the 
aberrant activities of the agent. [emphasis added] In addition in some situations it 
will pay the agent to expend resources (bonding costs) to guarantee that he will not 
take certain actions which would harm the principal or to ensure that the principal 
will be compensated if he does take such actions.  [emphasis added]… [But even 
after incurring these costs] there will [still] be some divergence between the agent's 
decisions and those decisions which would maximize the welfare of the principal. 
The dollar equivalent of the reduction in welfare experienced by the principal due to 
this divergence is also a cost of the agency relationship, and we refer to this latter 
cost as the "residual loss". [emphasis added] We define agency costs as the sum of: 
1) the monitoring expenditures by the principal, 2) the bonding expenditures by the 
agent, 3) the residual loss.”  
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 10, at 308.  
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incomplete.146  In response, contractarians argue that contractual gaps should 
be filled by reference to the “hypothetical bargaining approach”—the 
agreement that the majority of parties would have reached in an ideal world 
of no contracting costs and symmetric information.147  Under this view, 
                                                
146 See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 130; Grossman S. & Stiglitz J, Information 
and Competitive Price Systems, 66 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 246 (1976);  A. 
Schwartz & R. E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 Yale L.J. 541, 
605-08 (2003); R. E. Verrecchia, Consensus Beliefs, Information Acquisition, and Market 
Information Efficiency, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 874 (1980); J. Gordon & L.A. Kornhauser, 
Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 761 
(1985).  
147 On the “hypothetical bargaining approach”, see EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra 
note 38, at 14-15, 20-21; C.J. Goetz & R.E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An 
Analysis of the Interaction between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 
283-297; C.J. Goetz & R.E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of 
Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967 (1983); R.E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing 
Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641 (2003); B.A. Hermalin & M.L. Katz, 
Judicial Modification of Contracts between Sophisticated Parties: A More Complete View of 
Incomplete Contracts and Their Breach, 9 J. LAW. ECON. AND ORG. 230 (1993); Clark, supra 
note 103; W.A. Klein, The Modern Business Organization: Bargaining Under Constraints, 
91 YALE L.J. 1521, 1522 (1982).  For an economic perspective, see P. Aghion & P. Bolton, 
An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting, 59 REV. ECON. STUD 473 
(1992; O. Hart & J. Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56 ECONOMETRICA 755 
(1988); T.Y. Chung, Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, and Risk Sharing, 58 REV. 
ECON. STUD. 1031 (1991); P. Aghion et al., Renegotiation Design With Unverifiable 
Information,  62 ECONOMETRICA 257 (1994).  Yet, the assumption that implementing the 
ideal contract corresponds to the agreement the majority of parties would choose has raised 
criticism. See I. Ayres & R. Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic 
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989); I. Ayres, Preliminary Thoughts on Optimal 
Tailoring of Contractual Rules, 3 S. CAL. INTER. L.J. 1 (1993); I. Ayres & R. Gertner, 
Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choices of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 
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standard form terms substitute consent in situations of contractual 
incompleteness, with the dominant approach among contractarians being that 
the maximization of wealth is the agreement most parties would agree upon 
in conditions of perfect contracting.  Mandatory rules are therefore justified 
only to the extent that they satisfy this condition.148  But given the difficulty 
of such a configuration of mandatory rules, contractarians choose defaults 
over mandatory rules.  They argue that only by providing a set of non-
mandatory standard-form provisions, corporate law can facilitate the private 
contracting process and thus make the achievement of Pareto efficiency 
possible. 149   The underlying assumption is that only parties negotiating 
around default rules can attain an optimal allocation of rights, whereas parties 
limited by mandatory rules can only achieve sub-optimal allocations.  This is 
because “gap-filling” rules allow parties a broad domain of freedom of 
                                                                                                                         
729 (1992); A. Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete 
Contracts and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1992). 
148 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 142, at 1433 (suggesting that the 
imposition of mandatory laws make sense “only when one is sure that the selected term will 
increase the joint wealth of the participants-that is, that it is the term that the parties would 
have selected with full information and costless contracting.”). See also F.H. Easterbrook & 
D.R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of the Investors, 70 VA. L. REV 699 
(1984); L.A. Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable 
Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820 (1989); Bebchuk, supra note 
137, at 1410-1413; R. Cranswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and 
Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361 (1991).  
149 See supra note 20 (defining Pareto efficiency).  
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contract, which is, instead, displaced under a set of “rules of iron”.150  
Within this analytical framework, the role and duties of corporate 
directors is of fundamental importance. As noted above, contractarians 
conceive of directors and other corporate officers as a class of corporate 
participants that is contractually entrenched with all the other firm’s 
components.  Nonetheless, it is the relationship between directors and 
shareholders that is at the core of the contractarian analysis. 151   This 
relationship is modeled on the assumption that equity investors bear the risk 
of business failure and are entitled to marginal rewards of success.152  Based 
on this assumption, directors should exercise their discretionary power to 
                                                
150 An important exception to this conceptualization of legal rules is given by the 
existence of externalities—negative effects produced by a contract toward third parties and 
may, therefore, require correction through mandatory rules. See Easterbrook & Fischel, 
supra note 142, at 1436-1442 (pointing out that decisions not to reveal certain corporate 
information and decisions to resist takeovers involve significant externalities, which may 
justify the imposition of mandatory rules on disclosure duties and resistance to takeovers.) 
On externalities in general, see supra note 19.  
151 For an economic background, see M.C. Jensen & J.B. Warner, The Distribution 
of Power Among Corporate Managers, Shareholders and Directors, 29 J. FIN. ECON. 3 
(1988).  
152 To this extent, the position of shareholders could apparently be assimilated to 
that of “owners of the firm”, in the sense that their investment in the corporation presents 
ownership-like features. In the contractarian analysis, however, the property rights of 
shareholders are residual: shareholders are only entitled to what is left after all the other firm 
claimants have been paid, “but they get all of what is left.“ See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, 
supra note 38, at 69.   
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maximize shareholders’ wealth.153  Such “contractual” exchange between the 
parties is designed to solve the problem of alignment between their 
(potentially) conflicting interests.154  In a simplified description, shareholders 
vest directors with discretion in order to reduce the costs of monitoring and 
obtaining information about corporate matters.  And fiduciary law—in 
particular, the duty of loyalty—provides standard contractual terms to ensure 
that directors exercise their discretionary power in favor of shareholders and 
shareholders alone.155  The fact that the contract between shareholders and 
directors is not always explicit, or that its terms are drafted by directors and 
articulated in corporate charters or bylaws substantially ignored by equity 
investors, does not change the contractual nature of the relationship.  As long 
as a voluntary arrangement can be identified, there is a contract between the 
parties.  And the investors’ purchase of shares cannot be otherwise qualified 
than as a contract.156    
                                                
153 See infra Part  IV.1.1.2. (expanding the analysis of the residual claimant 
argument in favor of shareholder primacy).   
154 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 142, at 1418-1420; Fama, supra note 130, 
at 292-293; B. MANNING, LEGAL CAPITAL 12 (2d ed. 1981).  
155 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 142, at 1418-1420. 
156 American case law confirms the contractual view of the relationship between 
original owners or management of companies that go public and shareholders.  See, e.g., Er 
Holding, Inc. v. Norton Company, 735 F.Supp. 1094 (D.C. Ma. 1990), in which the District 
Court of Massachusetts stated: “the corporate by-laws constitute a contract between the 
corporation’s owners–the shareholders–and its managers, the Board”.  However, we must 
also account for opposite decision, see, e.g., City Capital Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Interco, Inc., 
551 A.2d 787, 797 (Del. Ch. 1988) (arguing against the voluntariness of shareholders' 
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Under this view, corporate fiduciary duties—traditionally conceived 
as mandatory terms of the relationship between shareholders and 
directors157—become subject to private ordering.  Fiduciary duties are merely 
one set of rights for which corporate actors can bargain for.158  Their default 
provision is justified because of the high costs of anticipating and drafting the 
potential contingencies affecting the shareholder-director relationship.159  In 
this light, the “standard duties” of care and loyalty serve the function of 
mitigating contracting costs.  That is, mandatory fiduciary rules become 
default rules for “completing incomplete bargains in a contractual 
structure”,160 which the parties are free to accept or contract around. 161   
                                                                                                                         
choices).  
157 In modern corporate fiduciary law, this only applies to the duty of loyalty, since 
the duty of care can be eliminated or mitigated through an express provision included in he 
act of incorporation.  See supra Part II.2.  
158 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 38, at 12, 90-93; Butler & Ribstein, supra 
note 130, at 29-33; Lipson, supra note 67, at 1199; J.R. Macey & G.P. Miller, Corporate 
Stakeholders: A Contractual Perspective, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 401 (1993). 
159 On the cost of fiduciary duties, see also Clark, supra note 103; K.B. Davis, 
Judicial Review of Fiduciary Decisionmaking--Some Theoretical Perspectives, 80 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1, 27-29 (1985). Beside private-ordered fiduciary duties and standard-form fiduciary 
duties, corporate scholars underline that parties can also rely on market devices to align their 
divergence of interests. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 38, at 91-92; Butler & 
Ribstein, supra note 130, at 29; W.A. Klein & K.B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in 
Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON 615 (1989). 
160 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 38, at 92. 
161 See e.g., F.A. Easterbrook & D.R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 
YALE L.J. 698, at 703-704 (1982); C.J. Goetz & R.E. Scott, Principles of Relational 
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2.  The Firm in the Communitarian Perspective  
The communitarian “reform” can be associated to the explosion of 
hostile takeovers activity during the 1980s.162  Takeovers involve the offer of 
                                                                                                                         
Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089 (1981); J.H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law 
of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625 (1995).  
162 Lyman Johnson, David Millon, and Lawrence Mitchell have been among the 
most vocal proponents of the communitarian position, which they have elaborated in a series 
of articles.  See L. Johnson, Corporate Takeovers and Corporations: Who are They For?, 43 
WASH. AND LEE L. REV. 781 (1986); L. Johnson, State Takeover Statutes: Constitutionality, 
Community, and Heresy, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1051 (1988).  L. Johnson, The Delaware 
Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Law, 68 TEX. L. REV. 865 (1990) [hereinafter 
Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary]; L. Johnson, Making (Corporate) Law in a Skeptical 
World, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 161 (1992); Millon, supra note 131; D. Millon, 
Communitarians, Contractarians and the Crisis in Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1373 (1993) [hereinafter Millon, Communitarians, Contractarians]; D. Millon, Redefining 
Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223 (1991) [hereinafter, Millon, Redefining Corporate 
Law]; L. Johnson & D. Millon, The Case Beyond Time, 45 BUS. LAW 2105 (1990); L.E. 
Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1675 
(1990); L.E. Mitchell, The Cult of Efficiency, 71 TEX. L. REV. 217 (1992); L.E. Mitchell, A 
Critical Look at Corporate Governance, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1263 (1992) [hereinafter 
Mitchell, A Critical Look]; L.E. MITCHELL, PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW, NEW 
PERSPECTIVES ON LAW, CULTURE, AND SOCIETY (ed. 1995) [hereinafter MITCHELL, 
PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW].  
On various aspects of the communitarian theory, see also V. Brudney, Contract and 
Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C.L. Rev 595 [hereinafter Brudney, Contract and 
Fiduciary Duty]; V. Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of 
Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1407 (1985) [hereinafter Brudney, Corporate 
Governance]; J.N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 
1539 (1989); M.A. O'Connor, How Should We Talk About Fiduciary Duty?: Directors' 
Conflict-of-Interest Transactions and the ALI's Principles of Corporate Governance, 61 
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generous premiums to target companies’ shareholders in order to obtain 
voting control regardless of incumbent management’s approval.  But the 
takeover activity of the 1980s was essentially designed to “bust-up” target 
companies, meaning that it was common for bidders to liquidate or radically 
restructure target companies immediately after the acceptance of a takeover 
offer.163  Bust-up takeovers intrinsically imply employees’ layoffs, plant 
closings, disruption of existing commercial relationships, and, more 
generally, loss of economic and social benefits.  The concerns raised by these 
circumstances opened the way to the emergence of the egalitarian instance of 
                                                                                                                         
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 954 (1993); J.W. Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. 
REV. 611 (1988); L.D. Solomon, Humanistic Economics: A New Model for the Corporate 
Constituency Debate, 59 U. CINN. L. REV. 321 (1990); K. Van Wezel Stone, Employees as 
Stakeholders Under State Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 21 STETSON L. REV. 45 
(1991).  
For a criticism of the neoclassical theory of the firm, see W. Bratton Jr., The New 
Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471 
(1989) [hereinafter, Bratton, The New Economic Theory of the Firm]; W. Bratton Jr., “Nexus 
of Contracts" Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407 (1989) [Bratton, 
Nexus of Contract]; W.W. Bratton, Jr., The Economic Structure of the Post-Contractual 
Corporation, 87 NW. L. REV. 180 (1992).  
163 See D. Millon, State Takeover Laws: A Rebirth of Corporation Law?, 45 WASH. 
AND LEE L. REV. 903 (1988); J. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in 
the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 2-7 (1986) (on bust-up takeovers); L. Johnson & D. 
Millon, Missing the Point About State Takeover Statutes, 87 MICH. L. REV. 846 (1989); M. 
Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 11 
(1987) (on the correlation between hostile takeovers and junk-bond financing); R.B. 
Thompson & D. Gordon Smith, Toward a New Theory of the Shareholder Role: Sacred 
Space and Corporate Takeovers, 80 U. TEX. L. REV. 261 (2001).  
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the communitarian movement.164  
Communitarians argue that corporations are institutions tied to all 
their components—including shareholders, debtholders, managers, 
employees and even local communities165—by means of trust and mutual 
interdependence. 166  Therefore, they radically rebut the contractarian idea of 
                                                
164 In particular, these scholars charged the big profits realized through takeover 
activity with the accusation of being inefficient (and illegitimate) wealth transfers from 
weaker corporate components to shareholders. For example, Shleifer and Summers claimed 
that shareholders’ gains can be explained as transfers of wealth from employees. See A. 
Shleifer & L.H. Summer, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers’ in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS, 
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33 (eds. 1988).  See also M.A. O'Connor, The Human Capital 
Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 
CORNELL L. REV. 899 (1993); M.A. O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus of 
Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 
1189 (1991). McDaniel, instead, focused on creditors (i.e., bondholders), arguing that they 
are the corporate actors that “pay” for shareholders’ return in takeovers transactions. M.W. 
McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 BUS. LAW. 413 (1986); M.W. 
McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders, 13 J. CORP. L. 205  (1988); M.W. McDaniel, 
Stockholders and Stakeholders, 21 STETSON L. REV. 121 (1991).  On the negative effects of 
takeovers on bondholders, see L.E. Mitchell, The Fairness Rights of Corporate Bondholders, 
65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165 (1990); 
165 The new communitarian vision of the corporate entity embraces also local 
communities, which can be harmed by profit seeking strategies as much as other non-
shareholders constituents.  Thus territorial communities in which the firm operates may 
suffer losses in terms of tax revenues and charitable contributions. Moreover, they may also 
find themselves saddled with costly public works projects that h become useless once a 
corporation moves away.  See Millon, supra note 131, at 232-233; Millon, Redefining 
Corporate Law, supra note 162, at 235.  
166 On the importance of trustworthiness among corporate participants, see M.M. 
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the corporation as a contractual structure in which parties can freely bargain 
for their interests.  For communitarians, the contract is an inadequate 
instrument to govern corporate relationships and guarantee protection of 
corporate participants. 167  In particular, employees and lower level managers 
would be the parties at greatest disadvantage, lacking both shareholders’ 
economics means and their privileged access to corporate information as 
directors’ principals. 168   The losses suffered by non-shareholder 
constituencies in bust-up takeovers would provide a clear example of these 
parties’ inability to adequately protect themselves by contract. 169  
Accordingly, communitarians claim that the proper role of corporate law is to 
consider and protect the interests of all corporate members.  To achieve this 
                                                                                                                         
Blair & L.A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate 
Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735 (2001); Mitchell, Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law, supra 
note 162. 
167 Some commentators argue that the communitarian or anti-contractarian theory of 
the firm is merely a modern version of the “old” concession theory of the corporation. These 
scholars reconnect the special public character of corporations advocated by communitarians 
to the state’s sovereignty concession to corporations. Fro this perspective, state confirmation 
would still represent an essential element in order to legally effectuate a corporate structure.  
The result of such historical vision of corporations as entities emanating from state 
concession is that for anti-contractarians certain regulatory provisions are untouchable (i.e., 
cannot be waived or modified by private ordering). The most important among these 
provisions are directors’ fiduciaries duties to creditors. See A.E. Conaway Stilson, 
Reexamining the Fiduciary Paradigm at Corporate Insolvency and Dissolution: Defining 
Directors’ Duties to Creditors, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (1995). 
168 See Brudney, Corporate Governance, supra note 162, at 1403.  
169 See Singer, supra note 162, at 618.  
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end, they advocate a corporate system for the large part comprised of 
mandatory rules,170 rejecting the contractarian idea of gap-filling corporate 
rules.  In other terms, communitarians conceive regulation as the only 
mechanism able of efficiently shaping corporate relationships.171  
As a matter of fact, communitarians embrace an egalitarian and 
progressive view of society, which radically departs from the utilitarian 
                                                
170 The leading advocates of the mandatory nature of legal rules include Victor 
Brudney, Melvin Eisenberg and Jeffrey Gordon. Brudney, in particular, justifies the need for 
government intervention on the ground of “the institutionalized disparity in bargaining power 
between management and dispersed investors over the terms of their arrangement.” See 
Brudney, Corporate Governance, supra note 162, at 1444. Similarly, Eisemberg (while not 
necessary a communitarian) claims that corporate law is for the large part comprised of 
mandatory rules.  See M.A. Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1461, 1462 (1989). Gordon is probably the strongest supporter of the mandatory nature 
of corporate law, suggesting that such rules “are one bulwark against opportunism….” See 
Gordon, supra note 162, at 1555, 1597-98. For a discussion of the mandatory nature of 
corporate law that puts at the center of the analysis the role of courts, see J. Coffee, The 
Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial  Role, 89 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1618, 1619 (1989) (arguing that “what is most mandatory is not a particular rule, but 
rather the use of courts as an ex post dispute resolution mechanism to resolve those issues 
and contingencies that the inevitable incompleteness of the corporate contract leaves open.”)  
171 The change in state anti-takeover regulation constitutes a clear example of the 
communitarians’ call for corporate law reforms. This regulation intervened to modify 
existing corporate law in order to take into better account the losses of non-shareholders 
constituencies and curb the effect of hostile takeovers on such corporate members. See 
Millon, supra note 131, at 233; D. Millon, State Takeover Laws: A Rebirth of Corporation 
Law?, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 903, 905 (1988).  See also infra notes 269-270 and 
accompanying text. 
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individualism of contractarians. 172   They believe in a shared moral 
commitment among the members of a same community of interests, under 
which individual members enjoy rights and owe duties independently from 
any contractual boundary. 173  Government action is required to prevent 
deviant behaviors among the community’s members.  Hence, legal rules and 
institutions are the means to protect and enhance the freedom of the 
community’s members rather than the instrument that constrains their 
freedom.174 
As within the contractarian theory, the role and duties of directors is 
at the core of the communitarian theory.  Within this theory, directors are 
viewed as the fundamental instrument to balance distributional disparities 
among corporate participants. Accordingly, directors should exercise their 
authority over the corporation to maximize the interests of shareholders as 
much as those of employees, suppliers, consumers, local communities, and 
any other corporate constituency.   This is the so-called multi-fiduciary or 
                                                
172 For some insights on the political theory underlying communitarianism, see Cox, 
supra note 133, at 396-398; J.R. Wallach, Liberals, Communitarians, and the Tasks of 
Political Theory, 5 POLITICAL THEORY 568-611 (1987); R. RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF 
PRAGMATISM (1982); R. Rorty, Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism, J. PHIL. 583 (1983); M. 
SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE, (1982); M. Sandel, Morality and the 
Liberal Idea, THE NEW REPUBLIC, 7 May 1984, 15-17 (1984).  
173 Millon, Contractarians, Communitarians, supra note 162, at 1382. 
174 Id. at 1383 (“To communitarians, life chances should not depend entirely on 
accidents of birth and bargaining power: people are entitled to more out of life than what 
they can pay for.”).  
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entity model of corporate governance, under which directors’ fiduciary duties 
are owed to all corporate participants.175  This model requires directors to 
evaluate the effects of their decisions on each category of corporate 
participants, avoiding strategies that can negatively affect one category or the 
other.   
It is thus unsurprising that communitarians reject the contractarian 
view of directors’ fiduciary duties as default rules, defending the mandatory 
nature of such duties.176  In their view, corporate law needs to regulate 
directors’ fiduciary duties in order to assure full protection of non-
shareholder interests.  Hence, corporate actors cannot establish dominant 
                                                
175  See R.M. Green, Shareholders as Stakeholders: Changing Metaphors of 
Corporate Governance, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1409, 1419 (1993). It is important to 
emphasize, however, that not all communitarians agree with this paternalistic view of the 
corporate system. Instead, the communitarian movement involves at least other two variants. 
The first, and perhaps more important, is the variant centered on economic efficiency rather 
than egalitarianism.  Under this variant, the maximization of overall corporate welfare rather 
than shareholder wealth is chosen because more efficient rather than more fair. See infra Part 
IV.2.1.2. The second, instead, is the “neo-republican” variant.  This variant substitutes 
participatory political mechanisms to the egalitarian instance’s institutional mechanisms. 
Among the theorists of neo-republicanism, see F. Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 
1493 (1988); C.R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988).  For 
a legal overview, see Cox, supra note 133, at 396-397, 402, 470-474.  
176 Among the studies that support this view f fiduciary duties, see A.G. Anderson, 
Conflicts of Interests: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate Structure, 25 UCLA L. REV. 738, 
756, 760 (1978); D.M. Branson, Assault on Another Citadel: Attempts to Curtail the 
Fiduciary Standard of Loyalty Applicable to Corporate Directors, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 375 
(1988); M.A. Eisenberg, supra note 162, at 1462; S. FitzGibbon, Fiduciary Relationship Are 
Not Contracts, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 303 (1999).  
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categories of stakeholders or require directors to subordinate non-
shareholders’ interests to shareholders’.  However, within this view, fiduciary 
duties also serve to protect shareholders’ interests.  This is because 
communitarians disregard the adequacy of the contractual instrument to 
mitigate not just conflicts among shareholders and other corporate 
participants, but also shareholders and directors.  Finally, for communitarians 
fiduciary duties should address and balance the divergences of power, wealth 
and interests among all corporate participants, including both shareholders 
and non-shareholders.  
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IV. ECONOMIC OR IDEOLOGICAL PARADIGMS?  
Part III has introduced the essential features that respectively 
characterize the contractarian and communitarian theories of the corporation 
and corporate fiduciary duties.  Framing this debate in terms of vertical and 
horizontal corporate conflicts is useful to further the understanding of each 
theory’s law and economics implications.177  Vertical corporate conflicts arise 
from the position of directors as agents running the business enterprise on 
behalf of outside investors.  Indeed, directors, as agents, may have incentives 
to pursue their own interests rather than the best interest of their investors.178  
Among others, they may shirk,179 extract private benefits from control,180 and 
entrench themselves.181 Economically, the common feature of these behaviors 
is that directors avoid taking costly actions that increase firm value—a 
                                                
177 See supra note 37 .  
178 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 10, at 308. 
179 “Shirking is the term commonly used to define situations where the agent is not 
fully focused on pursuing the principal’s best interest—in the corporate context, on 
maximizing corporate profits.”  See S. Sepe, Making Sense of Executive Compensation, 36 J. 
DEL. CORP. L. 136, 197, fn. 27 (2010). 
180  The extraction of private benefits can take several forms, including cash 
expropriation, perquisites’ consumption, the undertaking of projects that benefit the agent 
rather than the principal, and empire building (i.e., engaging in corporate expansion beyond 
what is rational). See A. Shleifer & R. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 
737, 742 (1997). 
181 Entrenchment occurs when directors and managers “stay on the job even if they 
are no longer competent or qualified to run the firm” See id., at 742-43. 
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problem generally labeled as insufficient effort.182  Viewed through this lens, 
the differences between the contractarian and communitarian positions are 
more formal than substantial.  Contractarians identify in the shareholders the 
exclusive principal of directors.  Instead, communitarians envision a model 
with multiple principals, 183  including investors in equity capital (i.e., 
shareholders), debt capital (i.e., debtholders), labor capital (i.e., workers), and 
all the other corporate constitutencies.  From a pragmatic perspective, 
however, this distinction is not that significant as concerns vertical conflicts, 
because the interests of outside investors are aligned when directors exert 
insufficient effort.  As put by one commentator, “the concerns about 
managerial slack [i.e., insufficient effort] are shared to some degree by all 
parties who contribute to the enterprise.”184  Accordingly, we can say that no 
                                                
   182 Economists broadly use the term effort to refer actions the agent takes to advance 
the principal’s interest. See, e.g., JOHN ROBERTS, THE MODERN FIRM: ORGANIZATIONAL 
DESIGN FOR PERFORMANCE AND GROWTH 126–27 (2004).  From this perspective, an agent 
exerts effort when she does not extract private benefits because she gives up the monetary 
and non-monetary benefits that may arise therefrom. 
183 In the economics of information, a common agency problem arises when a single 
agent performs tasks on behalf of multiple principals who have divergent preferences. See B. 
D. Bernheim & M. D. Whinston, Common Agency, 54 ECONOMETRICA 923, 923–24 (1986). 
Consistent with this paradigm, in the modern corporation directors/managers act as agents—
in the economic sense of the term—of multiple constituencies. On the one hand, they 
exercise delegated authority over the enterprise on behalf of the shareholders. On the other 
hand, in this position, they execute the non-shareholder constituencies contracts with the 
corporations. See Sepe, supra note 37, at 124-33 (arguing that the common agency model 
provide a better descriptive account of the modern public corporations than the classical 
principal-agent problem by capturing both vertical and horizontal conflicts of interest). 
184 G G. Triantis & R J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate 
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real disagreement exists between contractarians and communitarians as to the 
negative mandate of the duty loyalty, which is designed to prevent directors 
from engaging in self-interested conduct.   
The real conflict between contractarians and communitarians arises, 
instead, about horizontal corporate conflicts, which result from the competing 
claims of the firm’s outside investors.  Indeed, shareholders and other 
corporate constituencies intrinsically have divergent corporate interests.  
Shareholders expect managers to maximize corporate profits, while other 
corporate constituencies are fundamentally interested in the repayment of 
their fixed claims.185  For contractarians, however, the problem of horizontal 
corporate conflicts is negligible and, in any event, subordinated to that of 
vertical corporate conflicts.  It is negligible to the extent that maximizing 
shareholder wealth (i.e., corporate profits) also benefits other corporate 
constituencies by making more likely that the firm will duly meet its 
repayment obligations.  Further, it is subordinated because while a rule that 
requires directors to maximize shareholder wealth may engender negative 
externalities for other corporate constituencies, these constituencies can 
efficiently contract around these externalities.  On the contrary for 
communitarians, such a rule gives directors incentives to act in favor of 
                                                                                                                         
Governance, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1073, 1078 (1995).  See also Mitchell, supra note 37, at 603 
(“[F]iduciary rules meant to restrain vertical conflicts focus on the actions of the fiduciary 
rather than the interests of the beneficiary, with the correlative point that the identification of 
the beneficiary is relatively unimportant as long as it is clear that the fiduciary has no 
legitimate interest in the property entrusted to her.”)  
185 See Sepe, supra note 37, at 115 (2010). 
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shareholders and at the expense of other constituencies, with the contract 
being an inadequate instrument to protect the interest of non-shareholders. 
From this perspective, the debate between contractarians and communitarians 
can be more accurately described as a debate revolving around the positive 
mandate of the duty of loyalty, which cryptically requires directors to act “in 
the benefit of the corporation.”  For contractarians this benefit always 
coincides with that of shareholders.  On the contrary, for communitarians it 
coincides with the interest of the “corporate community” as a whole, which 
includes all the various corporate constituencies. 
This Part expounds on the efficiency-based considerations underlying 
the scholarly and judicial answers that have been provided to the normative 
question of who should be the ultimate beneficiary of directors’ positive 
obligation of loyalty.  To this end, this Part categorizes these answers under 
three different theoretical models (i) the contractarian-oriented shareholder 
primacy model, (ii) the communitarian entity model, and (iii) the more recent 
team-production model.186  It is important to note that the effort of placing 
scholarly and judicial discussions of this issue on equal footing creates 
overlaps and chronological lags in some parts of the analysis.  I maintain, 
however, that this is a little price to pay in light of the ultimate purpose of 
this analysis, which is to suggest that much of the modern debate around the 
puzzle of the beneficiary of directors’ fiduciary duties has been ideologically 
rather than economically driven.187  A thorough analysis of the paradigms that 
                                                
186 See supra note 49. 
187 CF. STOUT, supra note 6, at 3 (arguing that “shareholder value ideology is just 
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have been proposed to solve this puzzle reveals that contractarians and 
communitarians alike have chosen such paradigms more to suit ideological 
prejudices than develop an analytical theory of directors’ fiduciary duties.  A 
similar argument can be applied to the judicial decisions that have endorsed, 
whether directly or indirectly, one or the other of these approaches, with the 
ultimate result that the research of an answer to the fiduciary puzzle has 
failed to progress much.188  
1.  The Shareholder Primacy Model 
The principle that directors owe fiduciary duties to shareholders—
commonly known as shareholder primacy model (or rule)—provides the 
historical paradigm of U.S. corporate fiduciary law.189   As noted above, this 
                                                                                                                         
that—an ideology, not a legal requirement or a practical necessity of modern business life.”)  
While I share much of Stout’s criticism of the shareholder primacy model, I argue that she 
eventually falls in a similar ideological mistake in the elaboration of the team production 
theory of the corporation.  See infra Part IV.3.  
188 See Krugman, supra note 6 (making a similar claim about economic ideologies 
in general in the pre- and post- financial crisis landscape). 
189 See, e.g., Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: 
A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423 (1993) (“Shareholder wealth 
maximization long has been the fundamental norm which guides U.S. corporate 
decisionmakers”); Gordon Smith, supra note 131, at 283 (“The shareholder primacy norm is 
considered fundamental to corporate law”); K.B. Davis, Discretion of Corporate 
Management to Do Good at the Expense of Shareholder Gain-A Survey of, and Commentary 
on, the U.S. Corporate Law, 13 CAN.-U.S. L. J. 7, 8 (1988) ("The bedrock principle of U.S. 
corporate law remains that maximization of shareholder value is the polestar of managerial 
decisionmaking."); Lipson, supra note 67, at 1214 (“The shareholder maximization norm is 
the dominant theoretical approach to directorial duties …”); B.Black & R. Kraakman, A Self-
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paradigm has later become axiomatic of the contractarian theory, which has 
re-conceptualized shareholder primacy from an economically grounded 
perspective.   
Under the shareholder primacy model, the firm is conceived as a 
profit-making entity whose interest coincides with the shareholders’.190  In 
economic terms, within this model pursuing shareholders’ interest is the best 
proxy to increase aggregate social welfare.   Hence, the only concern of 
directors should be to produce the maximum returns for the shareholders’ 
corporate investments or—as stated in a famous decision—manage the 
                                                                                                                         
Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1921 (1996) ("The efficiency 
goal of maximizing the company's value to investors [is] the principal function of corporate 
law."); Millon, Communitarians, Contractarians, supra note 162, at 1374 (“[S] hareholder 
primacy has served as corporate law's governing norm for much of this century… [and] this 
governing norm heavily influences corporate decision making.”). 
190  The uncontested opinion among corporate scholars is that directors owe 
fiduciaries duties to common shareholders, but not preferred shareholders. Courts do not 
apply fiduciary duties standards to protect preferred stockholders’ rights, except in situations 
where the preferred shareholders’ interests are threatened by corporate control transactions 
involving interested directors or a controlling stockholder. Hence, many commentators 
suggest that preferred stockholders “are not stockholders at all”, but fixed claimants whose 
interests are exclusively regulated by explicit contracts. See, e.g., L.E. Mitchell, The Puzzling 
Paradox of Preferred Stock (And Why We Should Care About It), 51 BUS. LAW. 443, 444 
(1996); Mitchell, supra note 37, at 590-594; R.B. Robbins & B. Clark, The Board's 
Fiduciary Duty to Preferred Stockholders, 7 INSIGHTS 18 (1993); G.S. Crespi, Rethinking 
Corporate Fiduciary Duties: The Inefficiency of the Shareholder Primary Norm, 55 SMU. L. 
REV. 141 (2002); M.E. Van Der Weide, Against Fiduciary Duties to Corporate Stakeholder, 
21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 38 (1996). 
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corporation’s affair in order to get shareholders “until the last penny”.191 
 1.1. The Shareholder Primacy Model in the Academic Debate  
Several arguments have been advanced to justify shareholder 
primacy.  However, three stand out as largely dominant: (i) the shareholder 
ownership argument, (ii) the residual claimant argument, and (iii) the 
contractual incompleteness argument. The following discussion illustrates 
each of these arguments in turn.  
1.1.1. The Shareholder Ownership Argument  
The traditional argument used to support shareholder primacy rests on 
the position of shareholders as firm “owners”.  This argument dates back to 
the turn of the century, when the large public corporation with dispersed 
ownership replaced the closely held corporation as the dominant U.S. 
business model.192  The separation of ownership from control was the primary 
consequence of this novel business model, with directors substituting 
shareholders in the management of corporate affairs.  Harvard professors 
Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means famously articulated this view of the 
corporation in their 1932 masterpiece, The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property.193  The necessary corollary of this view was that shareholders, as 
                                                
191 See Revlon, supra note 234, at 182. See also infra Part IV.1.2.3. 
192 See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
193 See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 31. Although the argument of shareholder 
"ownership" is largely residual and mostly appearing in the popular press, the use of this 
argument is not infrequent at common law. See, e.g., Koehler v. Black, supra note 60; 
Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300 (Del. 1988); Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998).  
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owners of the corporation, deserved legal protection against the risk of 
misbehavior by those in charge of managing it, the directors.  That is, Berle 
and Means conceived the shareholder primacy norm as the response made 
available by law to the risk of expropriation of the shareholder-owners by 
opportunistic managers.  Thus, within this analytical framework the function 
served by corporate fiduciary law is limited to reconciling decentralized 
property with centralized management, without any consideration of the 
potential horizontal conflicts that may arise among the various corporate 
participants. 
Nobel laureate and Chicago school economist, Milton Friedman 
famously re-proposed the shareholder ownership argument in an article that 
appeared on the New York Times in 1970, observing that because 
shareholders are "the owners of the business", the only "social responsibility 
of a business is to increase its profits."194  For Friedman, directors are nothing 
more than employees hired by shareholders-owners to the purpose of 
incrementing the value of shareholders’ corporate investments.  Therefore, 
directors should “conduct the business in accordance with [shareholders’] 
desires, which generally will be to make as much money as possible ….”195 
Both critics and supporters of the shareholder primacy rule, however, 
have challenged the shareholder ownership argument. For example, professor 
                                                
194 M. Nobel , The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32-33, 122-26. 
195 Id. 
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Lynn Stout—one of the proponents of the team production model of 
corporate law—196 has criticized this explanation as “the worst argument for 
shareholders’ primacy”.197  But even the “most frequent defender of the 
shareholder primacy norm”, 198  Stephen Bainbridge, has rebutted this 
argument.  Indeed, commentators on both sides agree that the shareholder 
ownership argument is based on a misconception of corporate law or—to use 
Professor Bainbridge’s words—“what is now an outdated theory of the firm”. 
199 Shareholders do not own the corporation.  They do not exercise control 
over the corporate assets nor have any direct right on corporate earnings—
two essential features of ownership.200  As the next paragraph will explain, 
shareholders are instead “residual corporate claimants”. 
1.1.2. The Residual Claimant Argument  
The argument that shareholders are residual claimants—introduced in 
the law and economics scholarship by Chicago Law School professors Frank 
                                                
196 See infra Part IV.3. 
197 See L.A. Stout, Bad and Not-so-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1190 (2002).  
198 Gordon Smith, supra note 131, at 281. 
199 See Bainbridge, supra note ___, at 1427.  
200 See S.M.H. Wallman, The Proper Interpretation of Corporate Constituency 
Statutes and Formulation of Director Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 163, 172 (fn. 27) (1991). 
(“Legally, of course, the shareholders are not the "owners" of the corporation. They cannot 
pledge its assets or sell them, they cannot act for the corporation in business dealings, and 
they cannot hire and fire employees. Simply put, shareholders own stock, not the 
corporation.”)  
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Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel201—is the standard contractarian justification 
for shareholder primacy.  As observed by Easterbrook and Fischel, 
“[s]hareholders are residual claimants to the firm’s income …[This means 
that] [t]he gain and losses from abnormally good or bad performance are the 
lot of shareholders, whose claims stand last in line”.202  In other terms, 
shareholders’ payoff structure makes them intrinsically interested to overall 
firm performance.  Instead, other corporate participants only have fixed 
claims on the corporate income stream and are, therefore, less interested in 
the outcome of corporate projects.  Hence, because shareholders “receive 
most of the marginal gains and incur most of the marginal cost”203 from the 
corporate activity, they are in the best position to exercise discretion over 
corporate affairs.204  The structure of the modern corporation, however, 
prevents shareholders from exercising discretionary powers directly.205  This 
explains why the law attributes shareholders voting rights: to elect directors 
who will exercise corporate discretion on their behalf.  From this perspective, 
fiduciary duties set the default contractual terms of the shareholder-director 
contracts, requiring directors to exercise delegated discretionary powers in 
the exclusive benefit of shareholders, as residual corporate claimants.  
                                                
201 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 38, at 36-39, 67-68. 
202 Id., at 68.  
203 F. Easterbrook & D. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J. L. ECON. 353, 403 
(1983). 
204 Id. 
205 See supra Part III.1.1.1.  
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Further, the exclusive attribution of voting rights and fiduciary duties to 
shareholders serves as the means to ensure that directors will not deviate 
from the desirable decisional scheme.  Indeed, giving shareholders the power 
to remove the board and bring liability actions against them provides 
directors with the right incentives to avoid self-interested conducts in order 
“to advance their own careers and avoid being ousted.” 206   
Therefore, the ultimate assumption underlying the residual claimant 
argument in favor of the shareholder primacy rule is that under this rule each 
corporate participant receives exactly what she has bargained for.  On the one 
hand, shareholders receive the residual right to the firm’s income and, 
therefore, representation on the board of directors in order to monitor firm’s 
performance and ensure enforcement of their corporate contract.  On the 
other hand, other corporate constituencies receive the right to fixed 
compensation and other obligations, as provided for by their individual 
contracts with the firm.207  
1.1.3.  The Contractual Incompleteness Argument 
As the most influential explanation of the shareholder primacy 
norm,208 the residual claimants argument has also been the most criticized.  
                                                
206 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 38, at 68.  
207 Cf. O. Williamson, Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance, 43 J. FIN. 
567 (1988) (arguing that debt governance works mainly out of rules (i.e., specified 
contractual provisions), while equity provides for the exercise of discretion.  
208 In Ashman v. Miller Justice Hamilton held: “Equity recognizes that stockholders 
are the proprietors of the corporate interest and are ultimately the only beneficiaries thereof.  
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Some commentators have challenged its descriptive and normative value, 209 
others have questioned its efficiency, 210 and still others have argued that the 
residual claimant argument is simply irrelevant. 211  In particular, Yale Law 
School professor Jonathan Macey has argued that the residual claimant 
argument does not provide sufficient support for making shareholders the 
exclusive beneficiaries of fiduciary obligations. 212   This is because 
shareholders are not the only corporate constituency interested in the 
corporate decision-making process.  Instead, there are situations in which 
non-shareholders are as interested in the outcomes of corporate projects as 
                                                                                                                         
Those interests are in virtue of the law entrusted through the corporation to the directors and 
from that condition arises the trusteeship of the directors with the concomitant fiduciary 
relationship.” See Ashman v. Miller, 101 F.2d 85, 90-91 (6th Cir. 1939).  
209 See, e.g., Stout, supra note 97, at 1195, 1208 (suggesting that the residual 
claimant argument “treats shareholders' supposed status as sole residual claimants as a 
normative desideratum rather than as a positive description of the state of the world”); Green, 
supra note 175 (arguing that non-shareholders constituency statutes demonstrate both the 
descriptive and normative deficiency of the shareholder primacy rule).  
210 See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 49, at 287-289 (criticizing the suitability of 
the rule to promote overall welfare maximization); Crespi, supra note 49, at 143 
(“[E]conomic efficiency would be enhanced if the locus of corporate officials' fiduciary 
duties was redefined as running to the corporation”).  
211 See, e.g., Gordon Smith, supra note 131 (considering the shareholder primacy 
norm irrelevant to corporate decision making in modern, publicly traded corporations but for 
takeover contexts).  
212  J.R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making 
Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. 
REV. 23 (1991). For a detailed critic of Professor Macey’s argument, see Wallman, supra 
note 200.  
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shareholders. This is the case of, for example, corporate decisions that risks 
jeopardizing the payment of non-shareholders’ fixed claim.213  Thus, the 
argument that shareholders, as the constituency that bears most of the 
                                                
213  To better illustrate this argument, Macey proposes the following asset 
substitution example. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. He considers corporate 
directors of a company with only two classes of claimants (i.e. shareholders and fixed 
claimants) who face a corporate decision among three projects:  
(i) Project A, which has a 50% chance of producing a payoff with a 
present value of $1 million and a 50% chance of producing a payoff 
with a present value of $5 million at the end of period one (Thus, the 
expected present value of Project A is $3 million.); 
(ii) Project B, which has a 50% chance of a payoff with a present value of 
$1 million, and a 50% chance of a payoff with a present value of $6 
million at the end of period one (Thus, Project B has an expected value 
of $3.5 million.); and 
(iii) Project C, which has a 50% chance of producing a payoff with a present 
value of $500,000, and a 50% chance of producing a payoff with a 
present value of $10 million at the end of period one. (Thus, Project C 
has an expected value of $5.25 million.). 
He further poses that at the end of period one the company will owe the fixed 
claimants $1 million. For the fixed claimants the choice between Project A and Project B 
will be irrelevant. This is because in both cases the company will be able to meet its 
obligations to them. But the fixed claimants’ position changes “dramatically” in relation to 
Project C.  In such a case, in fact, the fixed claimants run the risk that the company will not 
be able to pay back its debt. Therefore, the fixed claimants will not indifferent to the 
potential directors’ decision to pursue Project C. Id. at 29-31.  As I will explain in more 
detail in Part V of this research, this kind of situation poses a serious challenge to any 
contractarian elaboration of fiduciary duties.  In fact, the problem of asset substitution 
provides an example that challenges not just the residual claimant argument in favor of 
shareholder primacy—as Macey suggests.  Instead, it also challenges Macey’s own argument 
to support shareholder primacy.  See infra Part V.3. 
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marginal costs of the corporate activity,214 should be the sole beneficiaries of 
directors’ duties is incomplete.  As a matter of fact, such argument does not 
explain why other constituencies do not deserve the same kind of protection, 
at least when corporate decisions are potentially detrimental to their corporate 
interests.   
Macey suggests that the ultimate reason for shareholder primacy 
consists on the greater difficulties (i.e., higher costs) implied by the 
shareholders’ corporate contracting. 215   These difficulties make it 
technologically impossible for shareholders to achieve full contractual 
protection by contract.  Instead, other corporate constituencies can effectively 
bargain for contractual protection, because of their more limited interest in 
the firm’s economic performance.216  Furthermore, non-shareholders can rely 
on judicial gap filling of their explicit corporate contracts.  Instead, because 
                                                
214 On the link between ownership of the firm and the class of corporate participants 
that bear the highest costs of market contracting, see H. Hansmann, Ownership of the Firm, 4 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 267, 278-79. 
215 Together with Geoffrey Miller, Macey further developed such an argument for 
shareholder primacy.  Indeed, they have argued that “the aggregate value of fiduciary duties 
to any group within the firm diminishes as those rights are shared with other groups”. See 
Macey & Miller, supra note 158, at 403. 
216 In particular, Macey argues that non-shareholders would be able to protect 
themselves “by retaining negative control over the firm's operations”. In other words, non-
shareholders would have the ability of negotiating contractual rights to veto potentially any 
directorial decision. The fact that this does not normally happen is explained by the 
unwillingness of such corporate actors to pay for it (for example through reduced salaries or 
lower interest rates). Id. at 36. 
Tesi di dottorato di Saura Masconale discussa presso l’Università LUISS Guido Carli. Soggetta a copyright. 
Sono comunque fatti salvi i diritti dell’Università LUISS Guido Carli di riproduzione per scopi di ricerca e 
didattici, con citazione della fonte. 
 
88 
 
of the implicit nature of their corporate contract, shareholders cannot rely on 
judicial gap filling.  On this view, the attribution to shareholders of directors’ 
fiduciaries duties is the only available device to fill in the implied terms of 
the shareholders’ contract.  In the end, making shareholders the exclusive 
beneficiaries of directors’ duties simply give them “a level of judicial 
protection commensurate with the nature of the firm's contractual obligations 
to them”. 217 
This view—which I dub as neo-contractarian because it moves past 
traditional contractarian positions—has the merit of pointing out the 
oversimplification underlying the classical residual claimant argument in 
favor of shareholder primacy.   In the real world, there are many corporate 
situations that are of interest for other corporate constituencies as much as for 
shareholders.  Nevertheless, the neo-contrarian explanation of shareholder 
primacy fails to consider that in many of these situations, the contract may be 
as inadequate an instrument to protect the interests’ of other corporate 
constituencies as the shareholders’.  After all, if one brings the incomplete 
contract approach to the extreme, no contract can foresee and specify all 
possible contingencies when a relationship is long-term—as corporate 
relationships are.  
1.2.   The Shareholder Primacy Model at Common Law  
As noted above, while shareholder primacy has later emerged as 
paradigmatic of the contractarian instance, it has also historically dominated 
                                                
217 Id., at 44. 
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American case law.218  Some commentators observe that the shareholder 
primacy rule has been displayed at common law well before the 1830 Ohio 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Taylor v. Miami Exporting Co in 1830,219 which is 
commonly acknowledged as the first case endorsing such a rule. 220 
1.2.1. Early Decisions 
As most of the subsequent early decisions on shareholder primacy, 
Taylor v. Miami Exporting Co. grounded the dominant position of 
shareholders on the existence of a trust relationship between directors, as 
                                                
218 See A.B.A. Section of Business Law, Committee on Corporate Law, Other 
Constituencies Statutes: Potential for Confusion, 45 BUS. LAW. 2253, 2255 (1990) 
[hereinafter ABA REPORT, Other Constituencies Statutes] ("With few exceptions, courts 
have consistently avowed the legal primacy of shareholder interests when management and 
directors make decisions."). 
219 Taylor v. Miami Exporting Co., 5 Ohio 162 (1831).  
220 For these commentators, contemporary judicial rulings and scholarly work, in 
addition to early corporate charters and incorporation statutes, provide evidence on the 
application of the principle that would later become known as “shareholder primacy” since 
early American corporate law.  The treatment of dividends and the exclusive attribution of 
voting rights to shareholders should be read in this sense. Similarly, the characterization of 
the shareholder-director relationship as one of trust would necessarily entail a duty on the 
part of the directors to act to the exclusive benefit of shareholders. Yet, the strongest 
argument in this line is probably that concerning the shareholders’ exclusive right to initiate 
a derivative action (i.e., an action on behalf and to the benefit of the corporation) against the 
company’ s directors.  See, e.g., Gordon Smith, supra note 131, at 291-304. For an early 
account, see also J.S. DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
CORPORATIONS 18-19 (1917).  
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trustees, and shareholders, as trustors. 221  In upholding a fiduciary claim 
brought against the directors of Miami Exporting Co. by a shareholder, 222 the 
Ohio Supreme Court stated that:  
[a]ll corporations are trustees for the individuals of which they are 
composed, and those who act for the corporation and conduct its 
affairs, are trustees for the corporation and cannot appropriate the 
corporation funds to their individual advantage, to gratify their 
passions or to serve any other purposes than those for the general 
interest of the corporation and its creditors.223   
The language of the court was even more explicitly in Dodge v. 
Woolsey, 224  the first case in which the United States Supreme Court 
recognized the shareholder primacy rule.  The Supreme Court stated that:  
It is now no longer doubted, either in England or the United States, 
that courts of equity, in both, have a jurisdiction over corporations …. 
to restrain those who administer them from doing acts which would 
amount to a violation of charters, or to prevent any misapplication of 
                                                
221 See supra text accompanying notes 60-61  (discussing the “law-of-trust” origins 
of American corporate fiduciary law)  
222 The case involved a claim brought against the directors of the Miami Exporting 
Company by one of its shareholders. The directors were accused to have implemented an 
illegitimate transaction to the sole purpose of determining a certain outcome in the next 
election of the company’s board.  See Taylor, supra note 219, at 162. 
223 See id., at 166.  
224 See Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1855). 
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their capitals or profits, which might result in lessening the dividends 
of stockholders, or the value of their shares ….225 
From this brief analysis, it clearly emerges that early common law—
similar to early scholarly arguments in support of the shareholder primacy 
norm226—exclusively focused on the vertical dimension of corporate conflicts 
(i.e., the conflict between directors and shareholders), without taking into 
account horizontal conflicts.   
1.2.2. Dodge v. Ford  
After the ruling of the Supreme Court in Dodge v. Woolsey, American 
courts began to steadily enforce the shareholder primacy rule.  However, it is 
the 1919 decision of the Michigan Supreme Court in Dodge v. Ford Motor 
Co. (“Dodge v. Ford”) that is commonly recognized as the case that set the 
judicial paradigm of the rule “once and for all”.    
Dodge v. Ford arose from a lawsuit brought against Ford’s board of 
directors by some minority shareholders (the Dodge brothers), 227  who 
                                                
225 Id., at 341. 
226 See supra Part IV.1.1.1. 
227 See Dodge v. Ford, supra note 5. Among the many authors who acknowledge 
the axiomatic value of the ruling in Dodge, see, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 189, at 1423 
(“[O]ne rarely finds stronger judicial rhetoric than that used by the court in the now classic 
case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co”);  Blair & Stout, supra note 49 at 301, (“The 1919 decision 
in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. is one of the most frequently cited cases in support of the 
shareholder primacy view”); Gordon Smith, supra note 131, at 315 (“The most quoted (…) 
statement of the shareholder primacy norm is taken from Dodge v. Ford Motor Co”).  
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challenged the board’s refusal to pay out dividends despite the firm’s high 
profits.228  Under the influence of Henry Ford—the company’s controlling 
shareholder and board chairman229—the Ford’s board had indeed decided to 
pursue a plan to expand the company’s manufacturing operations. Among 
others, this plan entailed the withholding of dividend payments owed to the 
corporation’s shareholders.230  Mr. Ford justified his expansion projects on 
the “humanitarian” ground of creating more jobs and benefiting consumers 
through less expensive cars.231  In ruling about these events, the Supreme 
Court of Michigan established what was to become the most oft-cited judicial 
reference for the shareholder supremacy norm:232 
                                                
228 At the time of the case, Ford Motor Company was a more than flourishing 
corporation, reasonably expecting a profit for the year of upwards $60,000,000.  See Dodge 
v. Ford, supra note 5, at 503.  
229 Id., at 504 (“Mr. Henry Ford is the dominant force in the business of the Ford 
Motor Company. No plan of operations could be adopted unless he consented, and no board 
of directors can be elected whom he does not favor.”) 
230 The expansion plan approved by the board provided for the enlargement of Ford 
factory and the construction of another giant manufacturing facility and iron smelting plant.  
See id., at 503-504.  
231 The plaintiffs alleged that the proposed expansion plan was “inimical to the best 
interests of the company and its shareholders and that, in any event, the withholding of the 
special dividend they had asked for, was arbitrary action of the directors requiring judicial 
intervention.” The board replied that it had been the policy of the corporation for a 
considerable time to annually reduce the selling price of cars, and that the company had long 
planned an expansion of its manufacturing capacity for which it was necessary to retain 
profits.  See id., at 499.  
232 Some commentators, however, have proposed an antithetical reading of the 
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A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the 
profit of the stockholders.  The powers of the directors are to be 
employed for that end.  The discretion of directors is to be exercised 
in the choice of means to attain that end and does not extend to a 
change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits or to the 
nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them 
to other purposes.233 
From an historical perspective, this passage of Dodge v. Ford 
perfectly fits the pioneering corporate era in which it occurred.  In that era, 
the U.S. corporate system was still in a phase of relative expansion. This 
                                                                                                                         
ruling in Dodge v. Ford.  They argue that Ford at the time was a closely held corporation, 
oppressed by the force of Mr. Ford.  Thus, the court’s ruling should be more accurately read 
as a statement on the conflict among shareholders themselves rather than the content of 
directorial duties. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 49, at 302 (“[T]he decision in Dodge v. 
Ford Motor Co. is most accurately construed as a statement about the special duties 
shareholders owe each other in closely held corporations, not about the relationship between 
shareholders and other stakeholders in a corporation.”); Gordon Smith, supra note 131, at 
279 (“[T]he court thought it was merely deciding a dispute between majority and minority 
shareholders in a closely held corporation .… In short, Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. is best 
viewed as a minority oppression case.”). 
233 Id. at 507. It is worth observing that the Supreme Court of Michigan denied to 
take into account whether the decision of the board to enlarge its business was "inimical to 
the best interests of the company and its shareholders” because of the protection afforded by 
the business judgment rule.  However, the court imposed on Ford to pay out dividends to its 
shareholders, since there was no reason for withholding the profits not employed to expand 
the business.  The courts interpreted the accumulation of such retained earnings as “a clear 
evidence of an arbitrary refusal to distribute funds that ought to have been distributed to the 
stockholders as dividends.”  See id., at 508-9.
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commanded bright-line rules in favor of shareholders in order to incentivize 
more corporate investments and the development of a mature capitalistic 
system.  Equating shareholder value with corporate value—as Dodge v. Ford 
did—was a shortcut to achieve this goal.  Accordingly, any deviation from 
this equation was conceived as potentially jeopardizing the social goal of 
American capitalism.   
1.2.3. Revlon  
The modern case in support of the shareholder primacy rule is Revlon, 
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. (“Revlon”)234—a takeover case.  
As discussed above, following the concerns raised by the spread of hostile 
takeovers of the 1980s, both corporate law scholarship and case law started to 
pay increased attention to non-shareholder constituencies.235  This “reform 
movement” gained vast popularity when several states enacted new statutes 
that allowed directors to take into account the interests of non-shareholder 
components in major business decisions—the so-called non-shareholders 
constituency statutes.236  Judicial rulings along the same line followed soon.  
For example, in Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,237 the Delaware Supreme 
                                                
234 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 
(Del. 1986). On the link between the ruling of the court in Revlon and the shareholder 
primacy norm, see, e.g., R.F. Hartman, Situation-Specific Fiduciary Duties for Corporate 
Directors: Enforceable Obligations or Toothless Ideals?, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1761, 
1769 (1993).  
235 See supra Part II.2. 
236 See infra notes 265-66 and accompanying text. 
237 See Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955-56 (Del. 1985).  
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Court explicitly recognized the directors’ power to take into account "the 
impact [of takeovers] on 'constituencies' other than shareholders (i.e., 
creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community 
generally)".238  This movement, however, was suddenly “frozen” by the 1986 
ruling in Revlon, which held directors liable for adopting defensive takeover 
measures with the purpose of, among others, protecting the interests of 
certain creditors of the company. 
To better grasp the Delaware Supreme Court’s reasoning in Revlon, it 
seems useful to briefly outline the underlying facts. Pantry Pride, Inc. (the 
plaintiff) approached Revlon proposing to acquire the company. The Revlon 
board, however, rejected Pantry Pride’s offer, suspecting that it would be 
financed by junk bonds and, therefore, result in the company’s dissolution.  
In order to thwart Pantry Pride’s efforts to acquire the company, the board 
also adopted several defensive measures.  Among others, these measures 
included a share repurchase program and an exchange offer program.  Under 
the latter program, existing Revlon shares were exchanged with newly issued 
notes that provided for anti-takeover covenants, such as covenants limiting 
Revlon's ability to incur additional debt, sell assets or issue dividends.239   
                                                
238 Id., at 955.  See also infra Part IV.2.2.1 (discussing the Unocal decision in 
detail). 
239 Revlon, supra note 234, at 176-177. In order to stop Pantry’s original “junk 
bonds financing” plan, the Revlon’s board first adopted a “Note Purchase Rights Plan”, 
which enabled Revlon to buy out existing shareholders at a substantial premium upon some 
triggering events.  Further, the board repurchased 10 million of the company outstanding 
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Pantry Pride, however, went on with the acquisition plan.  It 
countered the board’s actions with several offers—each revising the bidding 
price upward and conditional on the waiver of the notes’ restrictive 
covenants.240  In response, the board began negotiations with Forstmann 
Little & Co. (“Forstmann”), rapidly reaching an agreement for a leveraged 
buyout by Forstmann.  The original agreement provided for a share price of 
$56 and, importantly, the waiver of the notes’ restrictive covenants.241  When 
this agreement was announced to the market, however, the value of the notes 
fell abruptly and rumors of reported threats of litigation by “irate 
noteholders” started to spread.242  Moreover, Pantry Pride made a new, 
higher, offer of $56.25 per share, publicly announcing that it would top any 
higher bid from competitors.  At this point, the board rushed into closing the 
deal with Forstmann.  The final agreement provided for the following 
conditions: (i) Forstmann agreed to pay a purchase price of $57.25 per share; 
                                                                                                                         
shares exchanging for each share of common stock tendered one “Senior Subordinated 
Note”, which contained significant poison-pill-like covenants.  
240 See id., at 177-178. 
241 The original agreement with Forstmann also provided for a “golden parachute” 
option in favor of the incumbent board, that is, a termination agreement that granted 
substantial bonuses to Revlon directors and the right to buy stock in the new company. 
Further it provided for Forstmann’s obligation to pay off the debt incurred by Revlon 
through issuance of the Notes. See id., at 178. 
242 Id. (“The Notes, which originally traded near par, around 100, dropped to 87.50 
by October 8. One director later reported (at the October 12 meeting) a "deluge" of telephone 
calls from irate noteholders, and on October 10 the Wall Street Journal reported threats of 
litigation by these creditors.”)  
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(ii) a cancellation fee of $25 milion, and (iii) an exclusive-dealing promise 
that prevented Revlon from negotiating with other bidders, including Pantry 
Pride.  In exchange, Forstmann agreed to support the par value of the Revlon 
notes, which had faltered in the market, through an exchange of new notes.243 
The comparative analysis of the economics of the Pantry Pride and 
Fortmann offers emerges as a fundamental aspect of the court’s ruling. 244  
The court pointed out that while Forstmann's offer of $ 57.25 per share was a 
dollar worthier than Pantry Pride's $ 56.25 bid, Forstmann’s proposal was to 
be discounted for the time required to give full execution to the complex 
agreement agreed upon between the parties. 245   Furthermore, while 
Forstmann’s funding of the purchase price was not readily available, Pantry 
Pride already had a commitment by its investment banker to raise the 
acquisition balance in rapid times.  In this light, the only discriminating factor 
in favor of the Forstmann’s offer was Forstmann’s commitment to support 
the Revlon notes. 246  This circumstance induced the Delaware Supreme Court 
to condemn the Revlon directors for breach of their fiduciaries duties, 
                                                
243 See id. at 179. 
244 Id. 
245 See id. at 284. 
246 In addition to directly benefit the noteholders, this circumstance indirectly 
benefitted the directors, by shielding them from potential liability charges coming from the 
irate noteholders. (“In reality, the Revlon board ended the auction in return for very little 
actual improvement in the final bid. The principal benefit went to the directors, who avoided 
personal liability to a class of creditors to whom the board owed no further duty under the 
circumstances.”).  See id. 
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remarking that: 
[a] board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging 
its responsibilities, provided there are rationally related benefits 
accruing to the stockholders. However, such concern for non-
stockholder interests is inappropriate when an auction among active 
bidders is in progress, and the object no longer is to protect or 
maintain the corporate enterprise but to sell it to the highest bidder. 247   
In economic terms, the court adopted a Pareto criterion, establishing 
that the interests of non-shareholder constituents can be taken into 
consideration only when directors’ decisions are also beneficial to 
shareholders. 248  Therefore, under Revlon, directors’ decisions are conceived 
as the result of a constrained optimization problem, with shareholder value at 
any point in time representing the constraint.  Under this constraint, directors 
are allowed to make decisions that increase non-shareholder value as long as 
shareholder value does not decrease.  
Viewed through this lens, Revlon simply specified the limits of 
                                                
247 Id., at 182. 
248 The conclusion of Justice Moore’s opinion are very clear on the matter:  
in granting an asset option lock-up to Forstmann, we must conclude that under 
all the circumstances the directors allowed considerations other than the 
maximization of shareholder profit to affect their judgment, and followed a 
course that ended the auction for Revlon, absent court intervention, to the 
ultimate detriment of its shareholders. 
Id., at 185. 
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directors’ discretionary power to consider other constituencies’ interests, but 
it did not exclude this power.249  More specifically, Revlon established that 
when an auction among active bidders is in progress—in other words, when it 
is clear that the company is for sale—directors cannot take into consideration 
other interests but the shareholders’.  Thus, the defensive strategy adopted by 
the Revlon board at the time of the initial Pantry Pride’s offer was justified to 
protect the overall corporate interest to continuing Revlon as an independent 
entity.  But after the board had made clear that the breakup of the company 
was inevitable (by negotiating with Forstmann), 250  shareholder wealth 
maximization had become the only applicable standard.  Indeed, as remarked 
by the court: 
[t]he duty of the board had thus changed from the preservation of 
Revlon as a corporate entity to the maximization of the company's value at a 
sale for the stockholders' benefit ….  The directors' role changed from 
defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the 
                                                
249 Blair and Stout, in particular, argue that Revlon establishes that the sole field of 
application of the shareholder primacy rule is “when a formerly publicly held corporation is 
about to become essentially a privately held firm”. See Blair & Stout, supra note 49, at 309. 
Similarly, Gordon Smith suggests that Revlon confined the value of shareholder primacy to 
takeover contexts.  See Gordon Smith, supra note 131, at 280 (“The shareholder primacy 
norm serves a different function in the context of takeovers than it does in the context of 
ordinary business decisions.  Because takeovers usually are a terminal event for shareholders 
of the target corporation, the shareholder primacy norm protects rights that otherwise might 
be lost forever.”)   
250 Revlon, supra note 234, at 182. Indeed, by entering into negotiations with 
Forstmann, it was the board itself that recognized that the company was for sale. 
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best price for the stockholders at a sale of the company.251 
It is important to emphasize, however, that while the decision in 
Revlon is more economically grounded than prior decisions on the 
shareholder primacy rule, the fiduciary benchmark Revlon endorses might 
still lead to the exclusion of several Kaldor-Hicks efficient decisions.  For 
example, this benchmark excludes the opportunity of any inter-temporal 
shareholder transfer (i.e., the pursuing of long-term rather than short-term 
maximization goals), without taking into consideration that these transfers 
might be desirable from a social welfare point of view. 
1.2.4. Katz v. Oak Industries 
The decision in Revlon came just three days after another major 
decision concerning shareholder primacy, Katz v. Oak Industries. 252  Oak 
Industries, the company in question, signed an acquisition and stock purchase 
agreement with Allied-Signal Inc. (“Allied”), which provided for the transfer 
of some business activities and a large fraction of Oak shares to Allied in 
exchange for a substantial cash infusion.  Implementation of the Allied 
agreement was conditioned on the acceptance by 85 percent of Oak’s existing 
debtholders of a tender offer providing for the exchange of Oak’s outstanding 
debt securities into either cash or common stock.  The payout under the 
tender offer was lower then the debt securities’ par value but higher than their 
current market value.  Further, the tender offer was premised on the waiver of 
                                                
251 Id. 
252 See Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986). 
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certain protective covenants included in the underlying indentures.  Katz, one 
of Oak debtholders, sought to obtain a preliminary injunction to enjoin the 
consummation of the tender offer, contending that it constituted a “coercive 
device” that jeopardized the interests of debt securities holders. 253 
It is important to note that at the time of the acquisition agreement, 
Oak Industries was in serious financial difficulties, which made a major 
recapitalization vital to the prosecution of the business.  Indeed, the 
corporation’s financial situation was perhaps the most important factual 
assumption at the basis of the court’s legal reasoning.254  In considering the 
conflict of interests between Oak shareholders and debtholders, Chancellor 
Allen, sitting the case, observed:  
[t]his case does not involve the measurement of corporate or 
directorial conduct against that high standard of fidelity required of 
fiduciaries when they act with respect to the interests of the 
beneficiaries of their trust.  Under our law—and the law generally—
the relationship between a corporation and the holders of its debt 
                                                
253 See id. at 875. Katz argued that the exchange offer “benefited the common 
stockholders at the expense of the debt securities holders, forced the exchange of the debt 
instruments at an unfair price, and forced the debt holders to consent to the elimination of 
certain protective covenants.” Id., at 878. 
254 See id., at 877 (also pointing out that the required amendments to the indentures’ 
terms were essential to make Oak Industries able to finalize the purchase agreement and 
therefore obtain fresh cash). 
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securities, even convertible debt securities, is contractual in nature. 255   
The opinion of Chancellor Allen leaves no doubt on the identity of the 
beneficiaries of directors’ fiduciary duties.  Non-shareholders constituencies 
of the firm deserve no other rights than that provided for by the terms of their 
contractual agreements. Chancellor Allen went even further along these lines, 
observing:  
[i]t is the obligation of directors to attempt, within the law, to 
maximize the long-run interests of the corporation's stockholders; that 
they may sometimes do so "at the expense" of others (…) does not for 
that reason constitute a breach of duty. It seems likely that corporate 
restructurings designed to maximize shareholder values may in some 
instances have the effect of requiring bondholders to bear greater risk 
of loss and thus in effect transfer economic value from bondholders to 
stockholders.256   
Pursuant to Katz v. Oak Industries, the mandate of shareholder 
primacy may require directors to pursue shareholder wealth “at all costs” 
upon some circumstances—regardless of whether this may result in the 
undertaking of courses of actions that are detrimental to the interests of other 
corporate components.  The survival of the corporation is one of those 
circumstances.  That is, imposing losses on the debtholders may be justified 
                                                
255 Id. ,at 879. 
256 Id. 
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when this is the only means to avoid a termination-threatening event or—to 
use the words of Chancellor Allen—represents the “last good chance to 
regain vitality for [the] enterprise”.257  On this view, no corporate benefit can 
arise for any involved party unless shareholders’ interests are not satisfied in 
the first place.  In practice, this excludes any directorial discretion to 
implement actions that are not exclusively centered on shareholder wealth 
maximization. Analytically, directors’ decisions become an unconstrained 
optimization problem whose objective function is the maximization of 
shareholder wealth. 
This approach, however, fails to fully address the efficiency-based 
concerns underlying the case. Indeed, the continuation of the corporation as a 
going-concern is not desirable per se, but only to extent that a company’s 
going-concern value is higher than its liquidation value.258  That is, Kaldor-
Hicks considerations should guide the choice between continuation and 
liquidation of a business enterprise.  Yet, not similar consideration appears in 
Katz v. Oak Industries.  Further, similarly to Dodge v. Ford,259 this decision 
fails to address potential inter-temporal effects on corporate investments.  
One can reasonably expect that a rule that makes debtholders’ expropriation 
legitimate upon some circumstances may result in an increased cost of debt 
capital.  This is because debtholders will rationally anticipate the detrimental 
                                                
257 Id.  
258 See infra Part V.2. 
259 See supra Part IV.1.2.2. 
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effects of such a rule on their investment expectations and, therefore, demand 
ex-ante compensation for it.  For these reasons, Katz v. Oak Industries 
ultimately emerges as another ideologically driven decision on the 
shareholder primacy.  
2.  The Entity Model  
The entity model is the other mainstream theoretical approach to the 
analysis of the beneficiary of directors’ fiduciary duties.260  This model rebuts 
the idea of shareholder primacy and proposes a vision of directors’ duties as 
borne for the benefit of the corporate entity itself, that is, all corporate 
participants.   
2.1.  The Entity Model in the Academic Debate 
The common feature of entity model theories is the identification of 
the corporate entity itself as the beneficiary of directors’ fiduciary duties.  
However, the detailed articulation of this proposition differs—sometimes 
consistently—within the two variants of the model: namely, the egalitarian 
and the economically oriented variants.  
                                                
260 See, e.g., M. M. Blair, Stakeholders as Shareholders, Ownership and Control: 
Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-First Century, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1150 
(1996); W.S.W Leung, The Inadequacy of Shareholder Primacy: A Proposed Corporate 
Regime that Recognizes Non-Shareholder Interests, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 587 
(1997); Millon, Communitarians, Contractarians, supra note 162; Millon, Redefining 
Corporate Law, supra note 162; MITCHELL, PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW, supra note 162; 
Mitchell, A Critical Look, supra note 162.  
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2.1.1. The Egalitarian Variant  
As hinted to above, the egalitarian variant of the entity model arises 
out of the takeover concerns of the eighties.261  For scholars supporting this 
argument, the economic events of this period had the merit of bringing the 
interests of non-shareholders from the wings to center stage of academic, 
judicial, and regulatory discussion about fiduciary duties.262  It was indeed in 
response to “the prompt asset liquidations and plant closings [and] dramatic 
employee layoffs”263 of the takeover era that both judicial decisions and state 
laws became more sensitive to such interests.  
The defendants of the egalitarian variant see in the non-shareholder 
constituency statutes—enacted by most U.S. states in response to the 
distributive concerns raised by bust-up takeovers264—the means to move to 
                                                
261 See supra Part III.2. 
262 See Millon, supra note 131, at 241 (arguing that the hostile takeover era had the 
merit of fracturing “the complacently assumed unity of interest between the corporate entity 
and shareholders. As shareholders reaped unprecedented returns, lost jobs and other costly, 
highly publicized side effects focused attention on the fact that shareholder welfare did not 
necessarily imply corresponding benefits for nonshareholders.”). 
263 Id., at 234 (offering a detailed analysis of the effect of takeovers on various 
categories of “other constituencies” and, especially, employees.) 
264 In 1983, Pennsylvania was the first state to adopt a corporate constituency 
statute, soon followed by about other thirty states with the notable exception of Delaware.  
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1202(A) (1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313(e) 
(1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.111 (9) (1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202(5) (1989); HAW. 
REV. STAT. § 415- 35(b) (1990); IDAHO CODE § 30-1602 (1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, 
8.85 (1990), as amended by Pub.Act 86-126, 1989 Ill.Legis.Serv. 1314; IND. CODE ANN. § 
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23-1-35-1(d)(f)(g) (1990), as amended by Pub.Law 277-1989 (approved Feb. 23, 1989); 
IOWA CODE ANN. § 490.1108 (1990); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.12- 210(4) (1990); LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:92(G) (1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (1990); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, §  65 (1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251(5) (1991); MISS. 
CODE ANN. §  79-4-8.30 (1990); MO. ANN. STAT. § 351.347 (1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-
2035(l) (1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-14(4) (1990); N. M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11- 35(D) 
(1989); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §  1701.59 (1989); 
OR. REV. STAT. § 60.357(5) (1989); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § § 511(d), (e), (g) & 1721(e), 
(f), (g) (1990); R.I. GEN .LAWS §  7-5.2-8 (1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §  47-33-4 
(1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-35-204 (1988); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.305 (1990); WYO. 
STAT. § 17-16-830 (1989). 
In most cases the statutes’ provisions are introduced by the prefatory clause “[i]n 
considering the best interest of the corporation”, followed by the recital of the expanded 
interests directors may consider in the corporate decision-making process. See, e.g., ME. 
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (1990). Typically, the statement of interests includes one or 
more of the following provisions:  
1. The directors may consider the interests of, or the effects of their action 
on, various non-stockholder constituencies. 
2. These constituencies may include employees, customers, creditors, 
suppliers, and communities in which the corporation has facilities.  
3. The directors may consider the national and state economies and other 
community and societal considerations. See, e.g., OHIO REV.CODE ANN. 
§ 1701.59. 
4. The directors may consider the long-term as well as the short-term 
interests of the corporation and its shareholders. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 607.111(9) (1990).  
5. The directors may consider the possibility that the best interests of the 
corporation and its stockholders may best be served by remaining 
independent. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1202(A) (1990). 
6. The directors may consider any other pertinent factors. See, e.g., ILL. 
ANN. STAT. ch. 32, 8.85 (1990), as amended by Pub. Act 86-126. 
7. Officers may also be covered. See, e.g.,  ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, 
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the frontal assault of the shareholder primacy.265  From their perspective, the 
new statutes entail an affirmative and negative aspect. 266  The first authorizes 
directors to consider non-shareholder interests in the corporate decision-
making process, therefore “decentering” the role of shareholders within the 
firm.267  The negative aspect, instead, sets directors free from the exclusive 
                                                                                                                         
§ 716 (Supp. 1987). 
265 See Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, supra note 162; Johnson, supra note 162; 
Mitchell, supra note 162; Wallman, supra note 200; E.W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: 
Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14 (1992); P.J. Ryan, 
Calculating the "Stakes" for Corporate Stakeholders as Part of Business Decision-Making, 
44 RUTGERS L. REV. 555 (1992).  It is self-evident that the non-shareholder constituency 
statutes caused much upheaval among contractarians, who firmly among deplored their 
introduction. See S.M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 
PEPP. L. REV. 971 (1992); M.E. DeBow and D. R. Lee, Shareholders, Non-shareholders, and 
Corporate Law: Communitarians and Resource Allocation, 18 Del. J. Corp. L. 393 (1993); 
W.J. Carney, Does Defining Constituencies Matter?, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 385 (1990); J.J. 
Hanks, Jr., Playing with Fire: Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes in the 1990s, 21 
STETSON L. REV. 97 (1991); Macey, An Economic Analysis, supra note 212; Macey & 
Miller, supra note 158; L. Ribstein, Takeover Defenses and the Corporate Contract: Law 
Meets Economics, 78 GEO. L.J. 71 (1989) 
266 See, e.g., Millon, supra note 131, at 248. 
267 See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 37, at 584, 588-590; Millon, Redefining Corporate 
Law, supra note 162, at 225-226; D.W. Fessler, Of Fishes, Frogs and Franchises and the 
Humble Suggestion of Misplaced Governmental Priorities, 14 J. CORP. L. 111 (1988). In 
particular, David Millon has argued that “shareholders’ decentralization” should be intended 
as a new interpretation of the business judgement rule. Under the traditional view of 
directorial duties, directors fail to act in the best interest of the corporation–and are, 
therefore, liable for breach of duties–if they pursue interests different than shareholders’.  
Accordingly, “decentralizing” the role of shareholders means that directors should be 
shielded from liability if they “choose” non-shareholder interests over shareholders’  
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duty of maximizing shareholders’ wealth.  In fact, in a few cases, the statutes 
even give directors discretionary power to decide whether considering 
shareholders’ interest at all.268 
Nonetheless, non-shareholder constituency statutes are still far away 
from the implementation of the multi-fiduciary model of directors’ fiduciary 
duties advocated by communitarian-egalitarians.  Indeed, the statutes merely 
“consent” directors to consider non-shareholders’ interests. 269   For 
egalitarians, the lack of a mandatory provision requiring directors to pursue 
non-shareholders’ interests exposes non-shareholders to the risk that directors 
will simply continue to only pursue shareholders’ interests.270  They also 
                                                
268 See, e.g., ILL.ANN. STAT. ch. 32, 8.85, as amended by Pub.Act 86-126; MO. 
ANN. STAT. §  351.347; TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-35-204 (1988). However, “it seems highly 
unlikely that these legislatures intended actually to exclude shareholder interests from the 
realm of legitimate management discretion; these would no doubt be included among 
unspecified "pertinent factors" or be subsumed within the reference to the interests of the 
corporate entity.” See Millon, supra note 131, at 244. In this respect, it seems more relevant 
to observe that Connecticut’s statute once read that directors “shall consider” non-
shareholder interests. This provision, however, was amended in 2010 to read “may 
consider.”  CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-756 (West 2010).  Thus Connecticut has also 
joined the largely majoritarian positionamong state legislators of making the consideration of 
shareholders’ interests mandatory, as opposed to discretionary consideration of non-
shareholders’ interests.  See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59 (Baldwin Supp 1989).  
269 The non-shareholder constituency statutes do not provide any active role for non-
shareholders in the corporate governance of the firm, nor they attribute them voting rights or 
give non-shareholders any means to make directors accountable to them.  See Millon, supra 
note 131, at 244. 
270 Executive compensation schemes, capital market pressures, competition among 
corporations for debt financing, product (or service) market competition and other substantial 
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suggest, however, that giving the new statutes “serious interpretation” can 
help to reduce this risk.271  The several communitarian proposals that have 
attempted to articulate the content of this “serious interpretation” of the 
statutes can be summarized by the following tenets: 
(i) directors should not privilege short-term shareholders’ gains at 
expense of legitimate non-shareholders’ expectations;272  
(ii) directors should pursue wealth maximization strategies that 
balance shareholders’ interests and non-shareholders’ interests;273 and 
(iii) directors should pay the just tribute to the legitimate 
expectations of non-shareholder constituencies when the termination of 
existing relationships is necessary to serve the best interest of the 
corporation.274 
                                                                                                                         
incentives would, on the contrary, prevent directors to sacrifice shareholders’ interests in 
favor of non-shareholders.  See Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, supra note 162, at 260-
264.  
271 Id. at 265. 
272 In this respect, Lawrence Michell proposes a model that confers to non-
shareholders the right to challenge corporate actions that allegedly injured them. Non-
shareholders would have the burden of proving the damage caused by such actions. If they 
are successful, the burden should then shift on the board to show that such an action was 
undertaken in pursuit of a legitimate corporate purpose.  See Mitchell, supra note 37, at 635-
636. 
273 See, e.g., Millon, supra note 131, at 267-270. 
274 See, e.g., Green, supra note 175; MITCHELL, PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW, 
supra note 162; Mitchell, A Critical Look, supra note 162. 
Tesi di dottorato di Saura Masconale discussa presso l’Università LUISS Guido Carli. Soggetta a copyright. 
Sono comunque fatti salvi i diritti dell’Università LUISS Guido Carli di riproduzione per scopi di ricerca e 
didattici, con citazione della fonte. 
 
110 
 
As a matter of fact, these normative results seem based more on a 
common sense of justice than an efficiency rationale.  It is thus unsurprising 
that the egalitarian variant of the entity model has been largely criticized—
suggestively, by both contractarians and economically oriented 
communitarians.  The latter have mostly lamented the lack of efficiency-
considerations underpinning the model, which undermines its scientific rigor. 
Contractarians, instead, have advanced a more radical argument, which 
equally applies to the egalitarian and the economic-oriented variant of the 
entity model.   This is the so-called too many masters argument: requiring 
directors to consider non-shareholder interests in corporate decision-making 
would produce an ungovernable chaos, because directors should seek to 
balance too many and too different interests.275  Both these arguments, 
however, seem lacking. The first because the same criticism economic 
oriented communitarians move to egalitarians can be raised, as we shall see, 
                                                
275 The American Bar Association has expressed such a concern very clearly in its 
report on corporate constituency statute: 
The confusion of directors in trying to comply with such statutes, if interpreted to 
require directors to balance the interests of various constituencies without according 
primacy to shareholder interests, would be profoundly troubling. Even under 
existing law, particularly where directors must act quickly, it is often difficult for 
directors acting in good faith to divine what is in the best interests of shareholders 
and the corporation. If directors are required to consider other interests as well, the 
decision-making process will become a balancing act or search for compromise. 
When directors must not only decide what their duty of loyalty mandates, but also 
to whom their duty of loyalty runs (and in what proportions), poorer decisions can 
be expected. 
ABA REPORT, Other Constituencies Statutes, supra note 218, at 2269. 
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against their own elaborations of the directors’ duty of loyalty.276  And the too 
many masters arguments because it is overstated, especially if confronted 
with modern corporations’ multilayered capital structures, which counts not 
only different classes of stakeholders, but also shareholders.277  Denying 
consideration of other constituencies’ interests on the ground that it would 
make the life of corporate directors “too complicated” is out of touch with the 
actuality of corporate life.  
A better criticism to the egalitarian variant of the entity model is the 
one suggesting that such a model would risk making directors’ substantially 
unaccountable, both as concerns vertical and horizontal corporate conflicts.  
This is because the displacement of shareholders from their institutional 
monitoring position would leave directors free to act with unfettered 
discretion.278  This, on the one hand, would increase the risk of directors’ 
opportunism.  On the other hand, it could also potentially exacerbate 
                                                
276 See infra Part IV.2.1.2. 
277 See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 158, at 413. 
278 Id., at 412. See also ABA REPORT, Other Constituencies Statutes, supra note 
218, at 2270. It is suggestive to observe that both these studies quote the work of Robert 
Clark on the matter: 
[a] single objective goal like profit maximization is more easily monitored than a 
multiple, vaguely defined goal like the fair and reasonable accommodation of all 
affected interests . . . . Assuming shareholders have some control mechanisms, 
better monitoring means that corporate managers will be kept more accountable. 
They are more likely to do what they are supposed to do and do it efficiently”. 
R.C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 20 (1986).   
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horizontal corporate conflicts, because a more conspicuous number of 
corporate constituencies would attempt to have their rights enforced trough 
judicial intervention under the egalitarian model.279  From an information 
perspective, such a model would inefficiently shift monitoring of directors’ 
conduct from shareholders to less informed third parties, i.e., courts.  
2.1.2. The Economic Variant 
Under the economic variant of the entity model the concept of 
“benefit of the corporation” is interpreted as requiring directors to maximize 
overall corporate value. Importantly, this view departs from both the 
shareholder primacy norm, which requires directors to exclusively maximize 
shareholder wealth, and the egalitarian variant of the entity model, under 
which sociological and public policy implications provide the justification for 
requiring directors to act in the interest of all corporate participants.   
Thomas Smith has clearly articulated the economic variant paradigm 
in an article published in the Michigan Law Review in 1999.280  The starting 
point of Smith’s “neo-traditional interpretation” of directors’ fiduciary—as 
he dubbed his theory—is that shareholders have been misunderstood as a 
                                                
279 See, e.g., ABA REPORT, Other Constituencies Statutes, supra note 218, at 2270 
(“If directors have, or may have, recognized legal duties to other constituencies, perhaps a 
new class or classes of plaintiffs will have access to the courts to redress perceived breaches 
of those duties or to challenge directors' failures to take various competing interests into 
account.”)  
280 See T.A. Smith, The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A Neotraditional 
Interpretation of Fiduciary Duty, 98 MICH. L. REV. 214, 216-217 (1999).  
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“natural economic component” of the corporation, rather than a legal 
category created by corporate law. 281  Shareholders have erroneously been 
reified as a separate and independent class of economic actors.282  Instead—as 
made clear by the modern financial canon and, in particular, the Capital 
Assets Pricing Model ("CAPM")283—shareholders are “rational investors” 
that diversify their investment risk among all classes of capital assets, 
                                                
281  Id., at 226. D.J.H. Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For Whom are 
Corporate Managers Trustees, Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021 (1996) (suggesting that 
shareholders are a “legal fiction”); Wallman, supra note 200, at 173-174 (deconstructing the 
monolithic image of shareholders through a analysis of the differences between long-term 
and short-term shareholders, and undiversified and diversified shareholders)  
282 Id., at 226-227, 236. (“Shareholders as a separate class, the Berle and Means 
"owners," represent a nostalgic longing for a political economy that never existed.”)  
283 The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) considers a specific corporate risk 
irrelevant to the determination of firm value because investors can eliminate that risk by 
diversifying their portfolios, that is, by investing in different types of capital assets.  The only 
risk that matters, therefore, is the volatility of the firm as a part of the market as a whole, i.e. 
the systematic risk. See J. Lintner, The Valuation of Risk Assets and the Selection of Risky 
Investments in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budget, 47 REV. ECON. & STAT.13 (1965); W.F. 
Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium under Conditions of Risk, 19 
J. FIN. 425 (1964).  For a law and economics account of these issues, see R.J. GILSON & B.S. 
BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 101 (2D ED. 1995); W. 
Carney, The Theory of the Firm:  Investor Coordination Costs, Control Premiums and 
Capital Structure, 65 WASH. U.L.Q. 1 (1987); H.T.C. Hu, Risk, Time, and Fiduciary 
Principles in Corporate Investment, 38 UCLA L. REV. 277 (1990); H.T.C. Hu, 
Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure and the Promise of 
Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1498 & n.247 (1993); L.A. Stout, How 
Efficient Markets Undervalue Stocks: CAPM and ECMH Under Conditions of Uncertainty 
and Disagreement, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 475 (1997).  
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including both corporate stocks and bonds.284  
From this observation, Smith moves to the deconstruction of the 
shareholder primacy rule as advocated by contractarians.  While his basic 
argument is based on the hypothetical-bargaining approach, it challenges the 
idea that the shareholder primacy norm obtains as “the right solution” of this 
approach.  This is because rational investors would never agree to a rule that 
allowed directors to make a decision that decreases the profitability of part of 
their portfolio (i.e., debt claims) by more than it enhances the value of 
another class of capital asset they hold (i.e., stock).  Instead, they would 
choose a rule instructing directors to make decisions that maximize the 
overall value of their diversified portfolios.285 
                                                
284 See Smith, supra note 280, at 239-242 (“[E]very rational investor holds the same 
portfolio of risky assets: each risky asset portfolio is a bigger or smaller slice of the same pie.  
But, bigger or smaller, each slice has the same ingredients and has them in the same 
proportions as every other slice and as the pie as a whole.”) Id., at 238. From this basic 
consideration it follows that rational investors are not divided into shareholders and 
bondholders, or any other layer of the corporate entity; they are investors whose risky asset 
portfolios are identical but for their size. See also T.A. Smith, Institutions and Entrepreneurs 
in American Corporate Finance, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1997). 
285 See supra note 280, at 217. Smith adduces a very clear example to underline the 
difference between shareholders’ wealth maximization and corporate value maximization. 
He assumes that the directors of a certain corporation (XYZ corporation), with a net value of 
$20 million and $15 million liabilities, face a choice regarding the undertaking of a risky 
corporate project. Such corporate investment requires an outlay of $ 10 million, and has a 
10% probability of paying off at $200 million, but also a 90% probability of generating 
losses of $20 million, i.e. losses equal to the whole net value of the company. Hence, the 
expected value of the investment is only $2 million and, net of the $10 million outlay, it has 
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While Smith adopts a contractarian counterargument, his theory 
clearly falls within the entity model of fiduciary duties. Smith’s efficient 
norm for corporate law differs from the shareholder primacy rule not only in 
substance—refusing such a rule as an inefficient gap-filler—but also in form.  
Under his theory, the corporate entity is the ultimate beneficiary of directors’ 
duties, meaning that directors are required to maximize the value of the sum 
of all the financial claims against the firm.286  From this perspective the entity 
model assumes a new economic meaning: the corporate entity is the 
beneficiary of directors’ duties because the duty to maximize overall 
corporate value needs an abstract collective entity capable of standing as 
object of the duty.  
In economic terms, Smith’s neo-traditional interpretation clearly 
endorses a Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion for administering directors’ 
fiduciary duties.  However, he does not address the important issue of how 
                                                                                                                         
a value of negative $8 million. Put simply, it is a bad investment. Yet, managers bound to a 
duty of maximizing shareholder wealth would be obliged to pursue such investment. As a 
matter of fact, the investment would not be so bad for shareholders; whereas it paid off at 
$200 million, they would get all of that, while if thing went wrong, they would lose only 
their investment in equity of XZY corporation, i.e. $5 million. However, the perspective 
radically changes if we consider shareholders as rational investors; in such a case, they 
would also have to consider the eventuality that if the investment goes wrong they could lose 
the whole of their investment in equity. Rational investor would not choose to pursue such an 
investment because the reduction of debt value that it would entails (the debt-holders 
expected losses of $13,5 million) would not be outweighed by the increase in equity value 
(the shareholders total expected value of $6,5 million). Id. 
286 Id. at 246.  
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this criterion should be operationalized.  Under his proposal, the content of 
fiduciary duties merely is a function of a corporation’s capital structure.  
While plausible in theory, this approach may present serious feasibility 
issues.   Consider the following hypothetical.  There is a society with two 
corporations: X and Y.  Each corporation only has two outstanding financial 
claims: equity and debt. However, while corporation X is funded by 90% 
equity and 10% debt, corporation Y has the opposite capital structure (i.e., 
90% debt and 10% equity). Pursuant to Smith’s proposal, the directors of 
corporation X should give more weight to strategies that maximize equity 
value. Instead, the directors of corporation Y should act in exactly the 
opposite way, giving more weight to strategies that maximize debt value.  
But if investors anticipate these strategies, they could have incentives to 
concentrate all their wealth in just one corporation to avoid the risk of ex-post 
wealth expropriations.  At the extreme, this could lead to the paradoxical 
result of a world without diversified capital structures. 
2.2.  The Entity Model at Common Law  
The post-takeover era did not just involve the enactment of non-
shareholder constituency statutes and the rise of the communitarian theory.  It 
also marked an important change in judicial trends.  Motivated by new 
awareness about the negative externalities raised by the principle of 
shareholder wealth maximization, courts began to pay attention to corporate 
constituencies other than shareholders.   
2.2.1. Unocal 
Tesi di dottorato di Saura Masconale discussa presso l’Università LUISS Guido Carli. Soggetta a copyright. 
Sono comunque fatti salvi i diritti dell’Università LUISS Guido Carli di riproduzione per scopi di ricerca e 
didattici, con citazione della fonte. 
 
117 
 
The landmark ruling on the new communitarian-oriented approach of 
U.S. courts is Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. (“Unocal”)287— still a 
takeover case involving a dispute over directors’ ability to enforce defensive 
strategies. 
It is worth briefly summarizing the factual background of the case.  
Mesa Petroleum, the owner of 13% of Unocal’s stock, declared a two-tier 
tender offer to acquire control of Unocal.288  The Unocal board, however, 
rejected the offer, fearing that it was in fact a squeeze-out attempt sustained 
by junk bond financing. At the same time, the board implemented a defensive 
strategy, advancing an exchange offer to Unocal’s shareholders with the 
exclusion of Mesa Petroleum.289  The justification for such a course of action 
was that the board’s intent was indeed to defeat Mesa Petroleum’s  “junk-
bond offer.”  Moreover, extending the exchange offer to Mesa Petroleum 
would have meant to finance Mesa Petroleum’s squeeze-out attempt. 290  
                                                
287 See Unocal, supra note 237. 
288 The terms of Mesa Petroleum’s offer provided for (i) a front-end cash offer of 
$54 per share for the 37 % of Unocal stock plus (ii) a back-end offer to exchange securities 
with the remaining Unocal shares.  See id. 
289 Specifically, the board’s resolution established that in case of success of the 
Mesa cash front offer for the 37% of Unocal stock, the company would have bought back 
from its shareholders the remaining 49% for an exchange of debt securities having an 
aggregate par value of $72 per share. See id, at 951.  
290 The board alleged that extending the offer to Mesa Petroleum would have 
defeated their intent because “under the proration aspect of the exchange offer (49%) every 
Mesa share accepted by Unocal would displace one held by another stockholder.” Id.  
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Consequently Mesa sued the board of directors, contending that the 
discriminatory exchange offer violated the fiduciary duties the board owed to 
Mesa as a Unocal shareholder.  
In addressing this claim, the court articulated a modified version of 
the business judgment rule for reviewing the board’s defensive plan.  The 
court held that: 
If a defensive measure is to come within the ambit of the business 
judgment rule, it must be reasonable in relation to the threat posed. 
This entails an analysis by the directors of the nature of the takeover 
bid and its effect on the corporate enterprise. Examples of such 
concerns may include: inadequacy of the price offered, nature and 
timing of the offer, questions of illegality, the impact on 
"constituencies" other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, 
employees, and perhaps even the community generally), the risk of 
non-consummation, and the quality of securities being offered in the 
exchange.291 
This passage of the ruling has been interpreted as acknowledging the 
power of directors to justify anti-takeover defensive measures based on the 
protection of non-shareholders’ interests.292  Stretching this interpretation, 
                                                
291 Id. at 955. 
292 Revlon itself acknowledged the “Unocal’s standard“, although the court added 
that to consider nonsharehoders’ interests "there must be some rationally related benefits 
accruing to the stockholders." See Revlon, supra note 123, at 176. In this respect, it seems 
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communitarians have argued that Unocal is a turning point in the judicial 
elaboration of corporate fiduciary duties.  In their view, Unocal displaces the 
primacy of shareholders’ interests in favor of a corporate model that also 
encompasses the interests of other constituencies.293   
Once contextualized within the specific circumstances of the case, 
however, the underlying economic rationale of Unocal seems less clear.  
Read in its entirety, the above passage seems more directed to enable 
directors to take action that protect minority shareholders from grossly 
inadequate takeover offers, such as the Mesa Petroleum’s junk bond offer.  
The court clearly states this in other passage of the ruling, observing that 
when “a board addresses a pending takeover bid it has an obligation to 
determine whether the offer is in the best interests of the corporation and its 
shareholders”.294 In this light, the court’s decision enforces more a criterion of 
overall welfare maximization than any egalitarian instance.  
2.2.2. Paramount v. Time 
The other pivotal case on the judicial application of the entity model 
                                                                                                                         
difficult to deny that the Delaware Supreme Court’s intention in Revlon was to contain the 
“revolutionary” effect of Unocal and reinstate shareholder primacy.  
293 A few courts had previously credited non-shareholders’ interests, but in the 
limited context of charitable contribution. See, e.g., L. Johnson, The Eventual Clash Between 
Judicial and Legislative Notions of Target Management Conduct, 14 J. CORP. L. 35, 43 
(1988) 
294 See Unocal, supra note 237, at 954. 
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is Paramount v. Time.295  Paramount sued Time’s directors alleging that they 
had prevented the company’s shareholders from accepting Paramount’s 
substantial tender offer at the sole scope of preserving their role within the 
firm. 296 
The essential facts of the case are as follows. On March 1989, Time 
had entered into a merger agreement with Warner Communications Inc. 
(“Warner”) to the purpose of enhancing its media video industry and 
achieving global dimensions.297 Since the beginning of the strategic planning, 
Time board of directors committed to maintain Time as an independent 
enterprise and to preserve “Time culture”—a factor that will play a critical 
                                                
295 See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., Civil Action nos. 10866, 
1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 77 (Del. Ch. July 1989), aff’d 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).  For an 
exhaustive review of the case, see, e.g., Johnson & Millon, The Case Beyond Time, supra 
note 162; T.S. Norwitz, “The Metaphysics of Time": A Radical Corporate Vision, 46 BUS. 
LAW. 377 (1991). 
296 As clearly stated by Chancellor Allen, the plaintiff alleged that “[t]he board of 
Time is doing this, it is urged, not for any legitimate reason, but because it prefers that 
transaction [the merger with Warner] which secures and entrenches the power of those in 
whose hands management of the corporation has been placed.” Paramount v. Time, at 6. 
297 The original merger agreement provided for, among others, the consolidation of 
Warner into a wholly-owned Time subsidiary (TW Sub Inc.), the conversion of Warner 
common stock into common stock of Time Incorporated, and the change of the name “Time” 
into “Time-Warner”.  It further provided for some restrictive measures, including a share 
exchange agreement that gave each party the option to trigger an exchange of shares (i.e., a 
put option to sell 11.1% of Time shares to Warner and a reciprocal put option to sell 9.4% of 
Warner share to Time) should the merger have failed. Finally, Time was contractually 
obliged to refrain from entering enter into any takeover negotiations with other bidders prior 
to the closing of the merger. See id., at 26-30. 
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role in the final outcome of the court’s decision.298  Before Time shareholders 
approved the merger,299 Paramount made an offer to purchase all Time’s 
shares at a greater premium than that accruing to the shareholders under the 
agreement with Warner.300  Time’s board of directors, however, rejected 
Warner’s tender offer on the ground that the company was not for sale and 
that the ongoing transaction with Warner was far more appealing.301  Further, 
                                                
298 The court referred to “Time culture” several times in its decision, observing that 
Neither the goal of establishing a vertically integrated entertainment 
organization, nor the goal of becoming a more global enterprise, was a 
transcendent aim of Time management or its board. More important to both, 
apparently, has been a desire to maintain an independent Time Incorporated that 
reflected a continuation of what management and the board regarded as 
distinctive and important ‘Time culture.’ This culture appears in part to be pride 
in the history of the firm—notably Time Magazine and its role in American 
life—and in part a managerial philosophy and distinctive structure that is 
intended to protect journalistic integrity from pressures from the business side of 
the enterprise.” 
Id., at 13. 
299 While the original merger only required the affirmative vote of a majority of 
Warner’s shareholders under Delaware law (since only Warner’s stock was to be converted 
in the new entity’s stock), the transaction still required the approval of Time's shareholders 
pursuant to New York Stock Exchange rules. See id., at 27. 
300 Paramount’s offer, which was conditioned on the termination of the Time-
Warner merger agreement and related restrictive measures (first of all, the termination of the 
share exchange agreement), ranked at $ 175 per share cash. Id. 
301 See id., at 34 (observing that the Time board justified its refusal based on: “(1) a 
reasonable belief that the $ 175 per share offer was inadequate if Time were to be sold, and 
(2) a reasonable belief that if Time were not to be sold, which was the board's determination, 
then Warner was a far more appealing partner with whom to have ongoing business 
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after refusing Paramount’s offer, the board approved a resolution to 
restructure the agreement with Warner so that shareholders’ approval was no 
longer required to finalize the deal.302  Paramount countered with a higher 
offer, which was again refused by Time’s directors. Finally, Paramount sued 
the board and sought preliminary injunction to prevent Time from carry on 
the merger with Warner, alleging that the board’s strategy was only finalized 
to the preservation of their control position.  
Chancellor Allen, sitting the case, framed the matter at hand as 
hinging on whether directors of a company could accept less current value in 
the hope of greater value in the future. 303  Put differently, the normative 
                                                                                                                         
consolidation than was Paramount.”  
302 The board resolved to a restructuring of the deal with Warner, which provided 
for a cash acquisition by Time of a majority stake in Warner and was to be followed by a 
second-step merger. The overall effect of these measures was to exclude the need for 
shareholders’ approval of the transaction.  See id.  
303See id., at 54 (“This is the heart of the matter: the board chose less current value 
in the hope (…) that greater value would make that implicit sacrifice beneficial in the 
future”.) It is worth observing that Chancellor Allen was not new to this order of 
considerations. In TW Services, Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp. (“TW Services”), a takeover 
case that preceded Paramount v. Time of a few months, he had made the following 
observations about the directors’ duty to act in the best interest of “the corporation and its 
shareholders”: 
The knowledgeable reader will recognize that this particular phrase masks the most 
fundamental issue: to what interest does the board look in resolving conflicts 
between interests in the corporation that may be characterized as 'shareholder long-
term interests' or 'corporate entity interests' or 'multi- constituency interests' on the 
one hand, and interests that may be characterized as 'shareholder short term 
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question underlying Paramount v. Time was whether directors could depart 
from the rule of short-term wealth maximization in favor of the long-term 
interest of the corporation.304  Chancellor Allen gave a positive answer to this 
question through a three-step analysis.  First, he reinterpreted the decision in 
Revlon,305 holding that directors have no duty to maximize current shares’ 
value when the company is not for sale or under any other “Revlon mode” 
(i.e., a situation entailing a change in the company’s control).306  Hence, 
Time’s directors had not breached their fiduciaries duties to shareholders 
under the Revlon standard, because Time was not for sale.307  Second, 
                                                                                                                         
interests' or 'current share value interests' on the other? …. [W]hen, if ever, will a 
board's duty to 'the corporation and its shareholders' require it to abandon concerns 
for 'long-term' values (and other constituencies) and enter a current share value 
maximizing mode?” 
TW Services, Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ¶  94334, 92178 fn.5.(Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989).  See also T.L.Hazen, The Short-
Term/Long-Term Dichotomy And Investment Theory: Implications For Securities Market 
Regulation and For Corporate Law, 70 N.V.L. Rev. 137 (1991).  
304 It is important to observe that the court excluded any bad faith on the side of 
Time’s directors. (“ … there is no persuasive evidence that the board of Time has a corrupt 
or venal motivation in electing to continue with its long-term plan”) See id., at 88. 
305 See Revlon, supra note 234. 
306 See id., at 58. (quoting, among other decisions, Mills Acquisition, supra note 
101; Ivanhoe v. Newmont, supra note ___; TW Services, supra note ---). In this respect, 
Chancellor Allen embraced the reading of Revlon advocated by entity model advocated, 
limiting the application of the shareholders primacy rule to “’Revlon mode” cases, i.e., cases 
involving a proper sale of the company or a "sale" taking the form of an active auction, a 
management buyout, or a ‘restructuring’”. Id., at 59-60.  
307 Chancellor Allen fully embraced the defendants’ position that they had never 
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Chancellor Allen went on to re-consider the Unocal standard, 308 giving it 
broad interpretation.  He held that the actions of the Time board were 
consistent with a long-standing strategic plan. Therefore, such actions were to 
be interpreted not as a control device but rather a manifestation of the board’s 
willingness to manage the corporation for the long-term profit.309  Hence, the 
implementation of that plan was fully consistent with the Unocal standard 
which empowered directors to consider “other values” (i.e., interests other 
than shareholders’) in corporate decision-making. 310   Third, although 
Chancellor Allen never explicitly addressed the issue of the “other values” 
                                                                                                                         
intended to enter into a sale of the company:  
I cannot conclude, however, that the initial merger agreement contemplates a 
change in control of Time. I am entirely persuaded of the soundness of the view that 
it is irrelevant for purposes of making such determination that 62% of Time-Warner 
stock would have been held by former Warner shareholders. If the appropriate 
inquiry is whether a change in control is contemplated, the answer must be sought 
in the specific circumstances surrounding the transaction. (…) where, as here, the 
shares of both constituent corporations are widely held, corporate control can be 
expected to remain unaffected by a stock for stock merger. This in my judgment 
was the situation with respect to the original merger agreement.  When the specifics 
of that situation are reviewed, it is seen that, (…) neither corporation could be said 
to be acquiring the other. 
Id., at 68-69.  
308 Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum, supra note 237.  
309 Thus, although Chancellor Allen does not deny the defensive value of the 
impeding resolution of Time’s directors, he ultimately considers it as merely collateral to the 
“achievement of the long-term strategic plan of the Time-Warner consolidation.” Id., at 86.  
310 Id.  
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that directors may consider in their corporate choices, he indirectly addressed 
it by upholding Time directors concerns for the defense of “Time culture”.  
As stated by one of Time’s directors, Mr. Honer: 
… editorial freedom free from political or other kinds of intervention 
is absolutely essential if members of our society are to be enlightened 
enough to form wise judgments and fulfill their responsibilities as 
citizens. …. That feeling on my part coincides with the interests of 
Time stockholders. The editorial integrity I value is also a tremendous 
source of value to the company and its stockholders. Without it, Time 
magazine and the company's other magazines would lose their loyal 
readers and advertisers, and Time's revenues and value would suffer. 
The governance provisions were necessary to ensure Time writers and 
editorial personnel that editorial independence would continue to be 
respected at Time. Otherwise the integrity and ultimately the financial 
viability of the institution would be threatened. 311 
In this light, preserving “Time culture” becomes shorthand for 
pursuing the benefit of the corporation as a whole.  Hence, the idea of the 
corporation as an institution with a broader social purpose emerges in 
between the lines of Paramount v. Time and shapes the final outcome of this 
decision. 312 
                                                
311 Id., at 21. 
312 To the point, Chancellor Allen further observes "I am not persuaded that there 
may not be instances in which the law might recognize as valid a perceived threat to a 
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From an economic perspective, Chancellor Allen’s decision has the 
merit of introducing two basic novelties in the judicial analysis of directors’ 
fiduciary duties.  The first is that maximizing the value of existing 
shareholders is not always ex-post efficient. The second is that efficient 
corporate decision-making implies optimization along the temporal 
dimension.  This point, in particular, is crucial because it introduces the idea 
that social welfare is a dynamic rather than static measure.  In this light, the 
maximization of social welfare may require sacrificing the current interest of 
                                                                                                                         
'corporate culture' that is shown to be palpable (for lack of a better word), distinctive and 
advantageous." Id., at 13-14. Millon has been among the strongest supporter of a reading of 
Paramount v. Time as a case that marks an inversion in the judicial attitude vis-à-vis the 
nature of the corporation:  
To explain why preservation of Time's corporate structure in its existing form was 
significant, Allen might have referred to the maintenance of jobs or of business 
relationships with creditors, suppliers, and others dependent on Time's continued 
existence. …. Instead, the importance of "Time culture," and thus the justification 
for management's efforts to preserve the corporation intact, lay in the public's 
interest in the ongoing operation of the business in more or less the same manner as 
it had been conducted during recent decades. Disruption or destruction of Time's 
business would be harmful to the American public, so management's efforts to 
preserve it, by merging with Warner and blocking the Paramount tender offer, were 
justified.” 
Millon, supra note 131, at 257.   
Advocates of the shareholder primacy, however, give a completely different 
interpretation of Paramount v. Time, arguing that this decision merely re-establish directors’ 
discretionary power to determine which corporate strategy pursues the best interest of 
shareholders, regardless of the time’s horizons of such a choice. See Millon, supra note 131, 
at 258 (reporting such an argument).   
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one category for the interest of the future value of another (or even the same) 
category.  
3.  The Team Production Model (TPT) 
In addition to the shareholder primacy norm and the entity model, 
there is a third model of directors’ fiduciary duties: that developed under the 
team production theory (TPT) of corporate law.  Professor Margaret Blair 
and Lynn Stout have articulated this theory in a series of influential 
articles.313  For the purpose of this discussion, I briefly address the model 
proposed by Blair and Stout and then focus my attention on the TPT’s 
analysis of directors’ fiduciary duties. 
3.1.  The TPT: An Overview  
While Blair and Stout rebut the classical contractarian model of 
corporate law 314—and, with it, the principle of shareholder primacy—they 
                                                
313 The fundamental reference is to Blair & Stout, supra note 49. See also M.M. 
Blair & L.A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of the Corporate Board, 
79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403 (2001) [hereinafter Blair & Stout, Director Accountability]; Blair & 
Stout, supra note 166; M.M. Blair & L.A. Stout, Team Production in Business 
Organizations: An Introduction, 24 J. CORP. L. 743 (1999). Blair and Stout explicitly 
acknowledge that their approach is grounded on a substantial body of prior economic 
literature, including Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 130; B. Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in 
Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 324 (1982); and R.G. Rajan & L. Zingales, Power in 
the Theory of the Firm, 113 Q. J. ECON. 387 (1998). 
314 According to the Blair and Stout, both the principal-agent model and the 
property right (or contractual incompleteness) model at the basis of the contractarian 
elaboration of the corporate system are incomplete in a critical way. The principal-agent 
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still view the corporation as a nexus of inputs.315  Their model, however, does 
not conceive of corporate relationships as being ordered within a hierarchical 
structure dominated by shareholders.  Instead, under the TPT corporate 
relationships are the result of horizontal exchanges among the members of a 
team.  The reference is to “[t]he hitherto neglected team production 
approach”,316 imported from the work of economists Armen Alchian, Harold 
                                                                                                                         
model “ignores several problems” and, first of all, that of the ambiguity of corporate 
relationships because  in many corporate situations it would be not clear who is the principal 
and who is the agent.  In other words, Blair and Stout argue that shareholders retain too little 
control over the corporation and its officials to be regarded as principals.  The property right 
model, instead, ”is not a theory of corporations”, because it misstates the nature of 
shareholders’ corporate interests.  For Blair & Stout, shareholders merely are one of the 
inputs of the corporation and, therefore, should not be attributed any particular right.  More 
importantly, neither model offers an account of both the nature and the activity of public 
corporations. See Blair & Stout, supra note 49, at 258-265. 
315 Another provocative variation on the contractarian model of the corporation is 
represented by the proposal articulated by Stephen Professor Bainbridge. Bainbridge reviews 
the traditional nexus of contract approach, claiming thatit is the board of directors which 
serves as the nexus for the various contracts that make up the corporation. The “director 
primacy model”—as Bainbridge renames his theory of the corporation—is grounded on the 
premise that the corporation’s distinguishing feature is the existence of a central decision-
maker vested with “the power of fiat”. That is, for Bainbridge, the board of directors is 
essential to solve the uncertainty, complexity, and opportunism characterizing corporate 
relationships. Bainbridge also uses a team production analysis of the firm, to the extent that 
he sees the board of directors as the center of power to which team members willingly 
delegate this power of fiat. However, under the TPT “hierarchs work for team members 
(including employees) who 'hire' them to control shirking and rent-seeking among team 
members. Instead, under Bainbridge’s director primacy model directors hire the factors of 
productions, not viceversa.  See Bainbridge, supra note 1; Bainbridge, supra note 134. 
316 See Blair & Stout, supra note 49, at 258.  
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Demsetz, and Bengt Holmstrom.317  This approach views the corporate 
activity as requiring the combined investments and coordinated efforts of 
various team members (i.e. corporate participants)—including shareholders, 
managers, employees, corporate creditors, and even local communities.  
Under the TPT, the justification for the existence of corporations is the 
rational belief of team members that they can earn better return through 
cooperative endeavor than they can do individually.318 
On this view, the main purpose of corporate law is to offer a solution 
to team production problems.319  These problems arise for two basic reasons: 
(i) the specificity of team members’ investments (i.e., the fact that such 
investments tend to have lower re-deployability outside their corporate 
use), 320  and (ii) the non-separability of production outputs (i.e., the 
impossibility of determining the value of each team members’ contribution to 
the overall performance of the corporation).  Hence, under the TPT the 
central contracting problem is how to implement an efficient division of the 
economic surplus (i.e., the rents) generated by joint production.  Blair and 
                                                
317 See supra note 313. 
318 See Blair & Stout, supra note 49, at 269-270. 
319 Id., at 249-251.  
320 See O. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 55, 115. 
(1985) (defining specific investments as “durable investments that are undertaken in support 
of particular transactions, the opportunity cost of which investments is much lower in best 
alternative uses or by alternative users should the original transaction be prematurely 
terminated.”) 
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Stout contend that both ex-ante and ex-post allocation rules are unsuitable to 
this end.  Ex-ante allocation rules invite shirking.  When returns from 
production are predetermined (for example, on some proportional basis), 
team members will fail to exert optimal efforts.  This is because they will get 
the same share of the total output regardless of their effective commitment to 
produce it.  Ex-post allocation rules, instead, incentivize rent-seeking 
behavior.  That is, team members will have an incentive to squabble with 
each other over the size of their individual pieces, wasting time and efforts.  
In both cases, the result is the reduction of the overall welfare.  
For Blair and Stour, public corporation law offers a second best 
solution to these problems “because it allows rational individuals who hope 
to profit from team production to overcome shirking and rent-seeking by 
opting into an internal governance structure we call the ‘mediating 
hierarchy’."321  Under this governance structure, team members willingly give 
up their rights over corporate assets to a third party, the corporate entity 
itself.322  At the same time, they assign the power of control over those assets 
                                                
321 See Blair & Stout, supra note 49, at 250. Blair and Stout recognize that directors’ 
lack of a direct firm stake may discourage efficient monitoring and management functions.  
To this extent, the TPT could exacerbate agency costs. Nevertheless, “…if the likely 
economic losses to a productive team from unconstrained shirking and rent-seeking are great 
enough to outweigh the likely economic losses from turning over decisionmaking power to a 
less-than-perfectly-faithful hierarch, mediating hierarchy becomes an efficient second-best 
solution to problems of team production”. Id., at 283-284 
322 Indeed, it is the corporation that owns corporate assets and has the right to any 
surplus produced by the team and not distributed among team members. See Blair & Stout, 
Director Accountability, supra note  313, at 424.        
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as well as the rents they generate to an internal hierarchy, at top of which sits 
the board of directors.  Hence, directors’ ultimate obligation is to protect the 
specific investments of each member of the corporate team and, at the same 
time, ensure that all members receive a large enough share to induce them to 
invest optimally.  
3.2.  The TPT and Directors’ Fiduciary Duties     
Although the TPT is a general model of corporate governance, 323 the 
discussion of directors’ fiduciary obligations is at the center of this model.   
As a normative matter, the TPT approach results in the dismissal of 
the view of shareholders as the only corporate participants holding residual 
claims over the corporate income stream.  For Blair and Stout, all team 
members are residual claimants, because each of them makes a specific 
investment that leaves her vulnerable to potential opportunistic exploitations 
by other team members.  Moreover, the value of each team member’s 
corporate investment depends, explicitly or implicitly, on overall firm 
performance (i.e., joint production).324  Hence, it no longer makes sense to 
                                                
323 Blair and Stout claim that the TPT better describes existing corporate law than 
any other theoretical corporate governance model.  To show this, they take into exam several 
aspects of corporate law, including derivative claim rules, the business judgement rule, and 
shareholder voting rights.  Nonetheless, critics of the TPT have argued that it has at best a 
normative but not positive value, suggesting that “legal doctrine--particularly in the centrally 
important areas analyzed by Blair and Stout--bears a stronger shareholder primacy imprint 
than an imprint of TPM.”  See Millon, supra note 49, at 1021.   
324 Blair and Stout suggest that the case of employees is exemplar to this respect. 
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describe shareholders as the sole residual risk bearers and, therefore, as the 
sole beneficiary of directors’ fiduciary duties.  
As a positive matter, Blair and Stout argue that corporate law lacks 
any provision requiring directors to act as instructed by shareholders or to 
maximize shareholder wealth. 325  Instead, directors enjoy “an extraordinary 
degree of discretion” in the corporate decision-making process. 326   By 
contrast, conceiving of the board as a mediating hierarchy perfectly fits the 
wide leeway the law grants directors.  This conceptualization of the board 
explains why directors need to hold ultimate decision-making power over the 
firm.  It also explains why directors cannot be subordinated to the control of 
any corporate constituency.327  
                                                                                                                         
Employees make firm-specific investments (in terms of knowledge, skills, contacts), which 
have no corresponding value outside that particular firm. They accept to make such 
investments based on the assumption that they will be rewarded in the long run through wage 
increases, promotions, and so on.  This expectation, however, is legally unenforceable most 
of the times. Hence, employees also bear a significant residual risk, because bad firm 
performance can frustrate their “investment expectations” and, at the extreme, result in the 
employees’ layoff. Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 313, at 414-415.    
325 See Blair & Stout, supra note 49, at 291(“Shareholders can elect directors and, 
under some circumstances, remove them--but they cannot tell them what to do.”). 
326 See id., at 252. 
327 Blair and Stout argue that derivative claim rules and the attribution of voting 
rights to shareholders only apparently dismiss this view of the corporation. In fact, these 
special rights are attributed to the shareholders only because they are in the best position to 
represent the interests of all team members, i.e., the corporate interest.  Thus, a closer 
inspection of the legal rules applying to derivative claims shows that shareholders’ action is 
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The TPT has the merit of introducing a solution to the problem of ex-
post efficiency that may arise within corporate fiduciary relationships.  While 
this theory only addresses the issue of the intrinsic incompleteness of 
corporate contracts to a limited extent,328 from a normative viewpoint it offers 
an answer to this matter.  Under the mediating hierarchy model, directors can 
be viewed as charged with the task of completing incomplete contracts to the 
benefit of the team as a whole.   On the other hand, however, the TPT’s 
conceptualization of directors’ fiduciary duties may raise ex-ante uncertainty.  
This is because this theory fails to provide clear guidance about directors’ 
gap-filling role, especially as concerns potential situations of conflict of 
interests among the various team members. Blair and Stout only claim that 
there is enough “play in the joints” under the TPT for directors to favor one 
constituency's interests over another's, as long as they can allocate to team 
members a share of the total outcome that is sufficient to keep members in 
the team..329  But how can directors establish what this share is? 
Put another way, the TPT lacks constraining force.  While to some 
extent I share Blair and Stout’s argument that reputational concerns help to 
keep directors faithful, I also argue that this alone is insufficient to advance 
                                                                                                                         
designed to serve the interests of the firm as a whole, rather than the interests of shareholders 
per se. Similarly, shareholders’ voting rights are mostly designed to serve the interests of all 
stakeholders. See Blair & Stout, supra note 49, at 292-315; Blair & Stout, Director 
Accountability, supra note 313, 426-434. 
328 See supra text accompanying note 315. 
329 See Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 313 at 435. 
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corporate efficiency.  Relying exclusively on reputational capital to police 
directors’ misconduct means assuming a perfect labor market.  This, 
however, appears as a rather implausible assumption.  Instead, as I will 
explain in the following Chapter, bright and predictable rules are necessary 
for an effective enforcement of directors’ duties.  
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V.  THE CREDITOR VARIANT  
Part IV of this research has explained why modern corporate law 
discussions about the central question of the beneficiary of corporate 
fiduciary duties have failed to produce a normative paradigm that moves past 
ideological positions.  This view also helps to better understand why this 
debate, as reflected in the unending tension between contractarians and 
communitarians, is far away from a resolution.  As suggestively observed by 
one commentator “like the combatants in Vietnam, both sides appear to have 
declared victory and moved on to other endeavors.”330 
In this Part, I focus on a different approach to corporate fiduciary 
duties, which I rename as the “creditor variant” of corporate fiduciary law.331  
Under this variant, U.S. courts have recognized that directors might owe 
duties to creditors upon some specified contingencies.  Historically, these 
contingencies have coincided with the decline of the financial conditions of 
the corporation, that is, the occurrence of insolvency.332  As the ensuing 
                                                
330 Lipson, supra note 67, at 1236. 
331 For a discussion of the historical evolution of this paradigm, see Bratton, supra 
note 141, at 106-113. 
332 Among the cases holding the directors of insolvent corporations liable to 
creditors for breach of fiduciaries duties, see, e.g., Unsecured Creditors Comm. of Debtor 
STN Enters. v. Noyes (In re STN Enters.), 779 F.2d 901, 904 (2d Cir. 1985) (Vermont law); 
Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 660 F.2d 506, 512 (2d Cir. 1981) (New York law) FDIC v. Sea 
Pines Co., 692 F.2d 973, 977 (4th Cir. 1982) (South Carolina law); Brown v. Presbyterian 
Ministers Fund, 484 F.2d 998, 1005 (3d Cir. 1973) (Pennsylvania law) (superseded by state 
statute); Automatic Canteen Co. of Am. v. Wharton, 358 F.2d 587, 590 (2d Cir. 1966) 
Tesi di dottorato di Saura Masconale discussa presso l’Università LUISS Guido Carli. Soggetta a copyright. 
Sono comunque fatti salvi i diritti dell’Università LUISS Guido Carli di riproduzione per scopi di ricerca e 
didattici, con citazione della fonte. 
 
136 
 
discussion will show, this articulation of the creditor variant underlies both 
the so-called trust fund doctrine and the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.333  Under the 
influence of the contractarian paradigm, most corporate law scholars have 
interpreted the creditor variant as supporting the idea that the positive 
mandate of the duty of loyalty essentially is a function of payoff structures 
and priority rights.  Put another way, these scholars view insolvency as an 
exception to the rule that directors exclusively owe duties to shareholders 
because in insolvent corporations creditors take the place of shareholders as 
residual claimants.334  
                                                                                                                         
(Indiana law); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Toy King Distribus. v. Liberty Sav. 
Bank (In re Toy Distribs., Inc.), 256 B.R. 1 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2000); Brandt v. Hicks, Muse 
& Co. (In re Healthco, Int'l, Inc.), 208 B.R. 288, 300 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997) Beemer v. 
Crandon Enters. (In re Holly Hill Medical Ctr., Inc.), 53 B.R. 412, 413-14 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 
1985); Waldschmidt v. Gilly (In re IMI, Inc.), 17 B.R. 784, 786-87 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1982); 
Roberts v. Geremia (In re Roberts, Inc.), 15 B.R. 584, 586 (Bankr. D. R.I. 1981); A.R. 
Teeters & Assoc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 836 P.2d 1034, 1043 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992); Francis 
v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 824 (N.J. 1981); Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ'ns Co., 621 
A.2d 784 (Del. Ch. 1992); Snyder Elec. Co. v. Fleming, 305 N.W.2d 863, 869 (Minn. 1981); 
Hixson v. Pride of Texas Distrib. Co., Inc., 683 S.W.2d 173, 176 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) 
333 See infra Part V.2. 
334 See, e.g., Brudney, Corporate Bondholders and Debtor Opportunism, supra note 
162; G.S. Corey et al., Are Bondholders Owed a Fiduciary Duty?, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
971, 993 (1991); R. de R. Barondes, Fiduciary Duties of Officers and Directors of Distressed 
Corporations, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 45 (1998); L. Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty Upon 
Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of Directors’ Duty to Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1485 
(1993); Lipson, Directors’ Duties, supra note 67, at 1200-1201; DeBow & Lee, supra note 
265, at 398; J.C. Coffee, Jr. &William A. Klein, Bondholder Coercion: The Problem of 
Constrained Choice in Debt Tender Offers and Recapitalizations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1207, 
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I suggest, however, that the view of the creditor variant as an 
”isolated exception” to shareholder primacy is again the result of an 
ideological position. The modern corporate finance canon helps to better 
understand why.  This canon teaches that when a corporation has outstanding 
debt, equity payoff becomes asymmetric.  This means that shareholders profit 
from the undertaking of risky projects to detriment of debtholders.335 Being 
shielded by limited liability and holding a residual claim to corporate profits, 
shareholders expect in fact to reap all the upside potential from riskier 
projects.  Instead, debtholders, as fixed claimants, bear most of the downside 
losses from such projects.  Importantly, this problem is not only 
distributional, but also concerns allocative efficiency. This is because 
shareholders’ distorted risk preferences may result in the undertaking of 
projects that are individually efficient for them but socially inefficient, i.e., 
projects with negative net present value.   
A simple example is useful to better understand the implications of 
                                                                                                                         
1255-56 (1991); V. Jelisavcic, Corporate Law-A Safe Harbor Proposal to Define the Limits 
of Directors’ Fiduciary Duties to Creditors in the “Vicinity of Insolvency”: Credit Lyonnais 
v. Pathe, 18 J. CORP. L. 145 (1992); S.R. McDonnell, Comment, Geyer v. Ingersoll 
Publications Co.: Insolvency Shifts Directors’ Burden From Shareholders to Creditors, 19 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 177 (1994); H.R. Miller, Corporate Governance in Chapter 11: The 
Fiduciary Relationship Between Directors and Stockholders of Solvent and Insolvent 
Corporations, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 1467, 1477-1478 (1993); S.L. Schwarcz, Rethinking 
a Corporation's Obligations to Creditors, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 647, 667-68 (1996); G.V. 
Varallo & J.A. Finkelstein, Fiduciary Obligations of Directors of the Financially Troubled 
Company, 48 BUS. LAW. 239 (1992).  
335 See supra note 10.  
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this form of shareholder opportunism. Consider the case of a corporation 
whose capital structure is represented by equity capital, 𝐸.  The directors can 
decide to undertake two different investments: Investment 1 or Investment 2.  
Investment 1 generates revenues 𝑅!  with probability 𝑝!  and 0 with 
probability 1− 𝑝! .  Instead, Investment 2 generates revenues 𝑅!  with 
probability 𝑝! and 0 with probability 1− 𝑝! .  In this example, I make the 
following assumptions: 
(A1)       𝑝! > 𝑝!;  
(A2)       𝑅! < 𝑅!; and  
(A3)       𝑝!𝑅! > 𝑝!𝑅!.  
This means that: (i) Investment 2 is riskier than Investment 1; (ii) in 
the event of success Investment 2 delivers a higher payoff relative to 
Investment 1; and, finally, (iii) the present value of Investment 1 is higher 
than the present value of Investment 2.   Under this binary investment choice, 
if the corporation is exclusively funded through equity, it is easy to see that 
Investment 1 maximizes shareholder wealth.  Indeed, the undertaking of 
Investment 2 would reduce shareholder and corporate value by 𝑝!𝑅! −𝑝!𝑅!.  However, assume now that the capital structure also includes debt, 𝐷.  
Under this different capital structure, the shareholders’ payoffs change as 
follows: under Investment 1 they expect to receive 𝑝! 𝑅! − 𝐷 , while under 
Investment 2 they expect to get 𝑝! 𝑅! − 𝐷 .  Hence, whenever 𝐷 >  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!  , Investment 2 maximizes shareholder value at the expense of 
debtholder value and, potentially, aggregate welfare.   
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Even more important, as leverage increases, shareholders may have 
incentives to undertake value-decreasing projects, because higher leverage 
increases the amount of losses that is borne by debtholders rather than 
shareholders.  Since the condition that makes Investment 2 profitable for the 
shareholders is 𝐷 >    !!!!!!!!!!!!!! , it is easy to see that the shareholders’ 
incentives to undertake riskier investments are increasing in the level of debt 
(𝐷).  This means, in practice, that the undertaking of Investment 2 might lead 
to a social welfare loss equal to 𝑝!𝑅! − 𝑝!𝑅!. 
This simple example offers several intuitions.  First, it suggests that a 
corporate fiduciary law system that is centered on shareholder wealth 
maximization might be “systemically biased” in favor of excessive risk-
taking,336 at least when the level of corporate debt is high.  Second, as a 
corollary, it suggests that holding corporate insolvency an isolated exception 
to the application of shareholder primacy rule is untenable.  This is because 
the reasons justifying this exception also apply to other circumstances.  
Indeed, if one uses what I call the “reversed residual claimant” argument to 
justify the shift of fiduciary duties to creditors upon insolvency, she should 
acknowledge that this same argument applies to creditors of highly leveraged 
corporations with risky projects.  Third, and most importantly, this example 
suggests that the creditor variant is better described as a state-contingent 
approach to fiduciary duties.  Requiring directors to maximize shareholder 
wealth may increase overall welfare in some circumstances. However, it may 
                                                
336 See supra note 13. 
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lead to the opposite result in others, with insolvency only being one of these 
“other circumstances”.  This last observation finds support in the most recent 
evolution of the creditor variant as articulated in the path breaking decision of 
Chancellor Allen in Credit Lyonnais,337 which acknowledged the existence of 
directors’ duties to creditors prior to insolvency.338  Finally, a thorough 
reading of the evolution of the creditor variant at common law suggests that a 
state-contingent approach to fiduciary duties is a desirable direction to move 
toward an ideology-free paradigm of corporate fiduciary law.  
1.  The “Trust Fund” Doctrine  
The origins of the creditor variant of corporate fiduciary law can be 
traced back to the development of the trust fund doctrine, which establishes 
that the assets of a corporation facing dissolution are held in trust to the 
benefit of the company’s creditors.339 
The original elaboration of the doctrine dates back to the landmark 
1824 case of Wood v. Dummer (“Wood”),340 in which the creditors of a 
                                                
337 Credit Lyonnais, supra note 34.  See also infra  Part V.3.1. 
338 As discussed infra, New York Credit Men’s Adjustment Bureau Inc. V. Weiss, 
110 N.E.2d. 397  (N.Y. 1953) is the historic precedent of Credit Lyonnais.  See infra text 
accompanying notes 352-56.   
339 For a thorough discussion of the trust fund doctrine, see J.J. Norton, Relationship 
of Shareholders to Corporate Creditors upon Dissolution: Nature and Implications of the 
“Trust Fund” Doctrine of Corporate Assets, 30 BUS. LAW. 1061 (1975); Varallo & 
Finkelstein, supra note 334.  
340 Wood v. Dummer. 30 F. Cas. 435 (C.C.D. Me. 1824).  
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liquidating bank brought action against the bank shareholders to seek 
reimbursement of their claims out of illegitimate dividend payments.  Justice 
Story, sitting circuit, held that because the bank was insolvent, approving a 
dividend distribution amounted to “misconduct”.  It therefore required the 
shareholders to return the distribution to the creditors.  His elaboration of the 
basis for relief offers the original articulation of the trust fund doctrine: 
The capital stock of banks is to be deemed a pledge or trust fund for 
the payment of the debts contracted by the bank. (…). The charters of 
United States banks make the capital stock a trust fund for the 
payment of all the debts of the corporation. The bill-holders and other 
creditors have the first claims upon it; and the stockholders have no 
rights, until all the other creditors are satisfied. (…) Their rights are 
not to the capital stock, but to the residuum after all demands on it are 
paid. On a dissolution of the corporation, the bill-holders and the 
stockholders have each equitable claims, but those of the bill-holders 
possess a prior exclusive equity.341 
Wood provided the ground for further judicial application of the trust 
fund theory.342  In a series of early rulings, the Supreme Court expanded the 
                                                
341 See id., at 436. 
342 See, e.g., Mackenzie Oil Co. v. Omar Oil & Gas Co., 120 A. 852 (Del. Ch. 
1923); Asmussen v. Quaker City Corp., 156 A. 180 (Del. Ch. 1931); Reif v. Equitable Life 
Assur. Soc’ý, 197 N.E. 278 (N.Y. 1935); People v. Metro Sur. Co., 98 N.E. 412 (N.Y. 1912); 
Pennsylvania Co. for Insurance On Lives & Granting Annities v. South Broad St. Theater 
Co., 174 A. 112, 116 (Del. 1934); Heaney v. Riddle, 23 A. 2d 456 (Pa. 1942). 
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trust in favor of creditors of liquidating corporations to all the corporate 
assets,343 including unpaid subscriptions to the capital stock.344  But the 
crucial moment in the evolution of the doctrine coincides with a series of 
later cases focusing on the elaboration of the trust’s triggering event.  Wood 
and most of the early cases identified the company’s dissolution as the 
moment triggering the trust to the benefit of creditors.  For most 
commentators, this suggests that what prompted the development of the trust 
fund doctrine was the judiciary’s attempt to grant creditors of insolvent 
corporations equitable protection against the general common law rule of no-
post dissolution liability.345  A variant of this conceptualization holds that the 
                                                
343 See Curran v. Arkansas, 56 U.S. 15 How. 304, 306-307 (1853). The case in 
Curran involved an action against state legislature as an insolvent bank's principal 
shareholder, based on the claim the assets of the bank ought to be use to pay back plaintiff's 
interest as creditor.  The court held that the fact that the capital stock of the bank corporation 
came from the state did not affect plaintiff's right as a creditor to be paid out of the bank's 
property since the assets of the insolvent bank were to be deemed as held in trust to the 
benefit of its creditors. Some commentators have observed that the Supreme court’s ruling in 
Curran transformed the nature of creditors’ trust from “something approaching a lien” (as 
held in Wood) to an express lien. See also Conaway Stilson, supra note 167, at 81. 
344 Sawyer v. Hoag, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 610 (1873). The defendant in this case was 
an insolvent insurance corporation (a quasi-public enterprise) that operated under a special 
state concession requiring a capital stock account of $100,000.  The court held that the 
directors’ failure to ensure the payment of $90,000 of a corporation’s capital stock account 
amounted to fraud because it had shifted business risk from shareholders to creditors. See id., 
at 620. ("Though it be a doctrine of modern date, we think it now well established that the 
capital stock of a corporation, especially its unpaid subscriptions, is a trust fund for the 
benefit of the general creditors of the corporation."). 
345 The trust fund doctrine resolved one of the knottiest problems in early American 
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doctrine’s development was due to the lack of fraudulent-conveyance statutes 
in early American corporate law.346  From this perspective, it is unsurprising 
that the trust in favor of creditors was ultimately conditioned on court 
intervention, i.e., the beginning of legal proceedings against the insolvent 
corporation.  Indeed, a court’s disposition was necessary to establish the 
dissolution of “the corporate persona”.347  The Supreme Court’s ruling in the 
1893 case of Hollins v. Brierfield Coal & Iron Co. is paradigmatic of this 
early line of authority: 
Solvent, [the corporation] holds its property as any individual holds 
his, free from the touch of a creditor who has acquired no 
lien…Becoming insolvent, the equitable interest of the stockholders 
                                                                                                                         
corporate: namely, the common law rule under which the lands and tenements of a reverted 
to their respective grantors upon dissolution, with consequent extinction of the corporation’s 
debts. See e.g. Nevitt v. The Bank of Port Gibson (14 Miss. (6 S. & M.) 513 (1846)), in 
which Chancellor Kent held that to applying this "odious and obsolete doctrine of ancient 
date . . . would be a disgrace to any civilized state", concluding that the property of a 
dissolved corporation was to be deemed as held in trust fund for the benefit of its creditors. 
See N.P. Beveridge, Jr., The Corporate Director's Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: Understanding 
the Self-Interested Director Transaction, 41 Depaul L. Rev. 655, 659-62 (1992); Conaway 
Stilson, supra note 167, at 77-78. 
346 See J.C. Coffee, Jr., Court Has a New Idea on Directors’ Duty, NAT’L L.J., Mar 
2., 18 (1992) (arguing that that the remedies granted to creditors under the trust fund doctrine 
would be available today under the provisions of both the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance 
Act and the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act). But see Beveridge, supra note 345, at 614-16 
(observing that although both doctrines are finalized to sanction fraudulent transactions, 
fraudulent conveyance is applicable to both corporations and other kinds of debtors). 
347 Conaway Stilson, supra note 167, at 86-87. 
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in the property, together with their conditional liability to the 
creditors, places the property in a condition of trust, first, for the 
creditors, and then for the stockholders. (…) It is rather a trust in the 
administration of the assets after possession by a court of equity than 
a trust attaching to the property, as such, for the direct benefit of 
either creditor or stockholder.348 
The subsequent development of the trust fund doctrine, however, 
moves past the requirement of judicial intervention, conditioning the rise of 
the trust in favor of creditors to the mere fact of insolvency.  In the 1944 case 
of Bovay v. H.M. Byllesby & Co., the court held that “[t]he fact which creates 
the trust is the insolvency, and when that fact is established, the trust arises, 
and the legality of the acts thereafter performed will be decided on very 
different principles than in the case of solvency.”349  Hence, Bovay can be 
regarded as one of the first cases endorsing an insolvency exception to the 
                                                
348 Hollins v. Brierfield Coal & Iron Co., 150 U. S. 371, 383 (1893). Finally, the 
Supreme Court refused to apply the “trust fund” doctrine because the plaintiffs had not first 
reduced their claims to a judgment through the beginning of a legal proceeding against the 
insolvent debtor corporation.  
349 See Bovay v. Hm Byllesby & Co., Del. Supr., 38 A.2d 808, 813 (1944) 
(concerning a fraudulent diversion of corporate assets by the directors of a bankrupt 
corporation in favor of the company’s stockholders who had appointed them). Other cases in 
this line of authority include, for example, People v. Metro, supra note 342; Heaney v. 
Riddle, supra note 342; Bank Leumi-Le-Israel, Philadelphia Branch v. Sunbelt Indus., Inc., 
485 F. Supp. 556 (S.D. Ga. 1980); Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, supra note 332; FDIC v. Sea 
Pines Co., supra note 332; In re STN Enters, supra note 332; Askanase v. Fatjo, Civil Action 
No. H-91-3140, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7911 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 1993). 
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rule of fiduciary duties to shareholders.  This endorsement marks the 
evolution of the trust fund doctrine from an equitable remedy to a condition-
based attribution of fiduciary duties to creditors.  Economically, this shift in 
the beneficiary of fiduciary duties finds its justification in the same residual 
claimant argument that is used to explain the attribution of fiduciary duties to 
the shareholders of a solvent corporation.350  Under this argument, creditors 
take the place of shareholders as the parties who have an equitable interest in 
the corporation’s assets upon insolvency.351   
While plausible, the “reversed residual claimant” explanation of the 
trust fund doctrine emerges as restrictive once the subsequent judicial 
evolution of the doctrine is taken into account.  Indeed, in the 1955 case of 
New York Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau Inc. v. Weiss (“New York 
Credit”), the court held that “the imminence of insolvency” was a sufficient 
condition to establish the trust in favor of creditors.352  New York Credit arose 
out of a claim brought against the company’s directors by the bankruptcy 
trustee, who claimed that the directors had failed to obtain the maximum 
                                                
350 See, e.g., Lipson, supra note 67, at 1204; McDonnell, supra note 334, at 185; 
Schwarcz, supra note 334, at 647-648.  
351 See Schwarcz, supra note 334, at 667. It is important to observe that Justice 
Story’s ruling in Wood v. Dummer already contained the seeds of this conceptualization: 
“[t]he stockholders have no right to any thing but the residuum of the capital stock, after 
payment of all the debts of the bank.  The funds in their hands, therefore, have an equity 
attached to them, in favour of the creditors, which it is against conscience to resist.”)  See 
Wood v. Dummer, supra note 339, at 439.  
352 See New York Credit, supra note 338, at 399.  
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value from the auction sale of corporate assets.  While corporate assets’ value 
was approximately $60,000 (with book value of $70,000), the auction only 
netted $20,000.353  Although the action was formally based upon a New York 
statute,354 the court applied the trust fund doctrine and held that “[i]f the 
corporation was then technically solvent but insolvency was approaching and 
was then only a few days away, defendants, as officers and directors, were, in 
effect, trustees by statute for the creditors.”355  While at a first sight New York 
Credit might only seem to create “a presumption of insolvency immediately 
before insolvency-in-fact”,356 I argue that this case has more fundamental 
implications.  Indeed, an enlightened interpretation of New York Credit 
suggests a different motivation for this decision: the rationale supporting a 
                                                
353 Id.  
354 The bankruptcy trustee relied on § 60 of the New York General Corporation 
Law, which provided, among others, that:  
An action may be brought against one or more of the directors or officers of a 
corporation to procure judgment for the following relief or any part thereof: (…) 2. 
To compel them to pay to the corporation, or to its creditors, any money and the 
value of any property, which they have acquired to themselves, or transferred to 
others, or lost, or wasted, by or through any neglect of or failure to perform or other 
violation of their duties. 
N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 60 (Consol. (1943)), re-enacted and modified in N.Y. BUS. CORP. 
LAW § 720 (Consol. 1986 & Supp. 1993)). It is worth observing that critics of the trust fund 
doctrine have observed t the court’s final judgment could have been reached through mere 
reference to this statutory provision.  
355 See New York Credit, supra note 338, at 398.  
356 http://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/kirkexp/publications/2529/Document1/Zone%
20of%20Insolvency-%20Updated%202002.pdf (practitioners’ interpretation). 
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shift of fiduciary duties to creditors upon insolvency may as well hold before 
insolvency is (formally) triggered.  
In the context of the generalized imbalance of the American corporate 
system in favor of the shareholder primacy rule, it should come as no surprise 
that the trust fund doctrine has encountered much criticism.  Critics have 
argued that the doctrine was born as an equitable principle357 and only 
established directors’ duties in favor of creditors in the presence of 
“exceptionally compelling facts which warrant the abdication of explicit 
dissolution legislation or alternative legal remedies”.358  This means, in 
practice, that trust fund principles are at best redundant in light of the 
                                                
357 See, e.g. Norton, supra note 339 (”In its origin the trust fund doctrine must be 
seen as a peculiar creature of equity, having no foundation in common law or general 
corporate principles; an extraordinary device used to achieve fair and just result.”) 
358 Conaway Stilson, supra note 167, at 90 (including among the circumstances that 
compelled the early courts to utilize the doctrine 
”(1) corporate defendants with a public character -- e.g., banks, insurance 
companies, and railroads; (2) corporations which required substantial initial 
capitalization (but from which capitalization was not forthcoming by equity 
participants) to protect the public investors who deposited their funds with the 
defendant firms; (3) distributions to stockholders in preference to unpaid creditors at 
the moment of insolvency or dissolution of the corporation; and (4) disputes which 
focused solely upon creditors as against stockholders and not disputes among 
creditors inter se. 
Id.  See also Beveridge, supra note 345, at 621 (“an implied fiduciary duty by 
corporate directors (…) to the creditors of an insolvent or nearly insolvent corporation when 
there is no controlling statute or judicial intervention”) 
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evolution of modern corporate law rules.359  I argue, however, that this 
criticism is positively unfounded for three reasons.  First, it fails to take into 
full account the evolution of the trust fund paradigm, which radically departs 
from its original elaboration as an equitable principle.  Second, as the ensuing 
discussion will show, it misses one important point: the elaboration of special 
circumstances in which directors might owe fiduciary duties to creditors is 
not peculiar to the trust fund doctrine.  Instead, Chapter 11 of the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code also provides for similar circumstances.  Third, 
Chancellor’s Allen famous decision in Credit Lyonnais shows that the trust 
fund doctrine is everything but redundant almost 200 years after Justice 
Story’s original elaboration.  
2.  Directors’ Duties to Creditors under Chapter 11  
The U.S. Bankruptcy Code includes two separate bankruptcy 
procedures for business entities: Chapter 7, which is used to liquidate 
insolvent firms and Chapter 11, which is used to reorganize distressed 
                                                
359 Every state has enacted one of the uniform fraudulent transfer laws.  See Unif. 
Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 7A U.L.A. 2 (1918); Unif. Fraudulent Transfer Act, 7A U.L.A. 
266 (1984).  The Bankruptcy Code also contains its own prohibition on fraudulent transfers. 
11 U.S.C. § 548 (2000). Further, most corporation statutes contain provisions establishing 
the liability of corporate directors for distributions of dividends or other corporate property 
that are made when the corporation is insolvent or cause insolvency.  See Lipson, supra note 
67, at 1206, fn. 75-76. Further, the critics of the doctrine suggests that even if it interpreted 
as effectively establishing an insolvency exception in favor of creditors, its practical 
importance would be limited by the business judgment rule, which would expand to protect 
directors also vis-à-vis creditors. See, e.g., Varallo & Finkelstein, supra note 334. 
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firms.360   
                                                
360 It is important to emphasize that this discussion of Chapter 11 is limited to 
aspects involving directors’ duties.  For more comprehensive accounts of Chapter 11’s 
underlying law and economics issues, see D.G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate 
Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127 (1986); D.G. Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy, 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 173, 182 (1987); L.A. Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate 
Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REV. 775 (1988); M.E. Budnitz, Chapter 11 Business 
Reorganizations and Shareholder Meetings: Will the Meeting Please Come to Order, or 
Should Be Cancelled Altogether?, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1214 (1990); M. Bradley & M. 
Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043 (1992); J.R. Franks & 
W.N. Torous, A Comparison of Financial Recontracting in Distressed Exchanges and 
Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 35 J. FIN. ECON. 349 (1994); T.H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND 
LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW  (1986); M.J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt:  A New Model for 
Corporate Reorganization, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 527 (1983); D.A. Skeel, Jr., The Nature and 
Effect of Corporate Voting in Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases, 78 VA. L. REV. 461 (1992); 
M.J. White, The Corporate Bankruptcy Decision, J. ECON. PERSP. 129 (1989); M.J. White, 
Does Chapter 11 Save Economically Inefficient Firms?, 72 WASH. U.L.Q. 1319 (1994); 
W.C. Whitford, What’s Right About Chapter 11, 72 WASH. U.L.Q. 1379 (1994). Among the 
studies focusing on directors’ duties under Chapter 11, see M.J. Bienenstock, Conflicts 
Between Management and the Debtor in Possession's Fiduciary Duties, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 
543 (1992); D.B. Bogart, Liability of Directors of Chapter 11 Debtors in Possession: "Don't 
Look Back -- Something May Be Gaining On You", 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 155, 180 (1994); 
S.H. Case, Fiduciary Duty of Corporate Directors and Officers, Resolution of Conflicts 
Between Creditors and Shareholders, and Removal of Directors by Dissident Shareholders 
in Chapter 11 Cases, in Williamsburg Conference on Bankruptcy 373 (ALI-ABA 
Invitational Conference) 1988; Miller, Corporate Governance in Chapter 11, supra note 
334; J.T. Roache, The Fiduciary Obligations of a Debtor In Possession, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 
133 (1993); E.M. Ryland, Bracing For the "Failure Boom": Should a Revlon Auction Duty 
Arise in Chapter 11?, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2255, 2259 (1990); D.A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the 
Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 TEX. L. REV. 471, 500 (1994); 
G.G. Triantis, A Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-In-Possession Financing, 46 VAND. L. 
REV. 901 (1993); J. Ronald Trost, Corporate Bankruptcy Reorganizations: For the Benefit of 
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The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 introduced Chapter 11 as a 
reform of the former Chapter X and XI of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code,361 based 
on the assumption that under specific circumstances “it is more efficient to 
reorganize than liquidate [an insolvent corporation], because it preserves job 
and assets.”362 
  The distinguishing feature of the new bankruptcy procedure 
introduced by Chapter 11 is that—unlike a procedure under Chapter 7—it 
does not require the appointment of a trustee to manage bankrupt 
corporations.  The rational for this policy choice is that incumbent directors 
might have more chances to reorganize successfully a troubled corporation 
                                                                                                                         
Creditors or Stockholders?, 21 UCLA L. Rev. 540, 543 (1973).  
361 Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978), 11 U.S.C. § § 1101-1174 (1988).  The 
former Chapter X of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code was designed for firms with public debt or 
equity and required the appointment of a trustee to manage the bankrupt firm. It also 
assigned a significant oversight role to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 
order to ensure the fairness of reorganization plans. Chapter XI, instead, governed the 
reorganization of private companies and left incumbent management in charge of the 
bankrupt entity, contemplating no role for the SEC.  See Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, 52 
Stat. 840 (repealed by Pub. L. No. 95-598, tit. IV, § 401(a), 92 Stat. 2682 (1978)).  For 
general discussions of Chapters X and XI as compared to the new Chapter XI of the 
Bankruptcy Code, see J. J. WHITE, BANKRUPTCY AND CREDITORS’ RIGHTS, 281-89 (1985).  
362 See H.R. REP. NO. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 220 (1977), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179 ("The premise of a business reorganization is that assets that are 
used for production in the industry for which they were designed are more valuable than 
those same assets sold for scrap."); 123 CONG. REC. H35, 444 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1977) 
(statement of Rep. Rodino) ("For businesses, the bill facilitates organization, protecting 
investments and jobs  
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because of the familiarity with corporate affairs. 363  Therefore, upon a 
Chapter 11 filing the corporation is transformed into a debtor in possession 
(DIP) and the incumbent directors assume the powers and duties of trustees, 
assuming liability for the preservation and administration of the debtor’s 
estate.364   The immediate consequence of this liability assumption is that 
while the incumbent board continues to perform decision-making functions, a 
bright line is traced as concerns the beneficiary of that function.  After a 
Chapter 11 filing, directors’ duties are no longer borne to the exclusive 
benefit of corporate stockholders but also to the benefit corporate creditors 
(and, potentially, other stakeholders). As established in Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission v. Weintraub, "if a debtor remains in possession, the 
debtor's directors bear essentially the same fiduciary obligation to creditors 
and shareholders as would the trustee for a debtor out of possession".365  
                                                
363 H.R. REP. NO. 595, supra note 362, at 232-34, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
at 6191-94.  The corollary argument is that managers subject to the threat of a court-
appointed trustee might wait too long before filing for reorganization, increasing the 
likelihood of liquidation over reorganization. Id. 
364 See 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1), 1104, 1107, 1108 (1988). 
365 Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 355 
(1985). It is important to observe, however, the principle that the beginning of a 
reorganization procedure leads to a radical change in the structure of directors’ fiduciary 
duties is not borne with the new Chapter 11.  Instead, the first articulation of this principle 
dates back to the 1963 case Supreme Court’s case of Wolf v. Weinstein (“Wolf”), as an 
application of the former Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Code. In Wolf, a bankruptcy trustee 
had exceptionally not been appointed. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held that the 
corporation’s President and General Manager, as the officers of the debtor in possession 
performing those functions that would otherwise be performed by a disinterested trustee, 
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Similarly, in Fulton State Bank v. Schipper (In re Schipper) the court stated 
that the nature of the fiduciary obligations of DIP directors involves a duty of 
loyalty owed to both creditors and shareholders.366   
However, the operational content of DIP directors’ fiduciary duties is 
less clear.367  To the point, the Bankruptcy Code only provides that DIP 
directors have the obligation to represent the estate—comprised of all of the 
company's legal and equitable property interests—which is created upon a 
                                                                                                                         
were to be considered “fiduciaries” as they had been expressly appointed under § 249 of the 
former Bankruptcy Act. Therefore, they owed to the debtor's creditors and stockholders the 
same responsibilities and obligations of an appointed trustee: 
so long as the Debtor remains in possession, it is clear that the corporation bears 
essentially the same fiduciary obligation to the creditors as does the trustee for the 
Debtor out of possession....  [I]n practice these fiduciary responsibilities fall not 
upon the inanimate corporation, but upon the officers and managing employees who 
must conduct the Debtor's affairs under the surveillance of the court.” 
Wolf v. Weinstein, 372 U.S. 633 (1963). Because of the wording of the Court’s 
opinion, Wolf can be described as an ante-litteram application of the DIP principles later 
enforced by the new Chapter 11. Thus, it should note as a surprise that in Commodity 
Futures the court made explicit reference to Wolf. 
366  Fulton State Bank v. Schipper (In re Schipper), 112 B.R. 917, 919 
(N.D.Ill.1990), aff'd, 933 F.2d 513 (7th Cir.1991). 
367 Davis. supra note 189, 15 (1988) (”Although it appears clear that the directors 
owe a fiduciary duty to all parties in the reorganization, the nature and extent of that duty 
remains obscure.”); Miller, supra note 334, at 1467 (“The precise nature of the fiduciary 
duties of directors of an insolvent corporation to the corporation's creditors and stockholders 
becomes somewhat vague and diaphanous postinsolvency and after the commencement of a 
bankruptcy case under chapter 11.”).  
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Chapter 11 filing.368  It does not specify, however, what this implies in the 
increasingly common situations of conflicts of interest that may arise in 
today’s multilayered corporate structures. Judicial decisions on the matter are 
equivocal. Based on the "absolute priority" creditors enjoy under the 
Bankruptcy Code, some courts have suggested that directors should give 
preference to the interests of corporate creditors. 369   That is, because 
shareholders of a bankrupt corporation no longer have an equity interest in 
the corporate assets, they would be no longer entitled to the benefit of 
fiduciary duties.370  Cases in this line of authority include, for example, 
Manville Corp. v. Equity Security Holders Committee (In re Johns-Manville 
Corp.), in which the court established that the stockholders of an insolvent 
corporation lack any equity interest in the corporation.371  More importantly, 
in Weintraub the Supreme Court explicitly stated that: “[b]ankruptcy causes 
fundamental changes in the nature of the corporate relationships.... [O]ne of 
the painful facts of bankruptcy is that the interests of shareholders become 
subordinated to the interests of creditors.”372  Other courts, however, have 
adopted a less radical view of directors’ fiduciary duties in Chapter 11 
procedures, suggesting that the “Bankruptcy Code does not affect the 
                                                
368 See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1988) and 11 U.S.C. § 1106, 1107(a).. 
369 See 11 U.S.C. §  726, 1129(b) (1988). 
370 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 334, at 1490. 
371 Manville Corp. v. Equity Security Holders Committee (In re Johns-Manville 
Corp.), 801 F.2d 60, 65 (2d Cir.1986) (concerning a dispute about the election of an 
insolvent company’s directors).  
372 Weintraub, supra note 365, at 355.  
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applicability of the corporation law of debtor's state of incorporation as it 
relates to management of the corporation."373  Based on this different line of 
authority, DIP directors would owe duties to both shareholders and 
creditors.374 
In light of the above, we can say that DIP directors might not owe 
fiduciary duties to shareholders, but they undoubtedly owe duties to creditors.  
The reversed residual claimant argument is the underlying rational for this 
extension (if not, shift) of fiduciary duties—exactly as under the much 
debated trust fund doctrine discussed above.375  The ensuing discussion of the 
groundbreaking 1991 decision of Chancellor Allen in Credit Lyonnais will 
illustrate why this argument can likewise be extended to corporations “in the 
vicinity of insolvency” and, potentially, even solvent corporations. 
3.  State-Contingent Duties: Credit Lyonnais 
                                                
373 In re FSC Corp., 38 Bankr. 346, 349 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.1983) (citing 5 Collier on 
Bankruptcy §  1103.07, at 1103-19 n. 9 (15th ed. 1983)); accord In re Saxon Indus., 39 
Bankr. 49, 50 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1984); In re Lionel Corp., 30 Bankr. 327, 329 
(Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1983) 
374 See. Miller, supra note 334, at 1490 (suggesting that the ultimate goal of Chapter 
11 is to rehabilitate troubled corporations and not just pay back creditors); Budnitz, supra 
note 360, at 1249 (highlighting the right of DIP shareholders to both negotiate for a 
continued stake in the debtor and vote on a reorganization plans); R.T. Nimmer, Negotiated 
Bankruptcy Reorganization Plans: Absolute Priority and New Value Contributions, 36 
EMORY L.J. 1009, 1064 (1987) (suggesting that eliminating shareholders' power over DIP 
directors would give the directors too much leeway).  
375 See supra Part V.1. 
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If one was to judge the influence of a judicial opinion based on the 
volume of scholarly and practitioner commentary that opinion engendered, 
Credit Lyonnais would likely stand out as one of the most influential 
Delaware decisions ever.376  The reason for the upheaval created by this 
decision rests on its articulation of a new economically grounded fiduciary 
model, which I defend as being state-contingent and based on rigorous 
financial parameters.  
3.1.  The Decision  
Credit Lyonnais arose “from a leveraged buyout that failed to meet its 
                                                
376 The literature on Credit Lyonnais is far beyond extensive; see, e.g., Barondes, 
supra note 334; Beveridge, supra note 345; M.J. Bienenstock, Conflicts Between 
Management and the Debtor in Possession's Fiduciary Duties, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 543 
(1992); Davis, supra note 367; D.A. DeMott, Down the Rabbit-Hole and into the Nineties: 
Issues of Accountability in the Wake of Eighties-Style Transactions in Control, 61 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1130 (1993); Hartman, supra note 334; Jelisavicic, supra note334; Lin, supra 
note 334; Lipson, supra note 67; L.M. LoPucki & W.C. Witford, Corporate Governance in 
the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669 
(1993); C.R. Morris, Directors' Duties in Nearly Insolvent Corporations: A Comment on 
Credit Lyonnais, 19 J. CORP. L. 61 (1993); B. Nicholson, Recent Delaware Case Law 
Regarding Director's Duties to Bondholders, 19 Del. J. Corp. L. 573 (1994); Norton, supra 
note 339; R.K.S. Rao et al., Fiduciary Duty a la Lyonnais: An Economic Perspective on 
Corporate Governance In a Financially- Distressed Firm, 22 J. CORP. L. 53; Conaway 
Stilson,  supra note 167; Varallo & Finkelstein, supra note 334; D.J. Winnike, Credit 
Lyonnais: An Aberration or an Enhancement of Creditors’ Rights in Delaware?, 6 INSIGHTS 
31 (1992).  It is worth observing that Smith v. Van Gorkom and Revlon would probably be 
the other candidate to the role of “most influential Delaware opinion” concerning corporate 
fiduciary law.  See supra Part II.1.1. and Part IV.1.2.3.  
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sponsors’ expectations.” 377   On November 1, 1990, Giancarlo Parretti 
(“Parretti”) 378 —the major shareholder of Pathe Communications Corp. 
(PCC)—acquired MGM/UA Communications Co. for $1.3 billion. Credit 
Lyonnais Bank Nederland (“CLBN”), as principal lender of the transaction, 
financed most of the acquisition price. 379  Five months after the LBO, 
however, trade creditors of MGM-PCC (“MGM”) forced the company into 
                                                
377  See Credit Lyonnais, supra note 34, at 1105. The leverage buyout–as 
incidentally noted by Chancellor Allen–was the “protype transaction of the 1980s”, which 
was finalized to benefit shareholders at expense of other firm constituencies.  Chancellor 
Allen also highlighted that when LBOs do not work, they can be of great damage to the 
corporate entity as a whole and potentially lead to bankruptcy. See id.  
378 See id. Parretti started his movies business in the late 1980s through the 
acquisition of Cannon Group, Inc. (the predecessor of PCC).  At the time, Cannon was 
experiencing deep financial troubles and Parretti’s equity infusion was vital to repay its 
indebtedness to CLBN, the company’s principal lender.  From that moment, CLBN became 
Parretti’s principal business partner.  By the 1989, Cannon had recovered almost one third of 
its existing debt and changed its name into PCC. It was then that Parretti started to develop 
his expansion plans and hired entertainment executive Alain Dodd to achieve this goal.  
379 See id. at 1105-1106.  The $1.33 billion purchase price was paid through 
recourse to the following array of financing sources: (i) $225 million-cash from distribution 
rights; (ii) $400-million from CLBN financing as consideration for factoring rights on 
distributed licences and future payment obligations; (iii) $160 million from CLBN bridge 
financing provided to PCC at closing; (iv) $ 45 million from CLBN loan to Melia 
International N.V. (PCC’s parent company) and its controlling parent, Comfinance Holding. 
Corp. (the original Parretti entity); (v) $146 million from a Credit Lyonnais (CLBN parent 
bank) guaranteed loan granted by Sealion Corp. to PCC; (vi) $89 million from Sasea (Melia's 
Swiss minority owner) loan; (vii) $161 million from Italian financial institutions’ financing 
advanced on MGM’s credit; (viii) $107 million from unknown sources).  
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Chapter 7, seeking repayment of unpaid trade bills.380  In the attempt of 
dismissing MGM’s bankruptcy, 381  CLBN provided last resort financing 
conditioned on the right to appoint new management.382  Threatened by 
bankruptcy, Parretti agreed to step down from his position as CEO of MGM 
and Chairman of the MGM’s board.  In mid-April 1991, after intense 
contracting among Alain Ladd (a PCC and MGM executive), the bank, and 
Paretti, CLBN agreed to provide additional $145 million to MGM and Ladd 
agreed to become the company’s new CEO. Although a Corporate 
Governance Agreement (CGA) limited the operational and decisional 
influence of Parretti over the corporation,383 “from the first moment, Parretti 
                                                
380 Prior to the acquisition MGM had accumulated $20 million in unpaid trade bills, 
because Parretti had ordered to slow down payment to trade creditors in order to minimize 
cash disbursements under a working capital credit facility prior to the MGM’s closing.  Id., 
at 1111. Moreover, as Chancellor Allen observes, “[h]aving licensed away most of its films, 
factored the receivables resulting from such contracts, borrowed heavily and paid all the cash 
these transactions generated to Kerkorian [the former owner of MGM], MGM almost 
immediately found itself short of cash and cash producing assets.” Id. 
381 The trade creditors’ proceeding was particularly threatening because if not 
dismissed with sixty days would have resulted into the acceleration of MGM’s $300 million 
in outstanding bonds, bringing to the inevitable demise of the company. See id., at 1116. 
382 This request by CLBN was motivated by the distrust that the bank had maturated 
toward Parretti.  Before the bankruptcy petition was filed, two senior executives of the bank 
had discovered that, among others, Parretti had (i) misrepresented borrowed funds as equity 
investments, (ii) $100 million of the $400 million in license contracts that MGM had 
factored at CLBN were actually unenforceable, (iii) and MGM’s own credit had been 
surreptitiously used to finance part of MGM’s acquisition. See id., at 1111-1115.  
383 The Corporate Governance Agreement (CGA) provided extensive powers to an 
executive committee, made up by Ladd and other members of the Ladd’s team, while the 
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barely masked his efforts to continue to dominate and control the 
management of MGM.”384  Eventually, on June 14, 1991, Parretti called a 
special meeting of the MGM board.  On that occasion the board adopted 
several resolutions, despite it had failed to meet the qualified majority 
requirement provided for by the CGA because Ladd and other senior 
executives did not attend the meeting. 385   The core of the board’s 
deliberations consisted in giving Parretti powers to implement transactions in 
violation of the CGA.  Forced by these events, CLBN determined that 
Parretti had breached the CGA and removed the PCC directors from the 
MGM board.386  The bank then filed a lawsuit under Section 225 of the 
Delaware General Corporation Law to have its newly elected board declared 
valid.387   
While the primary legal issue in Credit Lyonnais was Paretti’s 
                                                                                                                         
MGM board only retained power to make extraordinary decisions.  Parretti was entitled to 
select three members of the new MGM five-person board, but Ladd–as new chairman of the 
company–and his appointed Chief Operating Officer had substantial power over the board. 
Finally, in order to assure Parretti’s compliance with the CGA, a collateral Voting Trust 
Agreement provided that the voting rights of PCC and MGM shares would shift to CLBN in 
case of breach of the CGA. Id., at 1117. 
384 Soon after the execution of the GCA Parretti started a “battle” to regain material 
control of MGM.   This battle began with a series of memos directed to Ladd and other 
MGM officers of MGM finalized to constrain their independency. Id., at 1123. 
385 See id., at 1133-35. 
386 See supra note 383. 
387 See id., at 1137. 
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illegitimate breach of the CGA,388 for the purpose of this discussion the 
relevant part of the case concerns the discussion of Parretti’s allegation that 
both CLBN and Ladd breached the fiduciary duties they owed to him as 
MGM’s controlling shareholder.389  In particular, Parretti claimed that Ladd 
was disloyal because he hindered the sale of certain MGM properties that 
would have allowed Parretti to regaining control over the company.390  In 
rejecting Parretti’s claim, Chancellor Allen famously announced: 
 [a]t least where a corporation is operating in the vicinity of 
insolvency, a board of directors is not merely the agent of the residue 
risk bearers, but owes its duty to the corporate enterprise. … the 
MGM board or its executive committee had an obligation to the 
                                                
388 Parretti attacked the CGA based on a theory of conflict of laws. MGM had been 
operating under a 1987 SEC consent decree that required it to maintain a system of internal 
accounting controls. In addition, similar accounting control obligations for all public 
companies are mandatory under the Exchange Act § 13(b)(2). See Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 § 13, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m (West 1993)).  Therefore, Parretti alleged that the CGA had 
divested PCC of the power to perform its legal duty to maintain such an effective control 
system in place. See id., at 1132.  
389 Technically, Parretti claimed that the duty ran to PCC, which held 98.5 % of 
MGM shares.  But because Parretti controlled PCC, it is unharmful to refer to Parretti as the 
major MGM’s stockholder.  
390 See id., at 1155-1157. Parretti further argued that CLBN breached fiduciary their 
duties by forcing MGM to enter into severance agreements with members of the Ladd’s team 
that would be triggered had Parretti regained control over MGM.  For Parretti, the payments 
made under the severance agreements "represented a tax upon the shareholders' exercise of 
their right to elect the board and thus constituted a breach of the duty of loyalty.”  See id., at 
1154.  
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community of interest that sustained the corporation, to exercise 
judgment in an informed, good faith effort to maximize the 
corporation's long-term wealth creating capacity.391 
In the by-now famous footnote accompanying the above passage of 
the ruling, Chancellor Allen added that “[t]he possibility of insolvency can do 
curious things to incentives, exposing creditors to risks of opportunistic 
behavior and creating complexities for directors.”392  Combined with the 
hypothetical Chancellor Allen develops in the same footnote, these two 
statements offer the kernel of his view of fiduciary duties.  For Allen, the 
beneficiary of directors’ fiduciary duties varies with the specific 
circumstances in which a corporate decision takes place, with a corporation’s 
financial conditions standing out as circumstances of primary importance.  
Under this view, insolvency is a context in which efficiency concerns require 
that shareholder primacy be altered in favor of a paradigm of extended 
obligations toward “the community of interests that sustained the 
corporations”.393  This does not mean, however, that the need to evaluate a 
corporation’s financial conditions for purposes of determining the beneficiary 
of fiduciary duties is restricted to insolvency.  For the risk of shareholder 
                                                
391 Id. 
392Id., fn. 55. 
393  Based on the elaboration of directors’ fiduciary duties, Chancellor Allen 
concluded that “[t]he Ladd management was not disloyal in not immediately facilitating 
whatever asset sales were in the financial best interest of the controlling stockholder.” See 
id., at 1156. 
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opportunism that arises out of insolvency may likewise arise “in the vicinity 
of insolvency” and, potentially, even in solvent corporations.  The discussion 
of Chancellor Allen’s hypothetical helps to better understand the reason for 
this.  
3.2.      The Footnote of the Year394 
In support of his argument, Chancellor Allen provides a rigorous 
corporate finance hypothetical. 395   He poses that there is a solvent 
corporation,396 which has debt for $12 M owed to bondholders and a sole 
asset—a judgment for $51 M against a solvent debtor.  The judgment is on 
appeal and subject to modification or reversal.  The appeal’s possible 
outcomes are 25% chance of affirmance, 70% chance of modification, and 
5% chance of reversal.  Hence the judgment’s expected value is $15.55 M, 
while expected shareholder value is $3.55 M.  Then, the Chancellor poses 
that the corporation receives two offers to settle the judgment of respectively 
$12.5 M and $17.5 M.  For ease of reference, Figure 1 below summarizes the 
                                                
394 "Footnote of the Year" Has Lawyers Wondering About the Zone of Insolvency, 
24 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 388 (1992). 
395 Credit Lyonnais, supra note 34, fn. 55.  The hypothetical in Credit Lyonnais is 
modeled on the facts of In re Central Ice Cream Co. See In re Central Ice Cream Co., 836 
F.2d 1068 (7th Cir. 1987). For a comparative discussion of the two cases, see Douglas G. 
Baird & M. Todd Henderson, Other’s People’s Money, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1309, 1324-27 
(2008).  
396 The fact that the Chancellor refers to a “solvent corporation” highlights that the 
problem of excessive risk-taking is exacerbated in, but not exclusive of, insolvent 
corporations. 
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essential data of the example and the respective payoffs of shareholders and 
debtholders under each possible course of action.  
 
                                    Fig. 1. Credit Lyonnais –Expected Payoffs 
As clearly shown by Fig. 1, the bondholders will prefer that the 
corporation go ahead with the settlement.  This is because debt is always 
repaid in full when the corporation accepts one of the two settlement’s offers.  
The shareholders, however, will always prefer the appeal because the 75% 
risk of modification or reversal on appeal is worth the 25% likelihood of 
earning $9.75 M in case of affirmance.  Instead, under the $12.5 M offer, the 
shareholders would only receive an insignificant amount.  And even under 
the $17.5 M offer, they would not gain much after repaying the bondholders.  
Given these possible actions and events (i.e., specific circumstances), 
Chancellor Allen explains what an efficient fiduciary duty paradigm would 
entail:  
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[I]f we consider the community of interests that the corporation 
represents it seems apparent that one should in this hypothetical 
accept the best settlement offer available providing it is greater than $ 
15.55 million, and one below that amount should be rejected. But that 
result will not be reached by a director who thinks he owes duties 
directly to shareholders only.  It will be reached by directors who are 
capable of conceiving of the corporation as a legal and economic 
entity.  Such directors will recognize that in managing the business 
affairs of a solvent corporation in the vicinity of insolvency, 
circumstances may arise when the right (both the efficient and the 
fair) course to follow for the corporation may diverge from the choice 
that the stockholders (or the creditors, or the employees, or any single 
group interested in the corporation) would make if given the 
opportunity to act.397   
In light of this passage, two features emerge as central to the fiduciary 
paradigm articulated by Chancellor Allen.  First, this paradigm is state-
contingent, in the sense that it involves a conceptualization of fiduciary duty 
rules that varies with external states of the world.  For example, insolvent 
corporations and highly leveraged corporations with risky projects provide 
two working examples of state-contingent corporate contexts in which it is 
desirable that fiduciary duties are attributed to creditors rather than 
shareholders.  Second, the implementation of this paradigm envisions 
                                                
397 Credit Lyonnais, supra note 34, at fn. 55. 
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fiduciary duties as formally running to the corporate entity. This is because 
the maximization of overall firm value is the ultimate purpose of having such 
duties in place.   In practice, however, the identification of a particular 
constituency as the duties’ state-contingent beneficiary is required to provide 
directors with a working proxy to better pursue overall welfare maximization.  
3.3.  Credit Lyonnais’ Fiduciary Paradigm 
The fiduciary paradigm articulated by Chancellor Allen in Credit 
Lyonnais, is clearly designed to incentivize Kaldor-Hicks directors’ 
decisions.  Indeed, while many commentators have criticized Chancellor 
Allen’s opinion for being “against” the shareholder primacy model, the 
economic rationale underpinning Credit Lyonnais is perfectly compatible 
with this model as long as it meets Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criteria.  To make 
a concrete example, had Parretti strategy been incremental rather than 
detrimental to the wealth creating capacity of MGM, Chancellor Allen’s 
paradigm would have required Ladd to promote the sale of MGM assets.398   
Viewed through this lens, Credit Lyonnais overcomes one of the 
major criticisms raised against the extension of fiduciary duty to creditors: 
namely, the unfeasibility of a fiduciary paradigm that requires directors to 
                                                
398 Instead, Parretti was moved from the exclusive purpose of regaining control of 
MGM and thus the corporate directors well assumed that he could have undersold the 
corporate properties, causing a loss to the corporate entity as a whole. See id, at 1155  (“ 
observing that Parretti “needed to liquidate assets to raise capital. Ladd and his team could 
reasonably suspect that he might be inclined to accept fire-sale prices.”).  
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“balance” the conflicting interests of shareholders and non-shareholders. 399  It 
achieves this goal by providing directors with an economically grounded 
paradigm that, on the one hand, offers them material guidance in case of 
horizontal corporate conflicts and, on the other, is clear enough for investors 
to be able to anticipate its ex-post consequences and, possibly, contract 
around them.  
At a first sight, this paradigm could appear to resemble the economic 
variant of the entity model (most notably, in the form of the “portfolio 
paradigm”). 400   Unlike this variant, however, Credit Lyonnais does not 
envisage the corporation as a mere aggregation of financial claims, but as a 
“community of interests”.401  This concept is much broader and potentially 
includes all the constituencies that have an economic interest in the 
corporation, such as non-voluntary creditors, employees, etc.402 Similarly, one 
could argue that Creditor Lyonnais does not differ much from the TPT’s duty 
to maximize the joint welfare of all the individuals who make firm-specific 
                                                
399 See supra text accompanying notes 275-279 (discussing multi-fiduciary counter-
argument to the entity model). 
400 See supra Part IV.2.2.1. 
401 See Credit Lyonnais, supra note 34, at 1156. 
402 Cf. A. Chaver & J.M. Fried, Managers’ Fiduciary Duty Upon The Firms’ 
Insolvency Accounting For Performace Creditors, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1813 (2002) 
(suggesting that the portfolio paradigm is conceptually flawed to the extent that it fails to 
consider that creditors as a corporate class includes both payment creditors and performance 
creditors (i.e., creditors who are owed contractual performance rather than cash).   
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investments.403  However, while the TPT fails to provide working guidance to 
directors on how to solve horizontal corporate conflicts,404 Credit Lyonnais 
suggests that a feasible solution is to devise fiduciary duty rules that 
specifically take into account the contingencies in which these conflicts are 
more likely to arise.  
3.4.     A Critical Assessment   
In light of the above, I consider Chancellor Allen’s fiduciary model as 
a valuable attempt to move past ideology-driven conceptualizations of 
directors’ fiduciary duties.  This does not mean, however, that such a model 
cannot be improved. For one thing, the “vicinity of insolvency” trigger for 
the attribution of directors’ duties to creditors lacks precision. Critics have 
largely criticized it as being, among others, “ill-defined”,405 “regrettably 
ambiguous in its timing and scope”,406 “too broad and thus without any clear 
significance”, 407 and “too difficult to evaluate”.408 But this criticism loses 
much of its force when one considers the excessive risk-taking rationale 
                                                
403 As a matter of fact, this is exactly the reading of the decision claimed by Blair 
and Stout. Indeed, they argue that “when viewed through the lens of the mediating hierarchy 
model, however, Credit Lyonnais makes sense”. Blair & Stout, supra note 49, at 297. 
404 See supra text accompanying notes 328-329. 
405 Lipson, supra note 67, at 1210; Lin, supra note 334, at 1512; Jelisavcic, supra 
note 334, at 159 (adopting the equivalent expression of “poorly defined”). 
406 Nicholson, supra note 376, at 575. 
407 Rao et al., supra note 334, at 62-64. 
408 Schwarcz, supra note 334, at 672. 
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underpinning the attribution of fiduciary duties to creditors in these 
circumstances.  Indeed, under this rationale state-contingent fiduciary to 
creditors are anchored by the firm’s capital structure and available corporate 
projects rather than the “temporal dimension” of insolvency.  
It is worth observing that some commentators have challenged the 
substantial impact of the problem of excessive risk-taking, suggesting that 
directors of financially distressed corporations would have incentives to act 
precisely in the opposite way than that described by Chancellor Allen. 409  
These commentators claim that a series of incentives would induce directors 
to refrain from excessively risky strategies, including contractual covenants410 
                                                
409 See, e.g., L. LoPucki and W. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy 
Reorganization of Large Publicly Held Companies, U. Pa. L. R. 669, 684 (1993) ("[A] 
manager whose job and company are not immediately in jeopardy might prefer investments 
with risks that are lower than those preferred by the company's investors"); Barondes, supra 
note 334, at 101 (stating that “[t]he available economic evidence supports the notion that the 
"overinvestment" problem does not dominate the actions of directors of distressed 
corporations”);  Rao et al., supra note 334 , at 54 ( “As this Article will demonstrate, in such 
circumstances [those of financially distressed firms], management has an incentive to serve 
the creditors' interests, perhaps at the expense of the shareholders, well before the firm is in 
bankruptcy”.).  
410 Debt contracts include covenants designed to restrict the company’s range of 
actions in an attempt to ensure that it remains creditworthy.  Most commonly, covenants 
include restrictions on liens ("negative pledge" causes), asset sales, leverage, and change of 
control.  See, e.g., D.R. Fischel, The Economics of Lender Liability, 99 YALE L.J. 131, 135-
36 (1989).  Even very detailed covenants, however, cannot cover all possible future 
contingencies. Furthermore, “weak creditors”, such as trade creditors, do not normally enjoy 
the protection of restrictive covenants. See W.W. Bratton, Jr., The Economics and 
Jurisprudence of Convertible Bonds, 1984 Wis. L. Rev. 667, 719. 
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and directors’ interest in preserving their employment.411  The recent financial 
crisis, however, has provided conclusive evidence about the magnitude of the 
excessive risk-taking problem, proving that “[p]eople who should know 
better paint themselves into embarrassing corners” sometimes.412   
In fact, it is suggestive to observe that banks, as highly leveraged 
corporations, perfectly fit the hypothetical developed in Credit Lyonnais.  
Thus, one is left wondering whether a strict application of the Credit 
Lyonnais fiduciary paradigm could have play any role in constraining the risk 
taking incentives of bank executives, which have been unanimously 
recognized as a major factor leading to the crisis.413  Unfortunately, Credit 
Lyonnais was applied strictly for only a relatively short period.  Mainly 
because of the dominant influence of the (neo)contractarian ideology—which 
found support in a long-lasting positive economic cycle—subsequent 
Delaware rulings went back to a shareholder-centered conceptualization of 
fiduciary law.414  The price paid for this was to finally learn—with the 
                                                
411 See, e.g., LoPucki &Whitford, supra note 409, at 684.  
412 Baird & Henderson, supra note 395, at 1312 (discussing, in general, the attempt 
by scholars to defend the shareholder primacy rule at all cost) 
413 See, e.g., L. A. Bebchuk & J. M. Fried, Paying for Long-Term Performance, 158 
U. PA. L. REV. 1915, 1916–17 (2010) (arguing that risk taking by bank directors and 
managers has been a crucial cause of the crisis); D. W. Diamond & R. G. Rajan, The Credit 
Crisis: Conjectures About Causes and Remedies, 99 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 606, 
607–08 (2009) (describing a “culture of excessive risk taking that had overtaken banks” and 
relating this culture to distorted risk incentives of top bank executives). 
414 In November 2004, the Delaware Court of Chancery issued a new, crucial 
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explosion of the crisis—that Chancellor Allen was right in warning corporate 
                                                                                                                         
opinion on directors’ duties to creditors: Production Resources Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, 
Inc.  See Production Resources Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc 863 A.2d 772 (Del. Ch. 
2004).  The factual background of Production Resources involved a claim brought against 
the board of the NCT Group (NCT) by one of its creditors, who alleged that, among others, 
the board was liable for breach of fiduciary duties based on Credit Lyonnais’s “vicinity of 
insolvency” paradigm.  Rejecting the plaintiff’s argument the court also explicitly rejected 
any expansive interpretation of Credit Lyonnais. Chancellor Strine, the decision’s extensor, 
reaffirmed the principle that absent bad faith or self-dealing, both creditors of solvent 
corporations and corporations in the vicinity of insolvency have no standing to bring 
fiduciary duty claims against directors. See id., at 787.  For creditors have other legal tools at 
their disposal to protect their interests, including in the first place the contract. Therefore,  
“[s]o long as the directors honor the legal obligations they owe to the company’s 
creditors in good faith, as fiduciaries they may pursue the course of action that they believe is 
best for the firm and its stockholders…. when creditors are unable to prove that a corporation 
or its directors breached any of the specific legal duties owed to them, one would think that 
the conceptual room for concluding that the creditors were somehow, nevertheless, injured 
by inequitable conduct would be extremely small, if extant.  
Id. at 787-90. 
In the 2007 case of Ghewalla, the Delaware Chancery Court was even more 
explicit in rejecting Credit Lyonnais and reaffirming shareholder-centered fiduciary 
principles:  
[t]he directors of Delaware corporations have the legal responsibility to manage 
the business of a corporations for the benefit of its shareholder owners. …. [w]hen a solvent 
corporation is navigating in the zone of insolvency the focus for Delaware directors does not 
change. 
N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101 (Del. 
2007). 
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America that the game played under shareholder primacy is not zero-sum.  
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VI. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This research has attempted to put some order in the debate on 
corporate fiduciary law in the United States.  This debate has revolved 
around one fundamental question: “To whom directors owe fiduciary 
duties?”  Yet, academic theories and legal doctrines alike have failed to 
provide a conclusive answer to this question.  To the extent that some 
conclusions can be drawn, a negative result obtains from my research: the 
U.S. policy of corporate fiduciary duties has been contingent on the business 
cycle and the political view that from time to time has emerged as dominant.  
That is, the interpretation and enforcement of such duties have been largely 
influenced by ideological paradigms, which, on their turn, have historically 
been a product of underlying economic conditions.  
On this view, the emergence of the contractarian instance parallels 
that of the libertarian ideals promoted by the Chicago School of free-market 
economists.415  Libertarianism rests on the assumption of the second theorem 
of welfare in which any optimum can be supported as a decentralized 
equilibrium. Explained simply, for libertarians market mechanisms always 
lead to allocative efficiency.  From a law and economics perspective, this 
                                                
415 See STOUT, supra note 7, at 18-19 (explicitly acknowledging the link between 
the Chicago School of economics and the contractarian view of the corporations and 
directors’ fiduciary duties.) Stout acutely observes that “[t]o tenure-seeking law professor, 
the Chicago School’s application of economic theory to corporate law lent an attractive 
patina of scientific rigor to the shareholders side of the longstanding ‘shareholders versus 
society’ and ‘shareholders versus stakeholders’ dispute.”) 
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ideal is grounded on the property of Coasean bargaining, under which parties 
can always improve their initial condition through efficient contracting.416  
Consequentially, libertarians conceive of the legal system as ancillary to 
markets and government action as limited to the enforcement of contracts.  
Even from this brief description, the strong ideological imprint of 
libertarianism is apparent.417  For libertarians, economic agents always do 
better than the government in defining their rights and duties, no matter how 
complex the transactional environment is.418  
The libertarian ideology reached its apotheosis in the 1980s, during 
the Regan presidency.  In a sense, Regan’s economic policy (or 
Reaganomics)—based on lower taxes and less state intervention—put 
libertarianism into practice. As concerns specifically corporate matters, 
                                                
416 The contracting part of the Coase Theorem states that parties will find it efficient 
to contract around externalities in order to reach a Pareto improvement.  This implies that 
when transaction costs are moderate, the allocation of property rights as enforced through 
regulation is indifferent because parties will always be able to allocate rights efficiently by 
contract.  See Coase, supra note 19. 
417 Given the influence exercised by libertarians on contractarians, it is self evident 
that libertarian ideology implies contractarian ideology as a direct consequence.  See STOUT, 
supra note 7, at 19.  See also supra note 23 (providing sources on the underpinning 
philosophical justification of this argument). 
418 The seminal work is A. Smith, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF 
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776) (using the metaphor of the invisible hand to explain how 
uncoordinated markets reach efficiency). Analytically, Smith’s invisible hand translates into 
the more sophisticated methaphor of the Walrasian auctioneer, according to which markets 
would always be in equilibrium because any disequilibrium would immediately readjust to 
another equilibrium.  See generally, MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 19, at 620-624. 
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Reaganomics embraced the view of shareholders as benevolent mass 
capitalists and managers as an elite selected through competitive market 
mechanisms. This approach fully internalizes the libertarian ideal that 
external governance mechanisms (i.e., the market for corporate control) 
provide the primary mechanisms to improve corporate efficiency,419 while 
internal governance mechanisms (i.e., corporate fiduciary duties) only play a 
residual function.  
With the economic crisis of the late 1980s, the trend reversed.  In 
particular, after the 1987 crash, corporate America came to realize that capital 
markets could destroy welfare.  Corporate scholars began to acknowledge 
that efficiency might not always be the equilibrium outcome under laissez 
faire economic policies. Indeed, the magnitude of the economic losses of the 
time largely exceeded the gains accumulated during prior years—especially if 
one considered the losses experienced by non-shareholders (i.e., bondholders 
                                                
419 External governance mechanisms have traditionally been identified with the sole 
market for corporate control, that is, the control and economic rights that arise from the 
trading of equity interests.  See H. G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate 
Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 112 (1965). In recent years, however, corporate law scholars 
have begun to acknowledge that non-equity holders (i.e., debtholders and holders of hybrid 
financial instruments) also exercise external control over the corporations in specified 
circumstances, such as nearly-insolvent corporations and .the venture capital context.  See, 
e.g., D. G. Baird & R. K. Rasmussen, Essay, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of 
Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1217 (2006).  Note that this is consistent 
with this research’s argument that in some circumstances creditors might be even more 
interested than shareholders in firm performance and therefore are likely to serve as a better 
proxy for overall welfare maximization. 
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and employees) during the takeover era.  With the concerns brought about by 
these events, the egalitarian perspective of communitarians began to reach 
popular consensus.  This perspective challenged the normative conclusions of 
libertarianism by reclaiming a role for non-market institutions (i.e., 
centralized mechanisms), seen as essential to mitigate the externalities 
engendered by private contracting.  Under this view restricting the space of 
contracts is instrumental to redirect the actions of economic agents toward 
more desirable equilibria.  Therefore, communitarians refuse the idea that 
Coasean bargaining always produces efficient outcomes.  They support 
instead the centralized dimension of the Coase theorem, which holds that the 
reallocation of legal entitlements is necessary to pursue efficiency in a world 
of high transaction cost.420  From a corporate fiduciary perspective, the kernel 
of the communitarian proposal consists in enlarging the scope of corporate 
fiduciary duties and delegating the resolution of corporate conflicts to the 
judicial system.  
Nonetheless, the communitarian proposal also turns out to be strongly 
ideological.  Communitarians ground their social model on the undisputed 
assumption that institutions are always superior coordination mechanisms to 
market—exactly the opposite of what contractarians advocate. As applied to 
the corporate fiduciary context, this ideology envisions directors as 
disinterested mediators of multiple corporate instances who pledge their 
personal liability to signal their impartiality. In other terms, directors are 
                                                
420 See supra note 19. 
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viewed almost as social planners, charged with the task of redistributing 
resources among corporate participants to the end of maximizing social 
welfare.  However, communitarians fail to provide clear indications on how 
to operationalize this fiduciary duty model. That is, faced with concrete 
implementation issues, this model emerges as unpractical and difficult to 
administer. 
The vagueness affecting the communitarians’ fiduciary duty model 
produced a new contractarian “offensive” during the economic boom of the 
Clinton era. Neo-contractarians dismantled the communitarian model by 
exposing the so-called too-many master argument. Pursuant to this argument, 
when directors are required to balance the interests of all corporate 
participants, the administration of fiduciary duties becomes so difficult that 
they practically become no duties at all.  Hence, it may become easier for 
directors to justify self-interested conduct on the basis of the alleged benefits 
accruing to one or the other corporate constituency.  
Since the Clinton years, the neo-contractarian paradigm has come to 
be regarded as the “orthodox” view of U.S. corporate fiduciary duties—more, 
I dare to say, because of the ambiguity of the communitarian proposal than 
the inherent validity of the contractarians’ normative propositions.  Under 
these propositions, a bright line is drawn between the remedies respectively 
available to shareholders and non-shareholders to solve horizontal corporate 
conflicts.  Neo-contractarians view such conflicts as the result of contractual 
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incompleteness issues (i.e., costs).421  Indeed, if corporate actors were able to 
specify ex-ante “payoff-relevant actions for every possible state of the world 
and the payoffs for these actions”,422 there would be no room for corporate 
conflicts of any sort.  For neo-contractarians, however, the contractual 
incompleteness costs faced by common shareholders, as residual claimants, is 
much more severe than that faced by other capital providers.423  In order to 
fully protect their interests, shareholders should contractually specify any 
directors’ action, since any such action has an impact on shareholder value 
(i.e., corporate asset value).  But because the corporate decision-making 
process is a continuous process, it is technologically unfeasible to control any 
directorial decision by contract.424   
                                                
421 Among others, incomplete contract costs include (i) bounded rationality costs—
the costs arising “in a complex and highly unpredictable world, [because] it is hard for 
people to think far ahead and to plan for all the various contingencies that may arise”; (ii) 
transaction costs—the costs arising because “even if individual plans can be made, it is hard 
for the contracting parties to negotiate about these plans” and (iii) non verifiability costs,—
the costs arising because  
even if the parties can plan and negotiate about the future, it may be very difficult 
for them to write their plans down in such a way that, in the event of a dispute, an 
outside authority—a court, say—can figure out what these plans mean and enforce 
them. 
See O. HART, FIRMS CONTRACTS AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURES 23 (1995). 
422 A. Schwartz, Incomplete Contracts, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 277 (1998).   
423 See supra Part IV.1.1.3. 
424 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 10, at 338. 
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Other corporate constituencies, instead, are not concerned with 
overall firm performance, but only with the fulfillment of the obligations they 
have bargained for (e.g., for creditors—the repayment of interest and 
principal.) Hence, they only care about a subset of directors’ decisions425 and 
can therefore achieve full protection of their interests by contract. 426  
Therefore, for neo-contractarians the protection of corporate law and 
corporate fiduciary duties should be exclusively reserved to shareholders. 
Non-shareholder interests, instead, should be protected at contract law.  But 
this solution fails to consider that the contract may be as inadequate an 
instrument to protect the interests’ of other corporate constituencies as the 
shareholders’ in some circumstances.  After all, if one brings the incomplete 
contract approach to the extreme, no contract can foresee and specify all 
possible contingencies when a relationship is long-term—as corporate 
relationships are.  This implies that other corporate constituencies may need 
additional protections to secure their investment expectations—including the 
acquisition of positive control rights, the appointment of board designees, and 
even the attribution of corporate fiduciary duties.427  
In this light, the ultimate problem underpinning corporate fiduciary 
                                                
425 See TIROLE, supra note 97, at 47. 
426 See Macey, supra note 212, at 36 (arguing that corporate constituencies other 
than shareholders can “protect themselves against virtually any kind of managerial 
opportunism by retaining negative control over the firm’s operations.”)  
427 See S. Sepe, Divided Loyalty, University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of 
Law working paper (on file with author).  
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law is how to reconcile the ex-ante efficiency of the contractarian model with 
the ex-post efficiency of the communitarian model.  The former model 
promotes ex-ante welfare by providing contracting parties with clear 
parameters as to future corporate actions.  Indeed, the operational mandate of 
the shareholder primacy rule offers the advantage of eliminating uncertainty 
on directors’ ex-post decisions. This safety, however, may come at the 
expense of the production of negative externalities, which parties may be 
unable to fully internalize by contract.  In contrast, the communitarian model 
achieves ex-post efficiency by enabling directors to efficiently “complete” 
corporate contracts as new information materializes. 428   But while this 
approach is alluring from a social planning point of view, it may raise ex-ante 
uncertainty. This is because this model would potentially enable directors to 
trump not only existing fiduciary principles, but also explicit contractual 
provisions.  This uncertainty would most likely result in an increase in the 
participation costs of the various corporate stakeholders—first of all, an 
increase in the cost of capital—with the result of reducing aggregate 
welfare.429 
                                                
428 Mechanism design studies how to elicit information by defining a game or 
mechanism (in applied terms, rules, institution and incentives) that induces the agent to 
truthfully reveal their information so that desirable social goals are implemented. See MAS-
COLELL ET AL., supra note 19, at 857-925. 
429 Potentially, these costs could be so high as to violate the firm’s participation 
constraint (or individual rationality constraint): the property of optimal agency contracts that 
is satisfied when the contract leaves all participants as well of as they would have been if 
they had not participated.  See B. SALANIÉ, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACTS 122 (2d ed. 
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An example may be useful to clarify the consequences that ex-ante 
uncertainty may produce on corporate relationships. Consider the case of an 
entrepreneur that has assets equal to 𝐴 and needs additional capital for an 
amount equal to 𝐾 to implement a project.  The project can yield a gross 
return equal to 𝑅  with probability 𝑝  and 0  with the complementary 
probability (i.e., 1− 𝑝 ).  The implementation of the project requires labor 
force for a cost equal to 𝐿.  Assume also the following: 
(i) The entrepreneur wants to raise equity to finance the project;  
(ii) The equity market is competitive;  
(iii) Both equity and labor providers are paid once the project is 
completed to the extent that cash flows will be available; 
(iv) The project gets financed because it has a positive net present 
value: 𝑝 𝑅 𝐾 + 𝐴 − 𝐿 − 𝐾 − 𝐴 > 0.   
Under this setting in competitive financial markets, in exchange for 𝐾 
the equity holders would ask a fraction of the corporation equal to 𝛼, which, 
in equilibrium, is determined by the following condition: 𝛼 = !!!! ! !!! !! .  
Assume now that at an intermediate stage of production, the directors—under 
the pressure of unions or the incumbent political power—have to decide 
whether to increase the cost of labor from 𝐿 to 𝜃𝐿, with 𝜃 > 1.430  If they do 
that with some positive probability 𝜋 ∈ (0,1], they will decrease the yield of 
                                                                                                                         
2005). 
430 Under a fiduciary system that obligates directors to consider the interest of labor, 
such as the German system, this is a realistic assumption.  See supra note 5.  
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the equity capital.  But if the equity providers anticipate this possibility, they 
will increase the cost of capital by requiring a larger stake (𝛼∗) of the firm.  
More specifically this stake will be determined by the following equation: 𝛼∗ = 1− 𝜋 𝛼 + 𝜋𝛼!!"!, where 𝛼!!"! = !!!! ! !!! !!" > 𝛼. 431 Note that the 
problem is not merely distributional between capital and labor.  Instead, it 
will concern allocative efficiency whenever prospective equity providers 
have some risk aversion or misestimate (i.e., overestimate) 𝜋 and, as a result, 
discount the cost of capital more than it would be required for being 
compensated for possible ex-post wealth expropriations.  
This simple example can be generalized to any kind of horizontal 
conflict between shareholders and other corporate constituencies.  This is 
because ex-ante uncertainty about future distributional outcomes may always 
lead to the reduction of overall welfare—no matter which the involved 
horizontal corporate relationship is.  On this view, the most challenging task 
for future research is devising a normative paradigm that enables directors to 
make ex post efficient decisions, while at the same time minimizing the 
overall cost of capital for corporations (i.e., ex-ante uncertainty).  To this end, 
I argue that selective judicial intervention would be desirable.  This 
intervention should provide corporate actors with a taxonomy of state-
contingent fiduciary duties.  This taxonomy would be useful, on the one 
hand, to guide directors’ ex-post completion of corporate contracts.  On the 
                                                
431 Analytically, that increasing the cost of labor increases also the cost of equity 
capital is immediate from the fact that !"!" > 0. 
Tesi di dottorato di Saura Masconale discussa presso l’Università LUISS Guido Carli. Soggetta a copyright. 
Sono comunque fatti salvi i diritti dell’Università LUISS Guido Carli di riproduzione per scopi di ricerca e 
didattici, con citazione della fonte. 
 
181 
 
other hand, it would enable corporate participants (i.e., both shareholder and 
non-shareholder constituencies) to know ex-ante—and, therefore, properly 
discount—the effects of such decisions on their investment expectations.  For 
example, in this research I have extensively discussed what I termed the 
creditor variant of the corporate fiduciary paradigm. 432   That variant 
challenges the validity of the shareholder primary rule as an operational 
guidepost for directors’ decisions upon specified circumstances.  To this 
extent, it redefines the boundaries of this rule, suggesting the possibility that 
alternative rules (i.e., a creditor primacy rule) may be desirable depending on 
state-contingent conditions.  The much-celebrated 1991 decision of 
Chancellor Allen in Credit Lyonnais moved further along this path, 433 
suggesting that fiduciary duties should shift to creditors “in the vicinity of 
insolvency” and, potentially, even in solvent corporation.434  
Forging ahead in this direction, I suggest that courts should generalize 
the creditor variant approach by identifying circumstances in which negative 
externalities are more likely to arise.  Then, they should prescribe specific 
fiduciary conducts for such circumstances.  A mindset for non-ideological 
inquiry would be the preliminary requirement for the success of this selective 
intervention by courts.  In practice, courts should abandon the ideological 
approaches to corporate fiduciary duties of the past and move to the 
                                                
432 See supra Part V. 
433 See Credit Lyonnais, supra note 34.  
434 See id., at 1155.  
Tesi di dottorato di Saura Masconale discussa presso l’Università LUISS Guido Carli. Soggetta a copyright. 
Sono comunque fatti salvi i diritti dell’Università LUISS Guido Carli di riproduzione per scopi di ricerca e 
didattici, con citazione della fonte. 
 
182 
 
identification of clear parameters (or tests) to articulate such duties.  For 
instance, they should start investigating under what circumstances, if any, 
directors would be allowed to keep a factory plant in place despite potential 
increases in the cost of capital.  Along the same line, it would be desirable 
that they addressed fiduciary issues in situations where directors have private 
information on the potential risks that may arise from firm activity for the 
surrounding community, individual workers, or the public at large.  To offer 
a more tangible example, in the aftermath of the crisis, it emerged that most 
bank directors (i.e., executive directors) were aware of the huge risks 
associated with investments in the remunerative subprime market.435  Thus, 
whether fiduciary law could have played any role in limiting the disastrous 
effects that reckless directorial decisions had on U.S. taxpayers is a non-
trivial normative question.436  
                                                
435 See generally STIGLITZ, SUPRA NOTE 7, at 154 (generally blaming the crisis on 
“poor corporate governance”). The by now infamous of word of Chuck Prince, Citigroup’s 
former CEO, are paradigmatic of the reckless attitude of bank board members before the 
crisis. “When the music stops in terms of liquidity, things will get complicated. But as long 
as the music is playing, you've got to get up and dance. We're still dancing.” See Michiyo 
Nakamoto & David Wighton, Citigroup CEO Stays Bullish on Buy-Outs, FIN. TIMES, Jul. 9, 
2007, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/80e2987a-2e50-11dc-821c-
0000779fd2ac.html#axzz1VSMRJlQb. Chuck Prince notably resigned from his position as 
Citigroup CEO only four months after this declaration, due to the major losses Citigroup 
experienced in the mortgage-backed securities business. See Statement from Citigroup on the 
Resignation of C.E.O. Charles O. Prince III, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2007, available at  
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/05/business/05citi-text.html (last visited on Dec. 10, 
2011). 
436 It is worth observing that one the strongest supporter of the shareholder primacy 
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Corporate actors need certainty in order to optimize actions along a 
strategic dynamic path.  But certainty should not come at the expense of ex-
post inefficiency. Corporate fiduciary law should be rethought so to provide a 
solution to the tradeoff between these two instances.  My suggestion that 
courts should devise state-contingent fiduciary rules is a first attempt to move 
toward this direction. 
 
  
                                                                                                                         
rule, Professor Macey has coauthored an article in which he proposes that  
the duties and obligations of corporate officers and directors should be expanded in 
the special case of banks.  Specifically, directors and officers of banks should be 
charged with a heightened duty to ensure the safety and soundness of these 
enterprises. Their duties should not run exclusively to shareholders. …. Our variant 
calls for bank directors to expand the scope of their fiduciary duties beyond 
shareholders to include creditors. In particular, we call on bank directors to take 
solvency risk explicitly and systematically into account when making decisions, or 
else face personal liability for failure to do so. 
J. R. Macey & M. O’Hara, The Corporate Governance of Banks, ECON. POL’Y REV., April 
2003, at 91.  
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